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S E C R E T

THE 1960 ANNUAL ESTIMATES

VOLUME TWO

POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF THE USSR

AND

THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE STATES

PART II.

THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE STATES

1 December 1959

Prepared by
Air Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington 25, D. C.

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THE 1960 ANNUAL ESTIMATES

VOLUME TWO

PART II. THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE STATES

Table of Contents

	Page
I. Albania	I. 1
A. Introduction	I. 1
B. Communist Party	I. 2
1. Growth in Membership	I. 3
2. Distribution and Composition	I. 4
3. Organization	I. 6
a. Central Party Organs	I. 7
b. Lower-Level Party Organs	I. 10
C. Government	I. 13
1. Central Government	I. 14
2. Local Government	I. 19
3. Administrative-Territorial Divisions	I. 22
D. Economic Administration	I. 23
1. Centralized Planning and Control	I. 24
2. Industrial Administration	I. 26
3. Agricultural Administration	I. 28
E. Control Force	I. 29
II. Bulgaria	II. 1
A. Introduction	II. 1
B. Communist Party	II. 2
1. Growth	II. 3
2. Distribution and Composition	II. 4
3. Organization	II. 6
a. Central Party Organs	II. 7
b. Lower-Level Party Organs	II. 12
C. Government	II. 15
1. National Government	II. 15
2. Local Government	II. 18
D. Economic Administration	II. 23
1. Centralized Planning and Control	II. 24
2. Industrial Administration	II. 26
3. Agricultural Administration	II. 28
E. Control Force	II. 29

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

		Page
III.	Czechoslovakia	III. 1
	A. Introduction	III. 1
	B. Communist Party	III. 3
	1. Growth	III. 3
	2. Distribution	III. 5
	3. Composition	III. 6
	4. Organization	III. 9
	a. Central Party Organs	III. 9
	b. Slovak Party Organs	III. 12
	c. Lower-Level Party Organs	III. 13
	C. Government	III. 16
	1. National Government	III. 16
	2. Slovak Government	III. 21
	3. Local Government	III. 23
	4. Administrative-Territorial Divisions	III. 27
	D. Economic Administration	III. 30
	1. Centralized Planning and Control	III. 31
	2. Industrial Administration	III. 33
	3. Agricultural Administration	III. 36
	E. Control Force	III. 40
IV.	East Germany	IV. 1
	A. Introduction	IV. 1
	B. Socialist Unity Party	IV. 3
	1. Membership of SED	IV. 4
	a. Growth in Membership	IV. 4
	b. Regional Distribution of Membership	IV. 5
	c. Occupational Composition of Membership	IV. 6
	d. Age and Sex Composition of SED	IV. 7
	2. Organization of the SED	IV. 8
	a. National Organization of the SED	IV. 9
	(1) The Politburo	IV. 12
	(2) Secretariat	IV. 13
	(3) Central Committee	IV. 13
	(4) Central Audit Commission	IV. 14
	(5) Central Control Commission	IV. 14
	(6) National Party Congress	IV. 14
	b. Intermediate Organization of the SED	IV. 15
	(1) Buro	IV. 15
	(2) Secretariat	IV. 16
	(3) Party Committee	IV. 17
	(4) Audit Commission	IV. 17
	(5) Control Commission	IV. 18
	(6) Party Conference	IV. 18
	c. Primary Party Organizations of SED	IV. 18
	d. Trends in SED	IV. 19
	C. Civil Government	IV. 19
	1. National Government	IV. 20
	a. Presidium of the Council of Ministers	IV. 20
	b. Council of Ministers	IV. 23
	c. Legislative Assembly	IV. 24

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

	Page
2. Intermediate Levels of Government	IV. 25
a. Council	IV. 25
b. Assembly	IV. 28
c. Standing Commissions	IV. 28
3. Communal Administration	IV. 29
4. East Berlin Administration	IV. 30
a. East Berlin Magistrat	IV. 30
b. East Berlin Legislature	IV. 32
c. Standing Commissions	IV. 32
5. Judicial System	IV. 33
6. Administrative-Territorial Organization	IV. 34
D. Economic System	IV. 35
1. Industrial Control	IV. 36
2. Agricultural Control	IV. 41
E. Control Force	IV. 43
V. Hungary	V. 1
A. Introduction	V. 1
B. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	V. 2
1. Membership	V. 4
a. Total Membership	V. 4
b. Regional Distribution of Membership	V. 5
c. Occupational Composition	V. 5
d. Age-Sex Composition of Membership	V. 6
2. Organization of the Hungarian Workers' Party	V. 7
a. National Organization	V. 7
(1) Political Committee	V. 7
(2) Secretariat	V. 8
(3) Central Committee	V. 8
(4) Central Control Committee	V. 10
(5) Central Audit Committee	V. 10
(6) Party Congress	V. 11
b. Intermediate Levels of Party Organization	V. 11
(1) Executive Committee	V. 11
(2) Secretariat	V. 12
(3) Party Committee	V. 12
(4) Control Committee	V. 13
(5) Auditing Committee	V. 13
(6) Party Conference	V. 13
3. Primary Party Organization	V. 13
4. Trends in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	V. 14
C. Government	V. 16
1. National Government	V. 16
a. Council of Ministers	V. 16
b. Presidential Council	V. 18
c. National Assembly	V. 19
d. Central People's Control Committee	V. 19
2. Intermediate Administration	V. 19
a. Executive Committee	V. 20
b. Council	V. 20
c. Control Committee	V. 23
d. Permanent Committees	V. 23

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

		Page
	3. Local Administration	V. 23
	a. Township Executive Committee	V. 24
	b. Township Council	V. 24
	c. Permanent Committees	V. 24
	4. Administrative-Territorial Divisions	V. 25
D.	Economic Administration	V. 26
	1. Industrial Control	V. 28
	2. Agricultural Control	V. 30
E.	Control Force	V. 33
VI.	Poland	VI. 1
A.	Introduction	VI. 1
B.	The Polish United Workers' Party	VI. 3
	1. Growth	VI. 3
	2. Organization	VI. 5
	a. Basic Party Organization	VI. 6
	b. Intermediate Party Organizations	VI. 7
	c. National Party Organization	VI. 8
	(1) Party Congress	VI. 8
	(2) Central Auditing Commission	VI. 10
	(3) Central Committee	VI. 10
	(4) Central Control Commission	VI. 11
	(5) The Politburo and Secretariat	VI. 12
	3. Distribution and Composition	VI. 14
C.	Government	VI. 18
	1. The National Government	VI. 18
	a. The Sejm	VI. 18
	b. The Council of State	VI. 19
	c. The Council of Ministers	VI. 20
	d. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers	VI. 23
	2. Provincial and Local Government	VI. 24
	a. People's Councils	VI. 25
	b. Presidium of People's Councils	VI. 26
	c. Departments of People's Councils	VI. 27
	3. Administrative-Territorial Divisions	VI. 30
D.	Economic Administration	VI. 32
	1. State Planning Commission	VI. 34
	2. Ministry of Finance and State Bank	VI. 35
	3. Industrial Administration	VI. 36
	4. Agricultural Administration	VI. 39
E.	Control Force	VI. 42
VII.	Rumania	VII. 1
A.	Introduction	VII. 1
B.	Rumanian Workers' Party	VII. 3
	1. Growth in Membership	VII. 4
	2. Distribution of the Party	VII. 5
	3. Organization of the Party	VII. 6

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

		Page
a.	National Party Agencies	VII. 9
	(1) The Politburo	VII. 9
	(2) Secretariat	VII. 9
	(3) Party Control Commission	VII. 11
	(4) Central Committee	VII. 11
	(5) The Central Auditing Commission	VII. 12
	(6) Party Congress	VII. 12
b.	Intermediate Party Agencies	VII. 13
c.	Local Party Agencies	VII. 14
C.	Government	VII. 16
1.	Central Government	VII. 17
a.	The Council of Ministers	VII. 17
b.	Ministries and Ministerial Agencies	VII. 20
c.	The Grand National Assembly	VII. 21
d.	Presidium of the Grand National Assembly	VII. 22
2.	Regiune and Local Government	VII. 22
a.	People's Councils	VII. 25
b.	Executive Committees of People's Councils	VII. 26
c.	Special and Functional Sections of Executive Committees	VII. 27
D.	Economic Administration	VII. 29
1.	Central Economic Agencies	VII. 30
2.	Industrial Administration	VII. 31
3.	Agricultural Administration	VII. 33
E.	Control Force	VII. 36

Tables

Number		
	Albania	
I. 1	Growth of the Albanian Workers' Party: 1945-1960	I. 4
I. 2	Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Albania: 1960	I. 22
I. 3	Composition of the Albanian Control Force: 1960	I. 30
	Bulgaria	
II. 1	Growth of the Bulgarian Communist Party: 1946-1960	II. 3
II. 2	Social/Occupational (?) Composition of the Bulgarian Communist Party: 1954-1958	II. 5
II. 3	Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Bulgaria: 1960	II. 21
II. 4	Bulgarian Control Force: 1960	II. 30
	Czechoslovakia	
III. 1	Growth of the Czechoslovak Communist Party: 1946-1960	III. 4
III. 2	Occupational Composition of the Czechoslovak Communist Party: 1960	III. 7
III. 3	Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Czechoslovakia: January 1960	III. 28
III. 4	Composition of the Czechoslovak Control Force: 1960	III. 41

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Number		Page
	East Germany	
IV. 1	Membership of SED: 1946-1960	IV. 6
IV. 2	Occupational Composition of SED Membership: 1950, 1958	IV. 7
IV. 3	Age Composition of SED Membership: 1958	IV. 8
IV. 4	Administrative Territorial Divisions: East Germany	IV. 34
IV. 5	East German Control Force: 1960	IV. 45
	Hungary	
V. 1	Membership of Hungarian Workers' Party: 1947-1960	V. 4
V. 2	Occupational/Social Origin (?) Composition of Membership of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: June 1959	V. 6
V. 3	Hungary: Administrative-Territorial Divisions: 1960	V. 25
V. 4	Hungarian Control Force: 1960	V. 35
	Poland	
VI. 1	Growth of the Polish United Workers' Party: 1946-1960	VI. 5
VI. 2	Distribution of the Polish United Workers' Party Administrative Division: 1960	VI. 16
VI. 3	Social Composition of the Polish United Workers' Party: 1948-1959	VI. 16
VI. 4	Alphabetical List of Administrative Divisions of the Polish People's Republic and their Control Centers: 1960	VI. 31
VI. 5	Composition of the Polish Control Force: 1960	VI. 43
	Rumania	
VII. 1	Growth of the Rumanian Workers' Party: 1944-1960	VII. 4
VII. 2	Distribution of Rumanian Workers' Party by Selected Administrative Divisions: 1960	VII. 6
VII. 3	Alphabetical List of Administrative Divisions of the Rumanian People's Republic and their Control Centers: 1960	VII. 23
VII. 4	Rumanian Control Force	VII. 37

Figures

	Albania	
I. 1	Organization of Central Apparatus of Albanian Workers' Party	I. 9
I. 2	Organization of the Albanian Workers' Party and Government	I. 15
I. 3	Composition of the Albanian Council of Ministers	I. 16
I. 4	Composition of Typical Rreth (District) Government	I. 21

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Number		Page
	Bulgaria	
II. 1	Organization of Bulgarian Communist Party and Government	II. 8
II. 2	Central Party Organs: 1960	II. 10
II. 3	Composition of Bulgarian Council of Ministers: 1960	II. 17
II. 4	Composition of Typical Local Government: 1959	II. 20
	Czechoslovakia	
III. 1	Organization of Central Apparatus of Czechoslovak Communist Party: 1960	III. 11
III. 2	Organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Government	III. 18
III. 3	Composition of Czechoslovak Cabinet (Council of Ministers)	III. 20
III. 4	Composition of Slovak Board of Commissioners	III. 22
III. 5	Composition of Typical Kraj (Regional) Government	III. 25
III. 6	Composition of Typical Okres (District) Government	III. 26
	East Germany	
IV. 1	Interrelations of Party and Government: East Germany	IV. 10
IV. 2	Central Apparatus of the SED: 1960	IV. 11
IV. 3	East German Council of Ministers: 1960	IV. 21
IV. 4	East German Provincial (Bezirk) Government: 1960	IV. 26
IV. 5	East German District (Kreis) Government: 1960	IV. 27
IV. 6	East Berlin Government (Magistrat): 1960	IV. 31
IV. 7	Industrial Subordination in East Germany: 1960	IV. 39
	Hungary	
V. 1	Hungarian Party-Governmental Interrelationships	V. 9
V. 2	Hungarian Council of Ministers: 1960	V. 17
V. 3	County (Megye) Administration: 1960	V. 21
V. 4	District (Jaras) Administration: 1960	V. 22
	Poland	
VI. 1	Organization of Central Apparatus of Polish United Workers' Party	VI. 9
VI. 2	Composition of Polish Council of Ministers: January 1960	VI. 21
VI. 3	Composition of Typical Voivodship Government: 1960	VI. 28
VI. 4	Composition of Typical County Government: 1960	VI. 29
VI. 5	Industrial Subordination in Poland: 1960	VI. 37

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

Number		Page
	Rumania	
VII. 1	Organization of Rumanian Workers' Party and Government: 1960	VII. 8
VII. 2	Organization of Central Apparatus of Rumanian Workers' Party: January 1960	VII. 10
VII. 3	Composition of Rumanian Council of Ministers: January 1960	VII. 19
VII. 4	Organization of Typical Regiune Government: January 1960	VII. 24
VII. 5	Economic Subordination in Rumanian People's Republic: 1960	VII. 34

Map

Administrative-Territorial Divisions of the European Satellites . . . . . Back Pocket

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

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Volume Two, Part II

I. Albania

A. Introduction

Since the end of 1944, when German occupation forces withdrew from the country, Albania has been controlled by a Communist dictatorship exercised by the Albanian Workers' Party under the aegis of the USSR, and dedicated to establishment of a "socialist" society and industrialization of the economy regardless of the desires of the population.

The strengths of the Albanian regime lie in the cohesiveness of the top leadership, its firm control over the apparatuses of coercion and persuasion, and the reluctance of most people to oppose the system out of fear for themselves and their families. The power of the Communists has so far not been shaken by the country's economic maladjustment. Discontent among the population in the form of active, organized resistance practically disappeared around 1953. Passive resistance, however, usually manifesting itself in slowdowns and deliberate negligence and abuse of state property, appears to be widespread.

Despite its economic failures and lack of popular support, the Albanian regime appears stable. Its 2 top leaders, Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and Premier Mehmet Shehu, have successfully collaborated in wielding absolute authority since 1948. They have quickly eliminated all persons within the Party capable of leading a movement against them. The abject loyalty of these leaders to the Kremlin can be attributed less to ideology than to awareness that the country is surrounded by hostile neighbors and the belief that it could not exist for any length of time without the political, economic, and military assistance of Moscow. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy had political and territorial designs on Albania even before the advent of communism in Albania. The regime contends that only Soviet friendship and power

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have kept Albania independent. Yugoslav encroachment has been most feared and most vehemently attacked by the regime, which apparently receives some popular support for its anti-Yugoslav policy.

The process of de-Stalinization, which went quite far in certain other satellite countries, has affected neither the stability of the regime nor the firmly entrenched position of the top leaders. The reluctance of the leaders with regard to de-Stalinization seems to stem largely from their determination to retain power and their awareness that false moves might jeopardize it. Moreover, the pressure of popular discontent has not been sufficient to force major concessions. The Communists have not had to contend with a well-developed political consciousness among Albanians, who lack a tradition of intellectual activity and have had no real experience with political liberty.

B. Communist Party

Founded in November 1941 by Tito's emissaries and sanctioned by the Comintern, the Albanian Communist Party was, until June 1948, an appendage of the Yugoslav Communist Party (at that time its name was changed to Workers' Party of Albania). When Tito broke with the Cominform and Albania sided with the latter, direct control of the Albanian Party was vested in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which supervises it and issues directives through its own Party representative in the Central Committee of the Albanian Party.

All political power in Albania is exercised by the Workers' Party through its subordinate bodies, governmental institutions, and the Democratic Front and other mass organizations under its control; no independent political organization is allowed to exist and any attempt to form one is regarded as treason. The Albanian Constitution provides that all power belongs to the workers and peasants and is exercised through locally elected governmental bodies--the people's councils;

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in reality, however, power is concentrated in the hands of the top Party leadership--currently exercised jointly by Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, and Mehmet Shehu, Premier of the Council of Ministers since July 1954. They control the Political Bureau (Politburo), the supreme policymaking organ of the Party which makes every important decision, political, governmental, economic, military, or cultural, without seeking the consent of the people at large, their representative bodies, or even Party members. A system of interlocking memberships in the directing bodies of Party, government, and mass organizations insures that all follow Party policy.

The Party as a whole has not displayed a marked ideological conviction judging from frequent official complaints about members who joined the Party for private gain, who are virtually ignorant of Marxist ideology and do not care to study it, and who display general indifference toward the policies and problems of the Party. Despite these ideological weaknesses, however, the Party machine is well entrenched. The principle of "democratic centralism" has given the Party hierarchy complete authority; once it has taken a decision all must observe it without dissent. Lower Party units may question the ways in which policy is implemented but not the policy itself. Thanks to a loyal secret police, Party leaders have been able to rule the Party rank and file with practically the same ruthless methods they have used against the rest of the population.

1. Growth in Membership

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Workers' Party of Albania totaled 55,000, or about 3.5 per cent of the total population of the country (see Table I. 1). Since its formation in November 1941 by emissaries of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the Albanian Party has experienced periods of rise and fall in membership, reflecting the

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Table I. 1

Growth of the Albanian Workers' Party: 1945-1960

Year	Party Members	Number per 1,000 Total Population
1945	10,558	9.5
1948	48,382	41.6
1952	44,418	35.0
1956	48,644	34.2
1960	55,000	34.7

adjustments of Party leaders to changing foreign and domestic situations.

When the German forces withdrew from Albania in late 1944, Party membership totaled 2,800; by early 1945 it had risen to 10,558. The greatest increase in membership occurred in the 1945-1948 period, when Party ranks grew at an average annual rate of 66 per cent. At this time many Albanians were influenced by the Communist promises or believed that their socio-economic status would be improved by becoming Party members. Although about 12,000 members were purged in the 1948-1952 period, the drop in membership amounted only to about 4,000 as many new members were accepted. During both the 1948-1952 and 1952-1956 periods (the periods between Party Congresses) the Party has stressed quality rather than numbers; in the latter period no known mass screenings or purges took place but a number of individuals were dropped or purged. Party membership grew at an average annual rate of 2.4 per cent from 1952 to 1956 and in 1956 was approximately the same as in 1948. Since 1956 it is estimated that Party ranks have maintained a moderate rate of growth of about 3.3 per cent per year.

2. Distribution and Composition

The Albanian regime has thus far failed to publish any data pertaining to the distribution of Party membership by administrative-territorial divisions. It is presumed that the distribution pattern is

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similar to that in the Soviet Union. Party membership is concentrated in urbanized and industrialized areas and in areas housing important government control agencies. In general, the incidence of Party membership is highest in Tirane Rreth (district) and in other rreths in the central and eastern parts of the country; the northern and southeastern rreths have the lowest incidences.

The area of Party recruitment was originally confined generally to southern and central Albania, particularly the former, which was the main field of action of the Communist-controlled partisan forces during World War II and from which most of the Communist leaders derived. By the end of 1944, when the Communists gained control of Albania, the Party had made very little, if any, headway among the conservative, tribal Gegs in the north, and nearly all its membership at that time was confined to the more liberal-minded Tosks in the south. Since the end of the war, members have been recruited in the north among the poor peasants and workers, but a high percentage of the total current membership is still believed to derive chiefly from southern and central Albania. Indeed, all the present full members of the Politburo derive from these 2 zones. In view of these circumstances, an undercurrent of resentment is probably felt by the Gegs against the Tosks. The Greek minority in Albania, numbering some 35,000 people all residing in the south, is well represented in the higher Party echelons.

Statistical vagueness on the part of the regime prevents a definitive breakdown of the occupational or social composition of Party membership. Apparently, the correct social composition is attained only when workers predominate and other groups are represented on a more or less "profile" basis. At the time of the Third Party Congress in 1956, only 17.7 per cent (8,610) of the total Party membership were workers; peasants represented 31.4 per cent (15,274), state and Party employees

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45.2 per cent (21,987), and tradesmen, artisans, and professional people 5.7 per cent (2,773) of total Party membership. In the 4 years between the Second and Third Party Congresses, a period of constant agitation and propaganda to recruit workers, the Party increased the number of members who were workers by only 6.2 per cent, evidence of little enthusiasm or support for the regime among this group. During the 1956 Party Congress, Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha expressed dissatisfaction over the small percentage of workers in the Party and urged priority for worker applicants. At the same time, it was reported that 40 per cent of all Party members were engaged in administrative work. In order to stem the growth of bureaucracy in the Party, Party organizations were called upon to further raise membership requirements for civil service applicants.

3. Organization

The Workers' Party of Albania is organized according to the administrative-territorial divisions of the country. There is a central apparatus in Tirane and subordinate rreth (district) and city organizations. At the lowest level are the basic Party organizations, established in all enterprises, villages, military units, institutions, and other work centers where there are not less than 3 Party members. Each level is substantially similar to the others in organization, with a representative body which theoretically is its leadership and an executive agency to do the real work.

The organization and operation of the Party is based on the concept of "democratic centralism." According to the Party Statutes it is defined as follows: election of all guiding bodies from the lowest to the highest; periodic reporting by Party agencies to their electors; strict Party discipline with the subordination of the minority to the majority; and compulsory compliance of lower bodies with the

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decisions of higher ones. Only the latter principle is carried out as stated. In practice, the leaders choose the candidates for office and the members approve them automatically, the reporting by Party agencies to their electors is either disregarded or done only for some specific purpose, and the majority is completely subordinate to the minority. This type of Party organization, characterized by strict hierarchical subordination, tends to ensure the immediate and effective execution of policies decided by the leaders while giving the appearance of democratic control.

a. Central Party Organs

Under the Party Statutes, revised in 1956 to bring them closer to the statutes of the Soviet Communist Party, the Political Bureau (Politburo) stands at the apex of the Party pyramid. Composed of 9 members and 6 candidate members, it commands a position of unquestioned ascendancy in the Party. As the top governing organ, the Politburo decides policy not only for the Party but also for the country as a whole in every phase of political, economic, and social life. Its members are the dominant figures in Albania and 6 of them (4 members and 2 candidate members) hold key governmental positions. The Premier and 3 First Vice Premiers of the Council of Ministers are members, while one of the 2 Vice Premiers and the Minister of Industry and Mines are candidate members of the Politburo. Although formally elected by the Party Central Committee, Politburo members are coopted, and the Central Committee merely ratifies the choices of the incumbents.

The day-to-day administration of the Party is in the hands of the powerful Secretariat and the central Party apparatus which it controls. Next to the Politburo, the Secretariat is the most important Party agency and the only body with any real authority. The Secretariat, appointed by the Politburo and then "elected" by the Central Committee,

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is presently made up of 5 members, of whom 4 (including First Secretary Enver Hoxha) are members and one is a candidate member of the Politburo. First Secretary Hoxha, the most powerful single person in Albania, has held his dominant position since 1941. Since 1954 Secretariat members have not been permitted to hold office in the Council of Ministers. Hoxha thus relinquished the premiership to Politburo member, Mehmet Shehu, in order to remain First Secretary. Each of the 5 secretaries oversees the work of one or more of the directorates and sections (see Figure I. 1) which comprise the central Party apparatus. Through this apparatus the Secretariat controls the activities of subordinate secretariats in rreth and city Party organizations.

The Central Control Commission, formally appointed by the Party Central Committee but actually chosen by the Politburo, is the organ charged with maintaining Party discipline. It fixes responsibility for betrayal of the Party and violations of the Party program and statutes and Party and state discipline, and it reviews appeals against decisions of lower Party organizations regarding punishments. It is currently composed of 9 members.

According to the Party Statutes, the chief executive and administrative agency of the Party is the Central Committee. It is ostensibly elected by the nominally supreme Party Congress and theoretically directs all activities of the Party between congresses. Despite its vast statutory authority, the Central Committee does not have any real power. The large size of the Central Committee (65), when coupled with the fact that its meetings are held infrequently (every 4 months), indicates that its significance is largely honorific. Nonetheless, individual members are politically influential. Twenty are known to hold important positions in the national government and 5 at lower levels. With the exception of the Ministers of Justice and Finance,

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FIGURE I.1

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL APPARATUS OF ALBANIAN WORKERS' PARTY



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all 12 ministers are full (9) or candidate (one) members of the Central Committee.

The Central Auditing Commission controls the promptness and accuracy of the handling of affairs in the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and takes care of the Party's funds. Although chosen by the Party Congress, the Auditing Commission is responsible to the Central Committee. It has no political significance.

Under the Statutes, the highest body of the Albanian Workers' Party is the Party Congress, which meets every 4 years and is made up of delegates elected by rreth and certain city Party conferences. As a collective body the congress hears and approves the reports of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, adopts and amends the bylaws of the Party, and establishes the line of the Party on basic questions of current policy. It also elects the members of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission. Actually the congress has no real power to determine Party policy and merely rubber stamps major policy pronouncements and appointments made by top Party leaders in the Politburo.

b. Lower-Level Party Organs

Below the national level, the pattern of Party organization reflects and parallels the governmental structure. Twenty-six rreth Party organizations and the Party organization of the capital city of Tirane are responsible to the central apparatus. Below the rreth level there are 38 city Party organizations, all of which are controlled by the appropriate rreth organizations. Below the rreth and city levels are more than 2,600 basic Party organizations which form the base of the Party pyramid.

According to the Party Statutes, the highest bodies of each rreth and city Party organization are the Party Conference and,

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when the conference is not in session, the committee, the counterpart of the national Central Committee. Regular conferences are to be called by the appropriate committees once a year; the fact that the conferences are elected by Party members on the next lower level gives the appearance of democratic control but actually, because of strict Party discipline, the control comes from above. No Party committee may refuse or even question orders given by higher authorities or reject an official nominated from above. The principal functions of the conferences are to elect their committees and auditing commissions and to hear and ratify the reports of these committees. The rreth conferences and the Tirane city conference directly responsible to the Central Committee elect the delegates to the Party Congress.

Each rreth and city Party committee elects an executive agency, called the bureau, consisting of not more than 11 members. The first secretary, who is the key Communist and overall political boss of the committee, and one or more secretaries are chosen from these members, but approved by the rreth Party committee or by the Party's Central Committee. A plenum of the rreth or city committee is called at least once every 2 months; such plenums, however, do not exercise any real power and are held merely to give formal approval to local programs and policies presented by the first secretary.

The functions of rreth and city Party committees parallel those of the Party's Central Committee. They assure the execution of Party directives, organize educational courses for Communists, administer the Party's fiscal affairs, control the governmental bodies and mass organizations at their level through Party groups formed in them, and organize and approve the formation of the Party's basic organizations.

At the base of the Party pyramid are more than 2,600 basic Party organizations, serving as the link between the working masses of

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cities and villages and the governing bodies of the Party. It is at this level that the policies of the Party are carried out and new members are recruited. These organizations are established in all villages, production enterprises, military units, offices and other work centers where there are not less than 3 Party members.

Basic Party organizations which have 50 or more members may create smaller Party organizations in units or work sections when necessary, but only with the approval of the appropriate rreth or city Party committee. Basic organizations with fewer than 50 members, as well as smaller Party organizations in units or work sections, may form Party groups based on work sectors or work brigades. With the approval of the Party Central Committee, the largest basic organizations (those with 150 or more members) may create Party committees, which serve as executive bodies.

For the guidance and control of the daily work of the basic organization with a membership of less than 15, a secretary and one or 2 assistant secretaries are elected. Basic organizations having 15 or more Party members elect a bureau composed of 3-10 members who, in turn, elect a secretary and one or 2 assistant secretaries from among themselves. The secretaries of the basic Party organizations are approved by the bureau of the rreth or city Party committee, or by the Central Committee.

The Party Statutes assign numerous and broad duties to the basic organizations. They are responsible for agitation and organizational work among the masses for the implementation of Party policies; recruitment of new members into the Party and their political education; mobilization of the masses in economic enterprises and farms for the fulfillment of production plans and maintenance of labor and state

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discipline; elimination of corruption, bureaucracy, and inefficiency in economic enterprises and on farms; and active participation in the political, economic, and cultural life of the country.

C. Government

The present governmental system in Albania is an imitation of the type of government in the USSR; it is completely subservient to the dictates of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party, which in turn is responsive to the orders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The constitution provides for the division of all governmental power into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In actuality, power is concentrated in the Workers' Party, which is above all governmental agencies and has absolute authority over every phase of life in Albania. All important decisions are made by the Party leadership and then passed on to the appropriate agencies for approval. Thus, the 3 branches of the government serve merely as executive and administrative bodies of the Party.

Within the government, only the Premier, 3 First Vice Premiers, and 2 Vice Premiers possess any real authority. The powers of these top executives stem largely from their high Party positions; except for one Vice Premier, all are members or candidate members of the Political Bureau (Politburo), the most powerful body in the country. The People's Assembly and its Presidium, which together comprise the state legislature, have no authority to modify actions of the executive. The units of local government--the people's councils whose members are popularly "elected"--merely implement the directives of the central executive agencies. The judiciary exists primarily to impose "class justice."

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1. Central Government

The major legal entities responsible for control of the central government are, in order of importance, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, the People's Assembly, and the Supreme Court. Operating entirely within the framework set by the Albanian Workers' Party, these organizations direct and coordinate virtually all activities within Albania.

The Council of Ministers, called the most important executive and administrative agency in the country, is nominally appointed and recalled by the People's Assembly and is accountable to the Assembly or its Presidium when the Assembly is not in session. Actually, the Council of Ministers is chosen by the central Party apparatus, and its main function is to make sure that all Party decisions are carried out by the central and lower governmental units. It is comprised of a Premier, 3 First Vice Premiers, 2 Vice Premiers, ministers, and heads of special agencies. Nearly all members of the Council of Ministers are also members of the Party's Central Committee. Moreover, Premier Mehmet Shehu and 4 of his 5 deputies are members or candidate members of the Politburo of the Party. Next to Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha, who holds no position in the government, they constitute the most powerful group in Albania, the point at which the highest levels of the Party and government are fused (see Figure I. 2). The current organizational structure of the Council of Ministers includes 12 ministries and 3 specialized agencies whose heads have ministerial rank (see Figure I. 3). In addition, there are various commissions and agencies not part of the Council of Ministers but directly subordinate to it. Among these are the State Arbitration Commission and the Higher Commission on Examinations.

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FIGURE I.2

ORGANIZATION OF THE ALBANIAN WORKERS' PARTY AND GOVERNMENT



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FIGURE I.3

COMPOSITION OF THE ALBANIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS



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The acts of the Council of Ministers, which cover all political, economic, social, cultural, and military activities in the country, are binding on all government agencies. Nominally, the council acts on the basis of the constitution and the laws in force, issuing decrees and regulations and supervising their execution. In practice, nearly all important decrees and decisions are issued jointly in the name of the Party's Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers controls the entire state administrative and economic apparatus directly through its ministries and special agencies. Each minister issues orders and directives within his competence on the basis of and in execution of laws, decrees, and regulations and controls their execution. He also has the right to suspend or annul orders and directives of subordinate institutions and organs of the ministry when these are not in accordance with the laws or orders of the government or the ministry. While little information is available on the organizational structure of the ministries, the following subdivisions, listed in descending order, are known to exist to varying extents: directorates, bureaus, branches, and sections. The number of directorates, which are actually the operational subdivisions of the ministries and agencies, varies according to the scope of their activities. Directorates are divided into bureaus, branches, and sections; some bureaus and branches, however, are independent of directorates but similarly subdivided.

The Presidium of the People's Assembly, composed of a president (not the same as the president of the assembly), 3 vice presidents, one secretary, and 10 members, is nominally elected by the assembly and responsible to it for its activities. Theoretically, it exercises all the authority of the assembly during the 6-month intervals between

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assembly sessions. The Presidium's impressive list of powers stands in contrast to its actual complete subservience to the Party. The main function it performs in reality is that of passing legislation introduced by the Party between sessions of the assembly.

The People's Assembly, the unicameral Albanian legislature, is constitutionally the most important government agency. In practice, it is essentially a policy-ratifying and propagating device of the Council of Ministers. All candidates for the People's Assembly are hand picked by the Party and presented to the people, who then "elect" them on the basis of one deputy to every 8,000 citizens. The assembly elects a president, vice president, secretary, and 4 permanent commissions: Budget, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and Credentials. In addition to amending the constitution, the assembly nominally approves the state budget, creates, abolishes, merges, and renames ministries, and approves decrees issued by its Presidium. Actually, little is done by the assembly at its short, infrequent (twice a year) sessions; after reviewing draft laws briefly it adopts them unanimously.

The Albanian Supreme Court, the highest judicial agency in the country, serves as the legal arm of the central executive. Its judges are elected by the People's Assembly for a term of 4 years. Like all lower courts, the Supreme Court is an agency of the state, and its actions must be coordinated with those of the government and Party. Although it has both original and appellate jurisdiction, the constitutionality of laws and governmental orders is dealt with not by the Court, but by the Presidium of the People's Assembly. The interpretation of the law, for all practical purposes, is the prerogative of the Prosecutor General. He is guided in all his actions by the Central Committee of the Party, which determines his "appointment" and may recall him if he disobeys the instructions of the Party.

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2. Local Government

Local government in Albania is based on a 3-level system of people's councils--rreth (district), localitet (locality), and fshat (village)--which exercise governmental authority over areas corresponding to administrative-territorial divisions. A fourth level, the qark (region), was eliminated during a February 1958 reorganization of the Administrative apparatus, intended primarily to reduce the bureaucracy. City people's councils may rank as rreth, localitet, or fshat councils, while ward councils in certain cities rank as fshat councils. Although theoretically autonomous, people's councils are essentially local agencies of the central government. In practice, the councils and their executive committees must follow the directives not only of higher governmental bodies, but also of local and central Party organizations. This, coupled with the detail of national legislation and directives by which the councils are bound, leaves little room for local initiative. Local governmental authorities, however, are held responsible for the fulfillment of practically all plans in the political, economic, and cultural fields.

Members of the people's councils at all levels are "elected" by the citizens for 3 years from candidate lists issued in the name of the Democratic Front but originally prepared by the Albanian Workers' Party. The "electors" have the right to recall people's councils and their members. Except in the villages, regular meetings of the councils are called by the respective executive committees: those in rreths and in the city of Tirane, where the council has the status of a rreth, meet once every 2 months; localitet, other city, and city ward councils meet once a month; and those of villages, twice a month.

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Each people's council at each level elects an executive committee, which is in continuous session and is the real depository of administrative and executive power in its area. The executive committee is comprised of a president, his deputies, and, except in villages, various section heads who manage the activities of the local administration (see Figure I. 4). Many of these persons also hold important posts in local Party organizations. Moreover, "Party groups" attached to the executive committee and consisting of all Communists there employed further ensure Party control. The chief task of an executive committee is to supervise all economic, social, and cultural affairs of local significance in accordance with higher governmental directives. It coodinates the work of its sections, directs and controls local enterprises and state properties within the area of jurisdiction of the people's council, and directs and controls the work of people's councils at lower levels and under the territorial jurisdiction of its council.

Executive committees are subordinate nominally both to their respective councils, to higher-level executive committees, and ultimately to the central government. Subordination of an executive committee to its people's council, appears to be never realized in practice. Subordination to superior executive committees and the central government, on the other hand, is actually realized in practice. The central government and higher-level executive committees have the right to abrogate measures of lower-level executive committees. Furthermore, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, at the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, may dissolve an executive committee and arrange for the election of a new one. The sections, created to help the executive committee carry out its administrative work, are only

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FIGURE I.4

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL RRETH (DISTRICT) GOVERNMENT



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nominally attached to it and actually are supervised by the ministries and other agencies of the central government.

3. Administrative-Territorial Divisions

At the present time, Albania is divided into 27 rreths (districts), including one for the city of Tirane (see Table I. 2 and Map I.). Rreths are subdivided into 217 localitets (localities) and 15 cities of rreth subordination. Localitets control the activities of the smaller cities and towns and approximately 2,600 fshats (villages), the smallest territorial units. The larger cities are subdivided into wards.

Table I. 2

Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Albania: 1960

Administrative Division	Control Center	Coordinates	
		Latitude	Longitude
Berat R.[1/]	Berat	40 - 42	19 - 56
Durres R.	Durres	41 - 20	19 - 25
Elbasan R.	Elbasan	41 - 06	20 - 04
Erseke R.	Erseke	40 - 20	20 - 40
Fier R.	Fier	40 - 43	19 - 34
Gjinokaster R.	Gjinokaster	40 - 05	20 - 10
Gramsh R.	Gramsh	40 - 52	20 - 10
Korce R.	Korce	40 - 37	20 - 46
Kruje R.	Kruje	41 - 31	19 - 48
Kukes R.	Kukes	42 - 05	20 - 24
Lezh R.	Lezh	41 - 47	19 - 39
Librazhd R.	Librazhd	41 - 12	20 - 21
Lushnje R.	Lushnje	40 - 56	19 - 41
Mat R.	Burrel	41 - 37	19 - 59
Mirdite R.	Unknown	--	--
Peshkopi R.	Peshkopi	41 - 41	20 - 25
Permet R	Permet	40 - 14	20 - 20
Pogradec R.	Pogradec	40 - 54	20 - 40
Puke R.	Puke	42 - 03	19 - 53
Sarande R.	Sarande	39 - 52	20 - 00
Skrapar R.	Unknown	--	--
Shkoder R.	Shkoder	42 - 05	19 - 30
Tepelene R.	Tepelene	40 - 18	20 - 00
Tirane R.	Tirane	41 - 20	19 - 50
Tirane City R.	Tirane	41 - 20	19 - 50
Tropoje R.	Bajram Curri	42 - 20	21 - 07
Vlore R.	Vlore	40 - 27	19 - 30

1/ R. rreth (district)

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D. Economic Administration

Albania, the smallest and most backward of the Soviet satellites, is about the size of Maryland and has an estimated 1960 population of 1,584,000. Because the country is poor, Albania has relied heavily since World War II on economic aid from Yugoslavia (up to mid-1948), the USSR, and other satellites. Although Albanian planners have stressed industrialization since the war, about 75 per cent of the population is still engaged in agriculture, and the country has the smallest industrial output of the satellite states. In 1957, nearly 70 per cent of gross industrial production consisted of consumer goods; handicraft and consumer cooperatives produced about 20 per cent of the total. Except for petroleum, chrome, and copper, natural resources are limited. The planners have made no serious attempt to develop the manufacture of heavy industrial goods.

Since their assumption of power in November 1944, the Albanian Communists have adopted Soviet types of institutions and policies designed to gain control of the production and distribution of goods and services. All industries, businesses, and mineral resources have been nationalized, with the result that the socialized sector (including cooperatives) accounts for practically all of Albanian industrial production. The state also owns all communication facilities, railroads, highways, and the merchant marine. Since 1955, the collectivization of agriculture has increased rapidly. By the end of 1957, about 57 per cent of the arable land was in collectives. The 1960 goal for the socialization of agriculture calls for 85 per cent of the arable land to be contained in collectives and 10 per cent to be held by state farms. In addition, the government controls all but about 16 per cent

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of domestic trade, and foreign trade and the banking system are state monopolies. Wages, working conditions and hours, and the hiring and firing of employees are also regulated by the government. "Forced labor" is legalized, and other decrees have frozen workers on their jobs and placed heavy penalities on absentees.

The centrally coordinated direction of the Albanian economy is based on national economic plans, which implement the policies set by the Politburo of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party under the guidance of the USSR and in collaboration with other bloc members. Because members of the Party's policy-making group also hold top positions in the government, they both formulate policy and administer its execution. Indirect Soviet control over Albanian economic affairs has been exercised mainly through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)--formed to promote long-range Soviet plans for economic development of the satellites--and through trade and credit agreements, and Soviet representatives provided to supervise economic planning.

1. Centralized Planning and Control

The Moscow-coordinated policy decisions and directives are translated into economic plans by the State Planning Commission of the Albanian Council of Ministers. The Commission, appointed by the Council of Ministers, is comprised of a President, Vice President, and such members as may be required. Its organizational structure consists of a Statistical Directorate and the following subdivisions: accounting, cadres, industry, planning, and agriculture. On the basis of plans presented by ministries, state and cooperative enterprises, local executive committees, and the city of Tirane, the State Planning Commission drafts a national economic plan which sets the goals for the planning period and allocates resources to meet the goals.

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The goals are defined for national income and its distribution between investment and consumption, and targets are set for employment, production, and trade. The prices of most commodities are also prescribed. The final draft plan is submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers which, in turn, presents it for routine approval to the People's Assembly. The State Planning Commission coordinates and supervises the operation of the plan, while individual ministries are responsible for ensuring that enterprises under their jurisdiction fulfill plan requirements.

In addition to the control exercised by the State Planning Commission and the production ministries, the Albanian government has adopted other specialized Soviet-type institutions for economic control. The most important of these are the Ministry of Finance and the State Control Commission. The Ministry of Finance prepares the state budget; which is the basic instrument designed to carry out the government's financial and fiscal policies. Revenues are channeled through the budget and expended for such purposes as investment, military requirements, and social and cultural needs. Taxes not only are a means of providing revenues for these purposes but also act as a device for siphoning off consumer purchasing power. By discriminating against private enterprises, primarily in agriculture, they also act as a tool for further socialization of the economy.

The Ministry of Finance also exercises financial control over all state economic organizations and institutions primarily through the activities of the State Bank which it directs and supervises. The State Bank controls short-term and long-term credit, note issue, money circulation, accounts of economic organizations, and the wage fund. Because all organizations which conduct operations connected with goods and services must conduct their finances through the State Bank,

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most receipts and expenditures are ascertainable by the Bank, permitting it to exert control over the activities of the enterprises.

The State Control Commission is the highest agency of fiscal and audit control. Although some of the functions of the Ministry of Finance overlap with those of the Control Commission, the functions of the latter are independent of those of the Ministry, more inclusive and more thorough. Actually, the State Control Commission supervises all the activities of the other ministries, including the control functions of these ministries.

2. Industrial Administration

A series of measures designed to insure control of industry was inaugurated by the Communists soon after their assumption of power. In December 1944 all Albanian industries were placed under state control; in January 1945 all wealth owned by the Italian and German Governments and their nationals was confiscated, and all concessions granted to foreigners were revoked. At the same time, all enterprises belonging to those labeled as enemies of the people were confiscated. All mineral resources were nationalized by December 1945, and manufacturing was progressively nationalized. By 1946 the socialist sector (including cooperatives) accounted for about three-fourths of gross industrial production. Complete control of the relatively large handicraft sector was taken over by the government in 1949 when it was placed under the cooperatives. In 1957 the socialist sector of industry accounted for 97.8 per cent of gross industrial production, including 74.6 per cent for state enterprises and 23.2 per cent for cooperative enterprises. The private sector contributed 2.2 per cent. Nearly 70 per cent of all industrial production was composed of consumer goods such as textiles, footwear, clothing, and processed foods.

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Volume Two, Part II — Albania, Economic Administration

Albanian industry is organized on 3 levels: national government industry, local government industry, and handicraft cooperatives. Except for those enterprises controlled by the Ministry of Construction, all industry in Albania is under the direction of the Ministry of Industry and Mines, whose head is a member of the Council of Ministers. This ministry controls all state enterprises of heavy and light industry through its directorates, the operational subdivisions of the ministry. The directorates, in turn, are divided into bureaus, branches, and sections; some branches and bureaus are independent of directorates but similarly subdivided. In 1955 the Ministry of Industry and Mines contained the following operational directorates: Industrial Planning, Accounting, Industrial Food and Clothing, Supplies and Transportation, Construction Material, Electricity and Machinery, Local Industrial Construction Material, and Mines.

Local industrial enterprises are created by the executive committees of People's Councils with the consent of the Albanian Council of Ministers. They are controlled by the functional sections of local executive committees which, in turn, are responsible to appropriate directorates of the ministry. The major functions of such enterprises is to supply the market with consumer goods.

The handicraft cooperatives are headed by local Unions of Handicraft, or Artisan, Cooperatives, under the direction of the Central Union of Handicraft Cooperatives subordinate to the Council of Ministers. They exist in nearly every field of light industry and are important contributors to light industrial production. It is believed that virtually all private artisans have been absorbed into collectives.

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3. Agricultural Administration

Albania is traditionally an agricultural country. Because of the mountainous terrain, however, only about 14 per cent of the land is arable, and raising of livestock is more significant than the growing of field crops. Animal products such as eggs, wool, and hides are supplied in modest amounts to the domestic economy and also provide export items. However, although 75 per cent of the sown area is devoted to wheat and corn, additional grain must be imported each year.

The Communist government has reorganized Albanian agriculture in conformity with Soviet methods. Under a series of plans, beginning in 1948, government control and direction of agriculture have increased. The plans have included the characteristic features of communized agriculture: land reform and collectivization, government control of distribution, establishment of state farms and machine tractor stations, establishment of production quotas, and confiscation of livestock.

Collectivization of the Soviet type was begun in 1946. Establishment of machine tractor stations and state farms soon followed. Collectivization moved slowly during 1946-1954, despite the fact that a sense of ownership was not deeply ingrained in the Albanian peasant. Since 1955, however, marked increases have been reported. By the end of 1957, over 58 per cent of the arable land was to be found in collectives of both advanced and simpler types, and when added to the state farm area the socialist sector comprised about 65 per cent of the arable land. The 1960 goal for socialization of agriculture calls for 85 per cent of the arable land to be contained in collectives and 10 per cent to be held by state farms.

Collectives are divided into 3 forms. The highest type resembles the Soviet collective farm (kolkhoz). The other 2 types are sometimes called associations or partnerships and are of simpler form.

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The state farms are modeled after the Soviet state farms (sovkhoz), receive preferential treatment and are considered model farms. Machine tractor stations assist the collectives in developing agriculture. In an effort to break up the larger private farms, machine tractor stations charge higher rates to independent farms than to collectives. At the beginning of 1958, Albania had 1,698 collective farms, 22 state farms, and 22 machine tractor stations.

The principal agricultural control agency in Albania is the Ministry of Agriculture. It directs the agricultural and forest economy for the state, cooperative, and private sectors. State farms and machine tractor stations are controlled directly by branch offices of the Ministry in centrally located towns. The collective farms are controlled by the agricultural sections of rreth and localitet executive committees which, in turn, are under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture.

E. Control Force

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Albanian Control Force totaled approximately 50,200 persons or 3.2 per cent of the total population (see Table I. 3). Like the USSR Control Force, the Albanian Control Force is composed almost exclusively of persons with command responsibilities or in staff positions requiring specialized knowledge which would enable them effectively to exercise supervisory responsibilities in crisis situations.

The individual components of the control force exercise varying degrees of responsibilities. The Communist Party Control Force, comprised of 2,900 full-time Party professionals, is the most powerful segment. Within this group, the members of the central Party apparatus exert nationwide control over all political, economic, social, and

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Table I. 3

Composition of the Albanian Control Force: 1960

Category	Number	Per Cent of Total
Communist Party	2,900	5.8
State Administration	5,400	10.7
Armed Forces	16,900	33.7
Economic Administration	12,500	24.9
Industry	(6,900)	(13.7)
Trade, Supply, etc.	(1,800)	(3.6)
Transportation and Communications	(1,000)	(2.0)
Construction	(1,800)	(3.6)
Agriculture	(1,000)	(2.0)
Services	12,500	24.9
Education	(7,600)	(15.1)
Health	(3,900)	(7.8)
Housing and Public Utilities	(600)	(1.2)
Finance and Credit	(400)	(0.8)
Total	50,200	100.0

military activities. On the local level, members of the Party apparatus are equally important within the geographic confines of their areas.

The second most important segment of the Albanian Control Force is the state administration, which consists of about 5,400 employees in the national, district, city, locality, and village governments. The members of this component function as the primary executors of the Party's will with regard to the population. Persons in the highest echelons of the state administration rank just below the central Party apparatus in power and prestige; at the lower echelons the differential is greater.

The armed forces control force, the largest single segment of the Albanian Control Force, is comprised of an estimated 16,900 officers and NCOs. They command the major instruments of repression at the disposal of the regime and would thus play a major role in a crisis situation.

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The economic administration control force is made up of about 12,500 persons. They range in importance from the head of a national industrial enterprise to a section leader in a clothing factory. Persons with nationwide responsibility in the economic sphere are included not in this category but in the state administration control force.

The remainder of the Albanian Control Force consists of about 12,500 persons employed in service occupations, such as education, housing, and public utilities. Although the command responsibilities of these people is relatively slight in peacetime, their role is augmented considerably in wartime.

Nearly all members of the Albanian Control Force live and work in urban areas. Tirane undoubtedly contains the majority of persons with nationwide responsibilities; lesser concentrations are probably found in the district centers.

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Volume Two, Part II

II. Bulgaria

A. Introduction

Since the end of 1944, Bulgaria has been controlled by a Communist dictatorship, wholly subservient to the Soviet Union and dedicated to establishment of a "socialist" society and industrialization of the economy regardless of the desires of the population.

The state fashioned by the Communists is totalitarian, despite the various nominally democratic processes provided for in the constitution adopted in 1947. Top posts in the state apparatus are occupied by members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party, and lower Party organizations check on and control the governmental bureaucracy at local levels. Liberal provisions in the constitution regarding suffrage, organization and operation of the government, and political and civil rights merely mask what is in reality a rigidly controlled police state denying all basic freedoms to the population.

Since the death of Stalin in 1953 the Bulgarian regime has been characterized by a high degree of stability, despite problems of adjustment to Soviet changes of policy. Pressures for relaxation of controls which developed after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were effectively suppressed. The Soviet Bloc reaction to the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956 strengthened the position of Bulgaria's Stalinist leadership, and in early 1957 there were signs of a return to the iron-handed methods of rule which characterized the Stalin era. This trend was accelerated by the renewal of the ideological dispute between Tito and Moscow in early 1958.

The Bulgarian people, about 90 per cent of whom are peasants or of peasant origin, appear to be resigned to Soviet domination. The majority of them probably believe that an armed uprising against the regime without effective Western assistance would be futile. The suppression of

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the Hungarian revolt served as an object lesson in this respect. Subversive activity is negligible and largely passive; it poses no serious threat to the regime.

B. Communist Party

Soviet domination since the end of World War II has radically altered the political dynamics of Bulgaria. The multiparty system of the prewar period no longer exists and all political power is held by the Bulgarian Communist Party. In theory as well as in practice, the regime is a dictatorship of the Party, which dominates the state apparatus and controls all phases of national life through "mass" social and cultural organizations.

Although the source of power in the state is constitutionally the "people," only the working class has been regarded as "reliable" in theory, and only Party members in practice. Within the Party, rank and file members theoretically have supreme authority and elect their leaders, but through "democratic centralism" a small group of top Communists, who comprise the Political Bureau of the Party and whose positions are dependent upon Soviet support, have gathered all power in their own hands. Although it lacks popular support, the Party maintains itself in power through police coercion and the ever-present threat of Soviet military intervention.

Among the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian Party is the oldest and most closely connected with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Bulgarian Communist leaders have always had very close ties with Moskva. During the 1930's leading Bulgarian Communists occupied key positions in the Comintern (Communist International). After World War II the Party earned the reputation of being one of the most devoted and subservient satellite parties. Party policies in Bulgaria are set exclusively within the framework of Moskva's adjustments of its policies

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towards its satellites. Although Bulgarian Party leaders are allowed some leeway in adapting Soviet policy changes to local conditions, generally they adhere strictly to the basic Soviet line.

1. Growth

On 1 January 1960 the Bulgarian Communist Party had an estimated total membership of 500,000, or 6.4 per cent of the total population and 9.2 per cent of the adult population (see Table II. 1). Since September 1944, when the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front seized power in Bulgaria, Party membership has experienced periods of sharp rise and fall, reflecting the adjustments of Party leaders to changing foreign and domestic situations.

Table II. 1

Growth of the Bulgarian Communist Party: 1946-1960

Date	Total Membership	Number Per 1,000 Total Population	Number Per 1,000 Adult Population
1946	490,000	69.7	105.3
1948	495,658	69.4	104.9
1950	428,846	59.0	87.7
1954	455,251	61.0	90.5
1958	484,255	62.7	90.8
1960	500,000	63.6	92.0

Party membership before World War II amounted to no more than 40,000 at its peak in 1922 and again in 1934. On the eve of the Communist coup in 1944, the Party numbered some 25,000 members. The greatest numerical increase in membership occurred during the early postwar period as a result of the Party's policy of mass recruitment and by the time of the Fifth Party Congress (December 1948) membership had swelled to nearly 496,000.

The Fifth Party Congress was called as a result of Soviet pressure for a purification of satellite parties after the Tito-Cominform split in

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June 1948. The Congress marked the end of the indiscriminate expansion of Party membership. It introduced the candidate membership system, slowed the pace of recruitment, and hinted at an impending purge of Party ranks. Originally directed against Deputy Premier Traicho Kostov, a potential Bulgarian Tito who apparently had begun to question Moskva's dictates, the campaign to eliminate nationalist tendencies in the Party soon assumed large-scale proportions. During the period 1949-1951 some 109,500 members were expelled because of suspected Kostovite sympathies. The victims included some of the lowest members in the remotest corners of Bulgaria and some of the very top members of the Party hierarchy. Apart from Kostov, who was executed, nearly a dozen ministers, under secretaries, and generals and a large number of okrug Party secretaries, lower army officers, and police chiefs were involved. At the same time, however, 40,000 new members were recruited; this made a net decrease of some 70,000 members. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1954. Party membership was announced as 455,251, an increase of 6.2 per cent over 1950. Since 1954 the Party has maintained a steady, though modest, increase at an average annual rate of 1.6 per cent.

2. Distribution and Composition

The geographic distribution of Party membership reflects the leadership's evaluation of the importance of various groups in Bulgarian society and its desire to place Communists in what it considers strategically important occupations. Variations in the incidence of Party membership among the administrative divisions of the country is therefore a useful index for assessing the significance of an area. Party membership is concentrated in areas which are highly urbanized and industrialized, such as Blagoevgrad and Sofia Okrugs, in areas housing important government control agencies, such as Sofia City Okrug, and in areas which contain large military establishments. It is estimated that while 64 of

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every 1,000 persons in Bulgaria are members of the Communist Party, Sofia City Okrug has at least 91 Party members per 1,000 total population. The industrialized okrugs in the southwestern part of the country also have high incidences; the lowest incidences are found in the northern, primarily agricultural okrugs.

Statistical vagueness on the part of the regime prevents a definitive breakdown of either the social or occupational composition of the Party. The goal of a Party composed primarily of workers, with some peasants and fewer intellectuals, however, remains clear. Available data indicate that while the regime is achieving some success is increasing the proportion of workers, the proportion of intellectuals in increasing at an even faster rate (see Table II. 2). Between 1954 and 1958 the total membership of the Party increased approximately 6 per cent; workers increased more rapidly (11 per cent), but intellectuals or white collar workers increased even more rapidly (29 per cent). The proportion of Communists among the various occupational groups in Bulgaria probably parallels that found in other Communist countries: the highest incidences of Party membership may be expected in occupations that the regime considers critical, such as the armed forces and state administration, and the lowest among such groups as peasants and bench workers in light industry.

Table II. 2

Social/Occupational (?) Composition
of the Bulgarian Communist Party: 1954-1958

Category	1954 Number	1954 Per Cent	1958 Number	1958 Per Cent
Workers	157,517	34.6	174,817	36.1
Peasants	181,190	39.8	165,615	34.2
Employees	81,490	17.9	105,083	21.7
Others	35,054	7.7	38,740	8.0
Total	455,251	100.0	484,255	100.0

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Current recruitment policies stress quality rather than quantity. First Secretary Zhivkov emphasized at the Seventh Congress that the ranks of the Party had to be constantly "cleansed" of unreliable and careerist elements and that the basic task henceforth would be to improve the quality of membership. He noted that Communists occupied key posts in all sectors of the economy (one-fourth of the members work in industry, transportation, and construction, and another third work in agriculture). He further stated that new members should be recruited from among the "most conscientious representatives of the working class, peasant-cooperators and specialists, as well as from among the best representatives from other groups of the intelligentsia, such as scientific workers and teachers."

More recently, Zhivkov has criticized local Party organizations for failing to appoint a greater number of women Party members to responsible positions. Although the proportion of women in the Party has increased from 13 per cent in 1948 to about 20 per cent in 1958, few women hold administrative posts in local Party, state, economic, and public organizations. In January 1960 there were only 3 women in the 30 bureaus of the okrug Party committees. Only 10 per cent of the secretaries of primary Party organizations were women, and there was only one woman among all collective farm chairmen in Bulgaria. All told, less than 4 per cent of Bulgarian women, ages 18 and over, belong to the Party, as opposed to almost 15 per cent of the males.

3. Organization

The structure of the Bulgarian Communist Party closely parallels the hierarchical arrangement of administrative-territorial divisions. There is a central Party apparatus in the capital, Sofia, and subordinate okrug (district), city, and urban and rural obshtina (county) organizations. At the lowest level are the primary organizations, formed

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in all enterprises, farms, military units, schools, offices, and other work centers in which there are at least 3 Party members. At each level there is a nominally representative body to which executive agencies are supposed to be responsible; in practice, however, executive agencies of the Party are responsible only to immediately superior executive agencies and ultimately to the central Party apparatus. The representative body of the Party as a whole is the Party Congress; of the okrugs, cities, and obshtinas--the conference; and of primary Party organizations--the general meeting. The Congress or conference elects a committee as its executive; the general meeting elects either a bureau or a secretary. It is this apparatus which directs and supervises government agencies which have operational responsibility for various facets of Bulgarian life (see Figure II. 1).

The formal organization and division of powers within the Party reflect the principle of "democratic centralism": on the one hand, the election of all Party organs from the lower echelons up, the accountability of those organs to their electorate, and the free discussion of Party policies by members before implementation; on the other, strict Party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority, and the unconditionally binding nature of directives of higher organs upon the lower. In practice, the democratic features of this concept are virtually inoperative, leaving the dictatorial features as the chief characteristic of Party organization and operation.

a. Central Party Organs

Under the Party statute, adopted at the Eighth Plenum of the Bulgaria Workers' Party (renamed the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1958) in 1945 d revised at subsequent Party Congresses, the Political Bureau (Politburo) stands at the apex of the Party pyramid. Comprised of 11 full and 3 candidate members, the Politburo commands a position of unquestioned

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FIGURE II.1

ORGANIZATION OF BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENT



1. An Obshtina Party Committee has no Bureau or apparatus; it elects only a Secretary.

2. A Primary Party Organization with less than 15 members elects only a Secretary.

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ascendancy in the Party and is actually the decisive political force in Bulgaria. It formulates policy for both the Party and the government and its members are the dominant political figures of the country. Premier Anton Yugov and several deputy premiers of the government are members of the Politburo, as are Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov and 2 of the other 5 members of the Central Committee Secretariat. No electoral relationship exists between the Party rank and file and Politburo members. Although formally elected by the Party Central Committee, new members are co-opted, and the role of the Central Committee is limited to ratifying the choices of the incumbents.

The only other Party organ with real authority is the Secretariat, the administrative arm of the Politburo and controlling instrument of the Party. Although its powers in directing day-to-day Party work are extensive, it implements rather than makes policy and its acts are subject to review by the Politburo. The Secretariat is primarily a device to transmit the orders of the Politburo to all lower level Party organizations and to see that they are implemented. Headed by Party First Secretary Zhivkov, who presides over and directs the work of the other 5 Secretaries, the Secretariat supervises the work of the central Party apparatus and of secretaries in all lower Party organizations. Each of the 5 secretaries (other than the First Secretary) oversees the work of one or more departments of the Central Committee (see Figure II. 2). Members of the Secretariat are chosen by the Politburo and then "elected" by the Central Committee of the Party.

The Central Control Commission, another body formally chosen by the Central Committee but actually appointed by the Politburo, is the disciplinary arm of the Party leadership. It determines whether members and candidate members maintain Party discipline, fixes responsibility for betrayal of the Party and violations of the Party program and statutes

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FIGURE II.2

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS: 1960



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and Party and state discipline, and reviews appeals against decisions by lower Party organs relative to expulsion from the Party and other punishments.

The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party theoretically is assigned the task of directing the activities of the Party between sessions of the nominally supreme Party Congress. According to the Party statute, the Central Committee represents the Party in its relations with other parties and public organizations, organizes the various executive agencies of the Party and supervises their activity, and maintains central funds. Despite its vast statutory authority and the fact that it formally elects the Politburo, Secretariat, and Control Commission, the Central Committee does not have any real power, although individual Committee members are politically influential. The relatively large size of the Central Committee (89 full and 48 candidate members were elected at the Seventh Party Congress in June 1958), when coupled with its infrequent meetings (every 3 months), suggests that its significance is largely honorific. Its many formal powers have been taken over by the Politburo and Secretariat, leaving it with only one important function: reporting executive activities to meetings of Party members or delegates.

According to the Party statute, the "supreme organ" of the Party is the Party Congress which is to be convened by the Central Committee at least once every 4 years. Composed of delegates elected by okrug Party conferences (in turn elected by lower level conferences), the Congress theoretically elects the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, hears and approves the reports of these agencies, and determines Party policies and the rules by which the Party is governed. Actually, the Congress does not function in any real electoral or legislative sense. It merely serves as a rubber stamp for major policy pronouncements and appointments made by a handful of top Party leaders in the Politburo.

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The Central Auditing Commission, "elected" directly by the Party Congress, is essentially a bookkeeping agency which administers the Party's central funds and draws up annual budgets. It also appears to be responsible for seeing that the Secretariat of the Central Committee conducts its business efficiently. The Auditing Commission is not politically significant, as indicated by the fact that neither its chairman nor any of its members is a member of the Central Committee.

b. Lower-Level Party Organs

The pattern of lower-level Party organizations reflects and parallels that of the governmental structure. Immediately below the national level are 30 okrug (district) Party organizations (including those for the cities of Sofia, Plovdiv, and Varna) which are directly subordinate to the central Party apparatus. Below the okrug level are the urban and rural obshtina (commune) and city Party organizations. Party organizations in some of the larger cities are divided into rayon (ward) organizations. The lowest level of the pyramid consists of the primary Party organizations set up in all economic enterprises, villages, military units, schools, offices, and other work centers where there are at least 3 Party members.

At the okrug level, the equivalent of the Party Congress is the Okrug Party Conference. It is comprised of delegates elected by obshtina and city conferences and is convened by the Okrug Party Committee every 2 years. It elects the Okrug Party Committee, which in turn "elects" an executive agency, the Bureau, consisting of not more than 7 members (1958) and including a First Secretary and several other secretaries. Actually, the appointment of the First Secretary as well as of other leading Party officials in the okrug is within the patronage of the central Party apparatus, and its "recommendations" are accepted as a matter of course. The apparatus of the Okrug Party Committee consists of

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various departments similar to those of the central Party apparatus. The First Secretary, the most important Party official in the okrug, presides over both the bureau and the administrative apparatus in his organization. These organs are responsible to the central Party apparatus, not to the committee which elected them. Their main duties are to supervise the organizations directly below them, approve appointments and elections of Party officials and members to offices in Party and mass organizations, and adjust general Party policies and directives to local conditions. The Okrug Party Committee is required to hold a plenum at least once every 3 months; such plenums, like plenums of the Central Committee, do not exercise any real political power and are held merely to give formal approval to local programs and policies presented by the First Secretary.

Party organizations in cities of okrug subordination are believed to be miniature replicas of okrug Party organizations. A city Party Conference, comprised of delegates elected at meetings of primary Party organizations, elects a City Party Committee. The Committee in turn elects a Bureau and Secretariat. In practice, however, the appointment of Party Secretariats at this level is strictly controlled by the appropriate okrug Party apparatus. The activities of city Party organizations mirror the work of okrug Party organizations on a smaller stage.

Urban and rural obshtina Party committees exist as an intermediate focus of administration between the primary Party organizations, which they control, and the okrug Party apparatus, to which they are subordinate. They are elected directly by the primary Party organizations under their jurisdiction. An Obshtina Party Committee is an operative Party organ headed by a Secretary; it has no bureau or apparatus. It controls all primary Party organizations in the obshtina, except those in large industrial enterprises, state farms, and machine-tractor stations, which are controlled directly by the Okrug Party Committee.

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Primary Party organizations, the basic Party units, are established in every enterprise, village, military unit, school, office, or other work center where there are not less than 3 Party members. Theoretically, they serve as a link between the working masses and the Party, but in reality they are one of the numerous instruments for the political control of the population. Smaller Party organizations or groups can be formed within a primary organization with more than 100 members, with the approval of the city or obshtina Party committee under whose jurisdiction the primary organization falls. Smaller Party organizations based on shops in factories or brigades in collective farms can also be formed within primary organizations with less than 100 members.

The membership meeting, convened once a month, is the equivalent of the Party Congress or Conference at the lowest level. For the conduct of daily work the general meeting elects annually a bureau of not more than 7 persons, including one or more secretaries. A primary Party organization with less than 15 members elects only a secretary for its executive. If groups exist within a primary organization, each elects a "chief", whose election must be confirmed by the bureau of the primary organization. The functions of the primary Party organizations include the following: agitation and organizational work among the masses for the implementation of Party directives; recruitment and training of new Party members and candidates for membership; mobilization of workers to prevent waste, fulfill plans, strengthen state and labor discipline, and develop "socialist competition"; and elimination of corruption, bureaucracy, and inefficiency in economic enterprises and on farms.

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C. Government

The present governmental system in Bulgaria is an imitation of the type of government in the USSR; it is completely subservient to the dictates of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which in turn is wholly responsive to the orders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Bulgarian Constitution, adopted in December 1947, provides for the division of all governmental power into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In actuality, all power is concentrated in the Communist Party, which is above all governmental agencies and has absolute authority over every phase of national life. All important decisions are made by the Party leadership and then passed on to the appropriate agencies for nominal approval. Thus, the 3 branches of the government serve merely as executive and administrative arms of the Party.

Within the government, only the Premier, 2 First Deputy Premiers, and 5 Deputy Premiers possess any real authority. The powers of these top executives stem largely from their positions in top Party agencies; all of them are members or candidate members of the Party's Political Bureau (Politburo), the most powerful body in the country, or its Central Committee. Neither the People's Assembly (state legislature) nor its Presidium possesses any authority to modify actions of the central executive. The units of local government, the people's councils whose members are popularly elected, merely implement the directives of the central executive agencies. The judiciary exists primarily to impose "class justice."

1. National Government

The major legal entities responsible for control of the Bulgarian national government are, in order of importance, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, the People's Assembly, and the Supreme Court. Operating entirely within the framework set by the Communist Party, these organizations direct and coordinate virtually all activities within Bulgaria.

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The Council of Ministers is the supreme executive and administrative agency in the country. It is comprised of Premier (chairman) Anton Yugov, 2 First Deputy Premiers, 5 Deputy Premiers, 11 ministers, and the heads of 7 specialized agencies (see Figure II. 3). The members of the Council of Ministers are nominally appointed by and formally subordinate to the People's Assembly; in practice, however, membership in the council is determined by the Party Politburo, and appointees are generally members or candidate members of either the Politburo or the Party Central Committee. In 1958, Premier Yugov and 3 of his then 4 deputies were full members of the Politburo. They constitute the most powerful group in Bulgaria, the point at which the highest levels of the Party and government are merged (see above Figure II. I). In addition to the ministries and specialized agencies whose heads have ministerial rank, there are other agencies not part of the Council of Ministers but directly subordinate to it. These agencies exercise functions usually too limited in scope to be assigned to a ministry; some of them, however, may be considered too important to be entrusted to any ministry, and more direct control by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or one of his deputy chairmen is desired. The relegation of certain functions to such agencies also may serve to hold down the membership of the Council of Ministers to practical proportions. The chief function of the Council is the administration of policies decreed by the Communist Party. All government agencies throughout the country are bound by the acts of the Council; it controls the entire state administrative and economic apparatus either directly through its ministries and other central agencies or indirectly through subordinate departments and sections in executive committees of local people's councils.

The Presidium of the People's Assembly is a largely honorific body composed of a Chairman, 2 Vice Chairmen, a Secretary, and 15 members

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FIGURE II. 3

COMPOSITION OF BULGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: 1960



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elected from and by the People's Assembly. The Chairman serves as chief of state in such matters as greeting foreign dignitaries and receiving credentials of foreign diplomats. Theoretically, the Presidium exercises all the legislative powers of the People's Assembly when the latter is not in session. Its only significant function, however, is to act as transmitter to the Assembly of legislative proposals originating in the nominally subordinate Council of Ministers, assuring their rapid enactment into law.

Supreme legislative authority is nominally vested in the People's Assembly, a unicameral body popularly elected on the basis of one deputy to 30,000 inhabitants for a term of 4 years. In practice, it is essentially a policy-ratifying and propagating device of the Council of Ministers. It meets for only a few days in biannual sessions and is severely limited in its legislative work, generally discussing briefly and passing unanimously the few main draft laws placed before it.

The Bulgarian Supreme Court, the highest judicial agency in the country, serves as the legal arm of the central executive. It administers justice primarily in the interests of the state; the interests of individuals are admittedly secondary. The constitutionality of laws and governmental orders are dealt with not by the Court but by the Presidium of the People's Assembly, while the interpretation of the law is performed by the Chief Prosecutor.

2. Local Government

Government below the national level in Bulgaria consists of people's councils which exercise governmental authority in areas corresponding to the following administrative-territorial divisions: 30 okrugs (districts), including the Sofia, Plovdiv, and Varna city okrugs; a number of large towns of okrug subordination; and 2,000 (1957) rural and urban obshtinas (communes). The larger cities, in turn, are

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subdivided into rayons (wards), each of which has its own people's council. (For a listing of major administrative-territorial divisions, see Table II. 3.) Deputies (members) of people's councils at all levels are popularly "elected" from candidate lists prepared by the Communist Party and Communist-dominated organizations.

People's councils are essentially intermediate and local agencies of the central government, with the task of executing the directives of the central government and securing the cooperation and participation of the local populations. Local offices of certain central agencies which maintain liaison with people's councils exercise independently of the latter certain important governmental functions. The extent to which people's councils exercise initiative in handling local affairs is limited since the scope of national legislation and directives of the central government is so broad that it includes practically all phases of local governmental operations. People's councils are obligated to carry out all instructions of the Council of Ministers, the individual ministries and other central bodies, and are subject to the supervision of all.

Each people's council at each level elects an executive committee which is the real depository of administrative and executive power for its area. The executive committee is comprised of a chairman, his deputies, a secretary, and the heads of the various departments, sections, and services who manage the activities of the local administration (see Figure II. 4). Executive committee members are invariably leading members of local Communist Party organizations; "party groups" attached to the executive committee and consisting of all Communists there employed further ensure strict Party control.

The chief task of an executive committee is to supervise all economic, social, and cultural affairs of local significance in

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FIGURE II. 4

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 1959



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Table II. 3

Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Bulgaria: 1960

Administrative Division	Control Center	Coordinates	
		Latitude	Longitude
Blagoevgrad O.	Blagoevgrad	42 - 01	23 - 06
Burgas O.	Burgas	42 - 30	27 - 28
Dimitrovo O.	Dimitrovo	42 - 36	23 - 02
Gabrovo O.	Gabrovo	42 - 52	25 - 19
Khaskovo O.	Khaskovo	41 - 56	25 - 33
Kolarovgrad O.	Kolarovgrad	43 - 16	26 - 55
Kurdzhali O.	Kurdzhali	41 - 39	25 - 22
Kyustendil O.	Kyustendil	42 - 17	22 - 41
Lovech O.	Lovech	43 - 08	24 - 43
Mikhaylovgrad O.	Mikhaylovgrad	43 - 25	23 - 13
Pazardzhik O.	Pazardzhik	42 - 12	24 - 20
Pleven O.	Pleven	43 - 25	24 - 37
Plovdiv O.	Plovdiv	42 - 09	24 - 45
Plovdiv City O.	Plovdiv	42 - 09	24 - 45
Razgrad O.	Razgrad	43 - 32	26 - 31
Ruse O.	Ruse	43 - 50	25 - 57
Silistra O.	Silistra	44 - 07	27 - 16
Sliven O.	Sliven	42 - 40	26 - 19
Smolyan O.	Smolyan	41 - 35	24 - 41
Sofia O.	Sofia	42 - 41	23 - 19
Sofia City O.	Sofia	42 - 41	23 - 19
Stara Zagora	Stara Zagora	42 - 25	25 - 38
Tolbukhin O.	Tolbukhin	43 - 34	27 - 50
Turgovishte O.	Turgovishte	43 - 15	26 - 34
Turnovo O.	Turnovo	43 - 04	25 - 39
Varna O.	Varna	43 - 13	27 - 55
Varna City O.	Varna	43 - 13	27 - 55
Vidin O.	Vidin	43 - 59	22 - 52
Vratsa O.	Vratsa	43 - 12	23 - 33
Yambol O.	Yambol	42 - 29	26 - 30

accordance with higher directives from the constitutional government. Traditionally, it has performed the following functions: coordination of the work of its departments, sections, and services; direction and control of the local enterprises and state properties in the area of jurisdiction of the people's council; and direction and control of the work of people's councils at lower levels and within the territorial jurisdiction of its people's council. The committee makes decisions by simple majority vote; the chairman in turn issues ordinances based on

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these decisions. All such activity, however, must be in accordance with directives of the central government and are only nominally in accordance with the decisions of the council which elects the committee. Each executive committee is responsible both to the people's council elected at that level and to the next higher executive committee (or Council of Ministers). Each section and department is subordinate both to the committee at the same level and to the corresponding agency (section, department, or ministry) at the next higher level. The higher organs are vested with the right to resolve disputes arising out of such dual subordination.

In January 1959 the administrative-territorial structure of Bulgaria underwent a sweeping reorganization. The 13 okrugs and 117 okoliyas (counties) then extant were abolished and replaced with 30 new administrative-economic okrugs. The obshtinas, administrative areas encompassing groups of villages, were retained as the basic territorial units. This reform was but one of a series of measures aimed at decentralizing economic management, streamlining the central state and economic apparatus, and eliminating superfluous links in the administrative chain of command. The effect of these changes, at the local governmental level, was to increase the jurisdiction and responsibility of the executive committees of people's councils. Operational control over much of the economy was transferred from the various ministries to the new okrug executive committees. At the same time, however, centralized planning, financing, and accounting were further strengthened. The management and control functions of okrug executive committees were extended particularly in regard to industrial and construction enterprises, collective and state farms, and the wholesale and retail trade networks. Full responsibility for providing the population with administrative services is being removed from the jursidiction of okrug executive committees and transferred to urban and rural obshtina executive committees.

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D. Economic Administration

Bulgaria, next to Albania the most backward of the Soviet satellite countries, is about the size of Ohio and has an estimated 1960 population of 7,858,000. Although substantial progress has been made in the industrialization of the country since World War II, more than 70 per cent of the labor force is still engaged in agriculture. Among the satellite states, Bulgaria outranks only Albania in industrial output. Light industry and food processing account for most of the industrial production, but the difference between the total value of consumer goods production and that of producer goods has narrowed considerably since the end of World War II. Mining accounts for about three-fifths (1957) of the output of producer goods, a much greater proportion than is found in the more industrialized countries of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Although industrialization will probably continue, diversification is likely to be curtailed. In view of the country's limited resources and the government's servile adherence to Soviet policy, Bulgaria will probably concentrate on agriculture and the mining and processing of ores.

Since their assumption of power in September 1944, the Bulgarian Communists have adopted Soviet types of institutions and policies designed to gain control of the production and distribution of goods and services. All industries, businesses, and mineral resources have been nationalized, with the result that the socialized sector (including cooperatives) accounts for practically all of Bulgaria's industrial production. The state also owns all railroads, highways, and communication facilities, and completely controls all domestic and foreign trade and the banking system. By mid-1956 collectivization of agriculture had proceeded further in Bulgaria than in any of the other satellite states, with 77 per cent of the peasants and 75 per cent of the arable land in collective

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farms. In 1960, according to figures made available by the State Planning Commission, 95 per cent of the arable land was collectivized; the remaining 5 per cent are orchards in the mountains. No other satellite state has approached this percentage of collectivization.

The centrally coordinated direction of the Bulgarian economy is based on national economic plans which implement the policies set by the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party under the guidance of the USSR and in collaboration with other bloc members. Because members of the Party's policymaking group also hold top positions in the government, they both formulate economic policies and administer their execution. Indirect Soviet control over Bulgarian economic affairs has been exercised mainly through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)--formed to promote long-range Soviet plans for economic development of the satellites--and through trade, credit, and technical assistance agreements.

1. Centralized Planning and Control

The Moskva-coordinated policy decisions and directives are translated into economic plans by the State Planning Commission, appointed by and subordinate to the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. On the basis of plans presented by ministries, state and cooperative enterprises, and local executive committees, the State Planning Commission drafts a national economic plan which sets the goals for the planning period and allocates resources to meet the goals. The goals are defined for national income and its distribution between investment and consumption, and targets are set for employment, production, and trade. The prices of most commodities are also prescribed, and estimates are made of the amount of the population's income which will go for purchases of commodities, bank savings, government bonds, and direct taxes. Economic plans, in effect, attempt to coordinate all economic activities and economic relations of the people and institutions of the country as well as the country's economic

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relations with other countries. The State Planning Commission submits the final draft plan for approval to the Council of Ministers which, in turn, presents it for routine approval to the People's Assembly. The State Planning Commission coordinates and supervises the operation of the plan, while individual ministries are responsible for ensuring that enterprises under their jurisdiction fulfill plan requirements.

In addition to the control exercised by the State Planning Commission and the production ministries, the Bulgarian government has adopted other specialized Soviet-style institutions for economic control. The most important of these are the Ministry of Finance and the State Control Commission. The Ministry of Finance prepares the state budget, which is the basic instrument designed to carry out the government's financial and fiscal policies. Revenues are channeled through the budget and expended for such purposes as investment, military requirements, and social and cultural needs. Taxes not only are a means of providing revenues for these purposes but also act as a device for siphoning off consumer purchasing power. By discriminating against private enterprise, primarily in agriculture, taxes also act as a tool for further socialization of the economy.

The Ministry of Finance also exercises financial control over all state economic organizations and institutions primarily through the activities of the National Bank and Investment Bank, both of which it controls. In 1951 the banking system was reorganized to give the government firmer financial control. Inter-enterprise credit was abolished, and the National Bank became the bank of issue, the sole source of short-term credit, and the accounting center of the state. Because all organizations which conduct operations connected with goods and services must conduct their finances through the National Bank, most receipts and expenditures are ascertainable by the Bank, permitting it to exert control over

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enterprise activities. Long-term investments are financed and controlled by the Investment Bank. It collaborates in the establishment of the investment plan which it must finance; it verifies the cost of the investment and the fact that it will be coordinated with the economic plan.

The State Control Commission is the highest agency of fiscal and audit control. Although some of the functions of the Ministry of Finance overlap with those of the Control Commission, the functions of the latter are independent of those of the Ministry, more inclusive and more thorough. Actually, the State Control Commission makes on-the-spot inspections to obtain information on the execution of the financial plan and oversees the economic aspects of the administration of economic units.

2. Industrial Administration

Three years after its seizure of power in December 1947, the Communist regime nationalized the Bulgarian industrial establishment. Large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were consolidated and put under the control of the Council of Ministers and the handicraft sector was organized into state sponsored and controlled cooperatives. By 1953, 87.9 per cent of gross industrial production was accounted for by the state sector and 10.7 per cent by cooperatives and only 1.4 per cent by the private sector. Light industry and food processing account for most of the industrial production, while mining accounts for three-fifths (1957) of the output of producer goods.

Bulgarian industry is organized on 3 levels: national government industry, local government industry, and handicraft cooperatives. Prior to the reorganization of economic management in January 1959, the various industrial ministries within the Council of Ministers directly controlled all industrial enterprises of nationwide significance. Through their operational chief directorates, which presumably had subordinate local

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offices throughout the country, the ministries exercised extensive jurisdiction; they were empowered to take all actions necessary to the functioning of the enterprises under their control. All other enterprises were considered to be of local interest and were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Light Industry. The day-to-day operation of such enterprises, however, was vested in the okrug executive committees.

In January 1959, the Bulgarian regime announced a major economic reorganization, aimed at decentralizing economic management, streamlining the central administrative apparatus, and eliminating superfluous links in the administrative chain of command. All industrial ministries, including the ministries of Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Electrification and Water Supply, and Construction and Building Materials, were abolished, and the responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day operations of enterprises formerly subordinate to these ministries was transferred from Sofia to local levels. In place of the abolished ministries, a Committee for Industry and a Committee for Technical Progress were established within the Council of Ministers. These committees deal with the main problems in the development of industry, such as plan fulfillment, specialization, rationalization, and the introduction of new techniques and technology. They are also responsible, apparently, for the overall supervision of nationally significant industrial enterprises, which are operationally subordinate to okrug executive committees. As in the past, local industrial enterprises are created by the executive committees of people's councils with the consent of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. They are controlled by the departments of local executive committees which, in turn, are responsible to the Council of Ministers. The handicraft cooperatives are headed by local cooperative unions under the direction of the Central Cooperative Union which is subordinate to the Council of Ministers.

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3. Agricultural Administration

Bulgaria is primarily an agricultural country. Although only 40 per cent of the land area is arable, agriculture employs nearly three-fourths of the total labor force. Conditions in general are favorable for a diverse agricultural economy. All major crops which are characteristic of Europe and the United States (except citrus fruit) may be grown in Bulgaria. Grain crops occupy about 87 per cent (1957) of the sown area, wheat and corn being the most important. About one-third of the Bulgarian land area is forest, most of which is suitable only for fuelwood.

Beginning in 1945 the Communist government reorganized Bulgarian agriculture in conformity with Soviet methods: collectivization; government control of distribution; establishment of state farms and machine tractor station; and establishment of production and/or delivery quotas. Collectivization of the Soviet type, based on the administrative machinery of the extant cooperative movement, began in earnest in 1945, following passage of the "Farm Workers Cooperative Law." In 1948 the government established a network of machine-tractor stations equipped with machinery acquired from the peasants through condemnation and a collectivization drive was mounted. By March 1960, 95 per cent of the arable land had been collectivized.

Although the 600 odd collective farms in Bulgaria are patterned after the kolkhozes of the USSR, the Bulgarian type differs in that a collective farm member retains an equity in the land that he contributes, for which he receives an annual remuneration in the form of rent. The laws governing membership in the collective fix the minimum membership period at 3 years. State farms, owned and operated by the government, comprise only 4 per cent of the arable land in Bulgaria. Although established as model, large-scale, mechanized farms (similar to the Soviet

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sovkhozes), efficiency has remained low because of incompetent management and the general indifference of the workers. Almost all of the complex agricultural machinery in Bulgaria is held by the state-owned and operated machine-tractor stations. The services of the MTS are available to collectives and private farmers at rates set by the state. Discriminatory rates charged to the private farmer for MTS services are major weapons in the hands of the state for furthering the socialization of agriculture.

The principal agricultural control agency in Bulgaria is the Ministry of Agriculture which directs the agricultural and forest economy for the state, cooperative, and private sectors. State farms and machine tractor stations are controlled by local offices of the state farm and machine tractor station directorates of the Ministry. Day-to-day supervision of the state sector of agriculture is vested in the agricultural departments of okrug executive committees which are also subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture. The collective farms are controlled by the agricultural departments of the obshtina executive committees, which, in turn, are controlled through the okrug agricultural departments by the Ministry of Agriculture.

E. Control Force

The Bulgarian regime maintains its domination of the country through the agency of Soviet support, and the services of some 413,000 persons who constitute the control force. These include all those who have administrative positions in Party or government, managerial posts in the economy, officer or NCO rank in the armed forces, or who, because of professional or technical training, provide specialized support to the state and its subordinate institution (see Table II. 4).

Most important among this group are some 3,000 persons who make up the primary control force. These are the most important leaders of the Party and of the civil government, as well as the general or flag officers

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Table II. 4

Bulgarian Control Force: 1960

Category	Number	Per Cent of Total
Party Administration	27,000	6.5
State Administration	53,000	12.8
Economic Administration	114,000	27.6
Industry	(69,000)	(16.7)
Construction	(12,000)	(2.9)
Transport and Communications	(11,000)	(2.7)
Agriculture	(8,000)	(1.9)
Commerce	(14,000)	(3.4)
Services	151,000	36.6
Education	(109,000)	(26.4)
Health	(31,000)	(7.5)
Other (Housing, Public Utilities, Police and Fire Services)	(11,000)	(2.7)
Armed Forces	68,000	16.5
Total	413,000	100.0

of the armed forces. Each of these is responsible for control of one or another facet of activity at the national level and, although there are marked differences among them, officials at this level comprise the basic decision-making segment of the nation. Next in influence is the intermediate control force, numbering about 103,000, whose responsibility extends only to specific geographic areas or branches of state and economic activity. Typical members of this group are heads of regional Party and civil administration, national managerial personnel of a given branch of the economy, directors of regional public service institutions, or field grade officers of the armed forces. Least powerful are the members of the lower control force, of which there are some 308,000. These provide professional and technical services, supervise the direct performance of work, or hold NCO rank in the armed forces. Members of this group have only limited authority, which does not usually extend beyond a given

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institution or specific agency of government. They derive their principal importance from the fact that it is at this level that direct and personal contact exists between the regime and the various segments of the public.

The primary control force is almost entirely concentrated in Sofia, except for a few persons in okrug administrative centers. The intermediate control force is more widely distributed among the major urban centers, while the lower control force is to be found in lesser urban centers as well. Comparatively few of the control force are located in rural areas, since the duties which they perform are chiefly administrative and industrial. There is no firm information about the sex and age composition of the control force, although it may be surmised that males predominate, particularly in the primary and intermediate control force segments, and that those over 40 years of age are in the majority. It is probable that membership in the Party is higher among the control force than in any other segment of the population.

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Volume Two, Part II

III. Czechoslovakia

A. Introduction

Since the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, stress on the necessity of consolidating state power and defending it against "class enemies" within and without has given the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia a Stalinist character, as yet hardly relieved by the post-Stalin currents from Moskva and some neighboring satellites, especially Poland.

The theory of the "people's democracy" with its recognition of the peculiar problems of Communist rule under non-Russian conditions affected the actions of the Czechoslovak Party only in the period before the coup. After the coup the leadership shifted to a complete identity of interests between the Soviet Union and themselves and hailed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as their infallible guide. Czech Party leaders have since maintained their ultra-orthodox stand; they continue to view the Soviet Party and USSR as the center of world communism and the model for all their activities.

As a result of this Stalinist position, the regime has encountered practical difficulties in realizing its aims. Strict political and cultural controls and a "temporary" lowering of living standards after 1948 alienated the population. A "new course" adopted in 1953 has since led to gradually improved living conditions and a degree of relaxation in other fields. These limited measures have not succeeded, however, in gaining public acceptance for the regime.

The Party leadership, purged of all non-Czech or non-Slovak, non-proletarian, and its intellectual elite, has displayed no serious ideological or personal differences since 1952. Soviet approval of the Czech leaders and the apparent lack of necessity for Soviet interference have undoubtedly contributed greatly to unity and stability and the generally smooth operation of Party and government.

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The internal unity of the leadership, its loyalty to the Soviet rulers and their reciprocal endorsement of the Czech leaders, together with the strict controls exercised over a passive population by the Party and government, have thus far frustrated forceful expression of widespread public dissension. There is little doubt, however, that the Party's popular support is weaker than it was in 1948 and that developments within the bloc since the death of Stalin have increased the difficulties of maintaining control.

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B. Communist Party

All political power in Czechoslovakia is held by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In theory, as well as in practice, the regime is a dictatorship of the Party, which seeks to establish a socialist, or Communist, society.

Although the source of power in the state is constitutionally the "people," only the working class has been regarded as "reliable" in theory, and only Party members in practice. Within the Party, its members theoretically have supreme authority and elect their leaders, but through "democratic centralism" the leadership has gathered all power in its own hands. At the same time, the Party is willing to accept the help of non-Party elements provided they share its purposes and are willing to subordinate themselves to its leadership. The survival of 4 non-Communist Parties (the People's Party, Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Slovak Revival Party, and Slovak Freedom Party) has not therefore contradicted the one-party concept. They are mere shadow parties which, together with other mass social organizations, maintain the fiction of a "National Front." The Communist Party alone possesses real power, limited only by intra-Party rivalries, by orders emanating from the Soviet Communist Party, and by the possibility that unduly harsh economic policies might provoke disturbances like those resulting from the unpopular currency reform in June 1953.

1. Growth

On 1 January 1960 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) had an estimated total membership of 1,425,000, or 10.5 per cent of the total population and 15.3 per cent of the adult population (18 and over), see Table III. 1). The Czechoslovak Communist Party is the fourth largest in the world numerically (the Chinese, USSR, and Italian Communist parties being larger) and the largest in the world relative to the population of the country.

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Table III. 1

Growth of the Czechoslovak Communist Party: 1946-1960

Date	Total Membership	Number Per 1,000 Total Population	Number Per 1,000 Adult Population
1946 (Mar)	1,159,164	96.0	134.2
1948 (Feb)	1,400,000	114.1	160.1
1948 (Aug)	2,418,199	197.2	276.5
1950 (Jan)	1,899,423	153.9	217.0
1956 (June)	1,444,000	109.7	158.7
1958 (Jan)	1,422,199	106.0	153.7
1960 (Jan)	1,425,000	104.8	153.0

Since 1945 Party membership has experienced periods of sharp rise and fall, reflecting the adjustments of Party leaders to changing foreign and domestic situations. In the months immediately after World War II membership grew rapidly from less than 50,000 in May 1945 to 713,000 in August 1945. At the time of the Communist coup d'etat (February 1948) membership in the Party had risen to approximately 1,400,000. During the 6 months following the coup the Party mushroomed, largely as a result of the merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party. By August 1948 Communist ranks had swelled to a peak membership of 2,418,199, an increase of 73 per cent over February of that year.

After August 1948, Party membership began a downward trend, continuous to 1957 at an average annual rate of almost 5 per cent. The sharpest drop occurred between August 1948 and February 1951. During this period a ban was imposed on the admission of new members and several mass purges were conducted to weed out those who had entered the Party for self-advancement, personal security, and other reasons inconsistent with the ideals of Party purity and militancy. By January 1949 more than 100,000 members, or 4.4 per cent of the total, had been expelled. About 22 per cent of the remaining members were demoted to candidate status (introduced in November 1948) to ensure their Party "education" and loyalty.

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In 1949 Soviet pressure for a purification of satellite parties after the Tito-Cominform split provoked a second, more drastic, purge. Between January 1949 and February 1951 Party membership fell by 28 per cent.

Although the ban on membership was lifted in the spring of 1951, the net decline in Party ranks continued at a reduced rate. Between February 1951 and June 1954 the average annual rate of decrease dropped to about 3 per cent. The most significant decline in this period occurred during 1951 and 1952 when the purge of prominent Communist officials, including Rudolph Slansky, the Secretary-General of the Party, was in full swing. While there have been no mass purgings since 1952, the continued expulsion of "hostile elements" reflects a renewed emphasis on strict membership requirements and the need for maintaining discipline. In the period 1954-1957 the average annual rate of decrease was less than 2 per cent. Since 1957 Party membership has remained relatively constant. The slight increase evident in the last few years reflects a change in recruitment policy initiated in 1955. Since then Party leaders, conceived that a continued decline could seriously damage the strength of the Party, have repeatedly criticized Party organizations for failing to recruit new members.

2. Distribution

The geographic distribution of Party membership reflects the leadership's evaluation of the importance of various groups in Czechoslovak society and a desire to place Communists in what it considers strategically important occupations. Variations in the incidence of Party membership among the administrative divisions of the country is therefore a useful index for assessing the significance of an area.

The largest concentrations of Party members are in highly urbanized and industrialized areas, in sites of major government control centers, and in areas which contain large military contingents. Party incidences are higher in urban centers than in rural areas, and significantly higher in highly industrialized areas (Brno and Ostrava Krajs)

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than in predominantly agricultural areas (Presov Kraj). Areas which contain important government control agencies (Praha Kraj) or large military establishments also have much higher Party incidences.

It is estimated that 105 of every 1,000 persons in Czechoslovakia are members of the Communist Party. In general, the incidence of membership is significantly higher in Bohemia and Moravia (the Czech Lands) than in Slovakia. There are 125 Party members per 1,000 total population in the Czech Lands compared to 55 in Slovakia. The Czech Lands, with 71 per cent of the total Czechoslovak population, have 85 per cent of the total Party membership. Slovakia's share of the total population (29 per cent) has remained nearly constant since World War II, while its proportion of Party membership has increased slightly, from 11 to 15 per cent, since the Communist coup d'etat in 1948. Among the krajs, it is estimated that Praha and other krajs in the northwestern and eastern Czech Lands have the highest incidences; the lowest incidences are probably found in krajs in the southern Czech Lands and in Slovakia.

3. Composition

Although statistical vagueness on the part of the regime prevents a definitive breakdown of the occupational and social composition of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, an estimated distribution of Party membership by selected occupations based on the fragmentary data thus far published, is presented in Table III. 2.

The ratio of full-time Party employees to total Party membership is believed to have declined in recent years, largely as a result of concerted efforts by the regime in 1956 and again in 1958 to rationalize the apparatus and to eliminate superfluous links in the administrative hierarchy. It is estimated that the Party bureaucracy (professionals who comprise the staff of the Party apparatus) now approximates 80,000 or 5.6 per cent of total Party membership.

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Table III. 2

Occupational Composition of the Czechoslovak Communist Party: 1960

Occupational Group	Number (in thousands)	Per Cent of Party	Per Cent of Group
Party professionals	80	5.6	100.0
Military and police	84[a]	5.9	28.0[a]
Workers and employees	1,157	81.2	24.6
Cooperative farmers	104	7.3	10.8
Total	1,425	100.0	10.5[b]

a/ As of June 1956; includes Party members in all police units (regular and security police, frontier and interior guards) of the Ministry of Interior.

b/ Per cent of total population.

According to data reported at the National Party Conference in 1956, about 6 per cent of total Party membership was in the armed forces and police, and Party members comprised 28 per cent of total military and police personnel. Announced reductions in Czech armed forces since 1956 have probably resulted in a decline in the number of Communists in the military and a drop in Party membership in the combined military/police category, although the incidence of Party membership is probable at least as high as in 1956. In 1956 the Czech Minister of Defense reported that 65.5 per cent of all officers in the armed forces were Party members, the same percentage as estimated for the USSR armed forces.

Continual complaints concerning the social composition of the Party since 1948 have been characterized mainly by dissatisfaction with the number of workers in the Party. Apparently the correct social composition is only achieved when workers predominate and when other strata of the population are represented on a more or less "profile" basis. In spite of the professed attention to proper social composition and the concerted efforts since 1955 to recruit young workers into the organization,

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the precentage of workers and unskilled laborers (36.3 per cent in 1956) has continued to decline since the coup, while the percentage of white-collar workers has increased. The main reason appears to lie in the mass promotion of workers to white-collar jobs, an important part of the process through which the Party has consolidated its power over the administrative and economic apparatus. Thus, while workers and empolyees together comprise an estimated 81 per cent of total Party membership, the vast majority are members of the extremely large, inflated bureaucracy.

Party leaders are plagued not only with this inherent imbalance in social composition but also with a static and aging Party membership. According to one report in 1958, 91 per cent of the members had joined the Party between 1945 and 1948. The same source stated that prewar members formed 1.5 per cent and persons admitted after the coup, 7.5 per cent of the total strength. Moreover, in 1958, 6.5 per cent of all Party members were under 26 years of age, while 12.7 per cent were over 60. In January 1958 the distribution of total Party membership by various age groups was as follows:

Age Group	Number of Party Members	Party Membership as Percentage of Age Group
18-25	92,443	6.2
26-34	304,351	16.2
35-44	339,906	21.7
45-60	504,880	19.2
Over 60	180,619	10.7
Total	1,422,199	15.3

The number of Party members between 35 and 45 years of age has declined during the last decade while the number over 45 has increased. The increasing dominance of older people appears to be most pronounced in rural areas. Efforts to recruit young people for Party membership have met with little success.

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4. Organization

The structure of the Communist Party closely parallels the hierarchical arrangement of administrative-territorial divisions. Each level of administration--national, Slovak, kraj (region), okres (district) or city, and obec (village)--has a corresponding Party organization. In addition, basic Party organizations are formed in all enterprises, farms, agencies, institutions, and military units in which there are at least 3 Party members.

The formal organization and division of powers within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia reflect the principle of "democratic centralism": on the one hand, the election of all Party organs from the lower echelons up, the accountability of those organs to their electorate, and the free discussion of Party policies by members before implementation; on the other, strict Party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority and the unconditionally binding nature of directives of higher organs upon the lower. In practice, the democratic features of this concept are virtually inoperative, leaving the dictatorial features as the chief characteristic of Party organization and operation.

a. Central Party Organs

Under the 1952 Party Statutes as revised by the Eleventh Party Congress in 1958, the Political Bureau (Politbureau) stands at the apex of the Party pyramid. Comprised of 7 members and 2 candidate members, the Politbureau commands a position of unquestioned ascendancy in the Party. As the top governing organ, it determines Party policy and tactics and, in effect, holds the reins of power in the state. No electoral relationship exists between the Party rank and file and the members of the Politbureau. Although formally elected by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, new members are co-opted, and the role of the Central Committee is limited to ratifying the choices of the incumbents.

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The only other Party organ with real authority is the Secretariat, the administrative arm of the Politbureau and controlling instrument of the Party. Although its powers in directing day-to-day Party work are extensive, it implements rather than makes policy and its acts are subject to review by the Politbureau. The Secretariat is primarily a device to transmit the orders of the Politbureau to all lower level Party organizations and to see that they are implemented. Headed by Party First Secretary, Antonin Novotny, who presides over and directs the work of the 4-6 Secretaries, the Secretariat supervises the work of secretaries in all lower Party organizations. Each secretary is in charge of one or more divisions and/or commissions of the Central Committee (see Figure III. 1). Members of the Secretariat are chosen by the Politbureau, then "elected" by the Central Committee of the Party.

The Party Control Commission, another body formally chosen by the Central Committee but actually appointed by the Politbureau, is the disciplinary arm of the top Party leaders. It checks upon all lower Party organs, reviews appeals from disciplinary actions of lower Party committees, and prevents Party officials from abusing their powers.

The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, despite its vast statutory powers as the Party's chief executive agency and the fact that it formally elects the Politbureau, Secretariat, and Control Commission, has steadily diminished in importance since the coup. The fact that the Central Committee has more than 100 members, when coupled with its infrequent meetings (every 6 months), suggests that its significance is largely honorific. Its many formal powers have been taken over by the Politbureau and Secretariat, leaving it with only one important function: reporting executive activities to meetings of Party members or delegates.

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FIGURE III.1

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL APPARATUS OF CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY: 1960



* Appears to be on a lower level than the divisions.

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According to the Party Statutes, the "supreme organ" of the Party is the Party Congress which is to be convened by the Central Committee at least once every 4 years. Composed of delegates elected by kraj Party conferences (in turn elected by lower level conferences), the Congress theoretically elects the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, hears and approves the reports of these agencies, and determines Party policies and the rules by which the Party is governed. Actually, the Congress does not function in any real electoral or legislative sense. It is merely a rally of Party and state functionaries gathered to ratify policies proclaimed by the ruling group.

The Central Auditing Commission, "elected" directly by the Party Congress, is essentially a bookkeeping agency, checking all Party organizations in economic and financial matters. It has nothing to do with policy or its implementation.

In addition to the Congress, the Party has also made use of another form of national Party participation, the National Party Conference. Composed of delegates elected by kraj committees rather than by kraj conferences, the National Conference is not so representative of Party membership as the Congress and includes only higher echelon Party officials. Convened between Congresses, the National Party Conference acts as the endorsing body for actions of the Party's central executive agencies.

b. Slovak Party Organs

The Party Statutes provide for a special organization of the Slovak Communist Party, which is defined as a territorial organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. As a concession to Slovak sentiment, a provision was incorporated in the Statutes providing for a Slovak Party Congress, a Slovak Central Committee with a Politbureau, Secretariat, and Control Commission, and a Slovak Central Auditing Commission. Thus, there exists in Bratislava a close replica of the central Party structure.

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The Slovak organs, however, are completely subordinate. In agreement with national Party agencies, they direct and control the activities of the 6 kraj Party organizations in Slovakia.

c. Lower-Level Party Organs

The pattern of lower-level Party organization reflects and parallels that of the governmental structure. At least 3 and sometimes 4 layers of Party administration can be distinguished. Below the national and Slovak levels are the kraj (regional) Party organizations, which in turn are broken down into okres (district) and city Party organizations. Party organizations in the larger cities are equivalent to kraj Party organizations, while their subunits in the form of borough (ward) Party organizations have the status of okres Party organizations. Below the level of the okres and city organizations are, in some cases, local Party organizations. Subordinate to okres or city Party agencies, they are established wherever basic Party organizations are too scattered or too numerous to be supervised directly by okres or city Party organizations. The lowest level of the pyramid consists of the basic Party organizations set up in all enterprises, villages, offices, and other establishments where there are at least 3 Party members.

At the kraj level, the equivalent of the National Party Congress is the Kraj Party Conference. It is comprised of delegates elected by okres and city conferences and is convened by the Kraj Committee every 2 years. It elects the Kraj Party Committee (43 to 63 members), which in turn "elects" a Bureau of 9-11 members, a First Secretary, and 2 Secretaries. Actually, the appointment of the First Secretary as well as of other leading Party officials in the kraj is within the patronage of the central Party apparatus, and its "recommendations" are accepted as a matter of course. The First Secretary presides over both the bureau and the administrative apparatus in his organization. The responsibility

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of these organs is to the next higher bureau and secretariat, not to the committee which elected them. Kraj bureaus and secretariats are patterned after the national organs, whose orders they carry out. Their main duties are to supervise the organizations directly below them, approve appointments and elections of Party officials and Party members to offices in Party and mass organizations, and adjust general Party policies and directives to local conditions.

Okres and city Party organizations are miniature replicas of kraj organizations. An Okres or City Party Conference, comprised of delegates elected at meetings of basic Party organizations, elects an Okres or City Party Committee. The Committee in turn elects a Party Bureau of 7-11 members, a First Secretary, and 1-3 Secretaries. In practice, however, the appointment of Party Secretariats at this level is strictly controlled by the appropriate kraj Party apparatus. The activities of okres and city Party organizations mirror the work of kraj Party organizations on a smaller stage.

Small, geographically-organized local Party committees (local, joint-local, and borough) exist in rural and urban areas where basic Party organizations cannot be easily controlled without an intermediate focus of administration between them and the okres and city Party committees. They are elected either directly or indirectly by the basic Party organizations. Local Party Committees are subordinate to okres or city organizations which, through them, control the activity of basic Party organizations.

Basic Party organizations are established in any enterprise, institution, village, or other establishment where there are not less than 3 Party members. In establishments with a relatively large number of Party members, shop or section organizations may be established as subunits of the basic organizations. A basic organization with more than 100 members may set up branch organizations; within the basic or branch organizations smaller Party groups may be created.

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The membership meeting, convened once a month, is the equivalent of the Party Congress or Conference at the lowest level. It elects a Party Committee of 7-11 members (3-5, in organizations with no more than 20 members; a chairman, in organizations with no more than 5 members). Since basic Party organizations have no bureaus, their committees, particularly their chairman and officers, have a measure of real power and responsibility before members. On this level, however, power to make decisions is so restricted it can be shared with the members themselves. The functions of basic Party organizations include the following: agitation and organizational work with the people and local press to fulfill Party directives; mobilizing workers to prevent waste, fulfill plans, strengthen state and labor discipline, and develop "socialist competition"; checking on the leadership in enterprises and government agencies, watching for shortcomings, and pressing for the removal of incompetent leaders; and recruiting and training new Party members and candidates for membership.

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C. Government

In Czechoslovakia since February 1948, government has been limited to the role of the administrator of policies decreed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which in turn is wholly responsive to the orders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The formulation of policy, as well as the supervision of each step implementing such policy, is in the hands of the Czechoslovak Communist Party but is subject to Soviet guidance. The execution of policy is the function of the government. Although it lacks the popularly based decision-making powers associated with Western-type governments, the government resembles in structure that of the First Czechoslovakia Republic (1918-1938), modified by separate legislative and executive organs for Slovakia.

Within the government, only the President, Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, and the 4 Deputy Prime Ministers possess any real authority. The powers of these top executives stem largely from their high Party positions; all 7 of them are members or candidate members of the Party's Political Bureau (Politbureau), the most powerful body in the country. Neither the state legislature (the Czechoslovak National Assembly), nor the "separate" Slovak National Council possesses any authority to modify actions of the central executive. The units of local government, the national committees whose members are indirectly appointed by the Party, merely implement the directives of the central executive agencies. The judiciary exists primarily to impose "class justice."

1. National Government

The major legal entities responsible for control of the national government are, in order of importance, the President of the Republic and Presidium of the Cabinet, the Cabinet, the Presidium and Inner Presidium of the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court. Operating entirely within the framework set by the Communist Party, these offices

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and organizations direct and coordinate virtually all activities within Czechoslovakia.

Supreme executive power is vested in the President of the Republic and in the Presidium of the Cabinet. The presidential office, the most significant structural difference between the Czechoslovak and USSR governments and between the Czechoslovak and other Soviet satellite governments, is weak in constitutional powers but extremely influential because of the position of its incumbent, Antonin Novotny, as First Secretary of the Communist Party and member of the Party's Politbureau. Formally elected by the National Assembly, the President makes Cabinet appointments and is nominally head of state.

The Presidium of the Cabinet, formally subordinate to the Czechoslovak Cabinet and, through the Cabinet, to the National Assembly, was established simultaneously with the multiplication of ministries in 1953 and is, in effect, an "inner cabinet." It is composed of the Prime Minister, Viliam Siroky, a First Deputy Prime Minister, and 4 Deputy Prime Ministers. Five of these persons are full members and the sixth is a candidate member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party. Thus, the President and the Cabinet Presidium constitute the most powerful group in Czechoslovakia, the point at which the highest levels of the Party and Government are merged (see Figure III. 2).

The Czechoslovak Cabinet, although appointed by the President and formally subordinate to the National Assembly, is the most important legislative and administrative agency in Czechoslovakia. It is comprised of the members of the Presidium, ministers, and heads of special agencies. Of the 31 ministers and officials of ministerial rank, 26 are Communist Party members and 21 are members or candidate members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The current organizational structure of the Cabinet includes 21 ministries and 4 specialized agencies

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FIGURE III. 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENT



1. An interim deliberative body, The National Conference, is elected by Regional Committees and also has the power to elect Central Committee members.
2. Slovak Party and Government Organizations direct the activities of the 6 Kraj Party and Government Organizations in Slovakia. Elsewhere Kraj agencies are subordinate directly to Czechoslovak agencies.
3. Exist where basic organizations are too numerous to be supervised directly by City or Okres Committees; they are elected either directly, by basic organizations, or indirectly, by Local Conference.

KEY

- Control or supervision
- Formal election
- Formally elected by party membership or general electorate
- Indirectly elected or appointed

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whose heads have ministerial rank (see Figure III. 3). In addition, there are numerous offices and commissions not part of the Cabinet but directly subordinate to it. These are the Prosecutor General, Chief Arbiter, Central Mining Office, Commission for Relations with Foreign Countries, Commission for Settling Border Areas, State Office of Social Insurance, State Wages Commission, State Population Commission, and State Statistical Office. The acts of the Cabinet are binding on all government agencies throughout the country. It controls the entire state administrative and economic apparatus either directly through Czechoslovak ministries or indirectly through its subordinate Slovak Board of Commissioners.

The Presidium of the National Assembly is a largely honorific body composed of a chairman, important only as a national figurehead representing the "legislative" branch of the government, and members elected by the National Assembly. Its only significant function is to act as transmitter to the Assembly of legislative proposals originiating in the nominally subordinate Cabinet, assuring their rapid enactment into law. An Inner Presidium, and extra-Constitutional device comprised of the chairman and vice chairmen of the Assembly, performs a similar function. However, it is the only channel for bills "demanded" by mass organizations and is thus the real directing force of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly, the unicameral Czechoslovak legislature, is constitutionally the most important government agency. In practice, it is essentially a policy-ratifying and propagating device of the Cabinet. Its members are elected by a nominal process of direct, universal, and equal suffrage. All statutory law is issued in its name.

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FIGURE III. 3

COMPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAK CABINET (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS)



[1] Also one minister without portfolio

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The Czechoslovak Supreme Court, the highest judicial agency in the country, serves as the legal arm of the central executive. The constitutionality of laws and governmental orders are dealt with not by the Court, but by the Presidium of the National Assembly. The interpretation of the law is performed by the Prosecutor General, a Cabinet official. Members of the Court are appointed by the President of the Republic upon the advice of the Cabinet.

2. Slovak Government

Although Slovakia has a governmental structure similar to that of the central government, its institutions are completely subservient to the government in Praha. Except that there is no Presidium in the Slovak Board of Commissioners (Cabinet) and no Supreme Court, the powers of Slovak agencies are similar to those of Czechoslovak organizations.

The Board of Commissioners, the most important legislative and administrative agency in Slovakia, is comprised of a chairman, a first deputy chairman, 2 deputy chairmen, 14 commissioners, and the heads of 2 specialized agencies (see Figure III. 4). Under the direct control of the Czechoslovak Cabinet which appoints its commissioners, upon the recommendation of the Slovak National Council, the Board has a peculiar dual function. It directs the activities of agencies and enterprises within its area of competence, and, more importantly, it transmits orders from the central government to lower administrative agencies in Slovakia. While it is clearly above the 6 Slovak kraj councils in authority, it does not break completely the direct line of control between the central government and the kraj councils.

The Board does not function in all fields. Czechoslovak ministries which do not have Slovak counterparts are as follows: Chemical Industry, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Foundries and Ore Mines, Fuel, General Engineering, Heavy Engineering, and Power

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FIGURE III.4

COMPOSITION OF SLOVAK BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS



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and Water Conservancy. In these fields Czechoslovak ministries operate for the most part from Praha directly through the local councils.

The Slovak National Council, constitutionally the most important government agency in Slovakia, is actually an advisory body with a few legislative powers and no power to control Slovakia's administration. Its limited authority is indicated by its inability to name the Board of Commissioners without prior approval of the Cabinet, and is emphasized by the fact that all its laws must be signed by the Prime Minister at Praha. Final authority to veto Slovak legislation lies with the Czechoslovak Cabinet.

3. Local Government

Local government in Czechoslovakia is based on a three-level system of national committees--kraj, okres, and local--corresponding to the territorial administrative units of the country. No elections have been held for national committees since 1948. Committee members are apparently appointed by the next higher committee on the proposal of the Communist-dominated National Front organization at that level. In addition to the three basic layers, there are also special types of national committees. Central national committees for Praha and Bratislava have the same status as kraj committees and are directly subordinate to the Czech Cabinet and Slovak Board of Commissioners, respectively. Municipal national committees in each kraj center and in some other large cities are equivalent to okres committees. Borough national committees created in Praha and Bratislava are equivalent to okres national committees, while borough committees in other large cities have the status of a local national committee. National committees are obligated to carry out all directives and instructions of the Cabinet, the individual ministries, and other central bodies, and are subject to the supervision of all. Each national committee at each level elects a council which is the real

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depository of administrative and executive power in its area. Council functions are extensions of ministerial functions of the central government to the local level, thus facilitating the complete subordination of the councils to central agencies. The Council is comprised of a chairman, his deputies, and the heads of various functional and branch departments who manage the activities of the local administration (see Figures III. 5 and III. 6). Many of these persons also hold important positions in local Communist Party organizations. Each council is responsible both to the committee appointed at that level and to the next higher council (or Cabinet of Board of Commissioners). Each department is subordinate both to the council at the same level and to the corresponding agency (department, ministry, or commission) at the next higher level. The higher organs are vested with the right to resolve disputes arising out of such dual subordination.

As a result of the trend toward decentralization of economic management begun in 1956, the jurisdiction and responsibility of the councils of national committees have been increased. By 1958 kraj, okres, and local councils were directly managing one-third of the entire national economy. All state farms and nearly all bulk-buying of agricultural produce were under their control. The jurisdiction of the councils was also extended in regard to local industry, health, education, and welfare services, road transport and maintenance, water supplies and installations, and trade. In addition, their responsibility for the allocation of material, financial, and manpower resources was also increased. In line with a recent reorganization of the territorial and economic structures, announced in January 1960, further categories of industrial enterprises will be transferred to the control of local authorities. By January 1961 all enterprises of less than nationwide significance are to be under the direct supervision of kraj, okres, and local councils.

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FIGURE III. 5

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL KRAJ (REGIONAL) GOVERNMENT



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FIGURE III. 6

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL OKRES (DISTRICT) GOVERNMENT



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4. Administrative-Territorial Divisions

At the present time, Czechoslovakia is divided into 19 krajs (regions) and 2 cities (Praha and Bratislava) or national subordination (see Table III. 3). Krajs are subdivided into 270 okreses (districts) and a number of cities of kraj subordination. Okreses control the activities of the smaller towns and approximately 14,000 obeces (villages)--the smallest territorial units. The larger cities are subdivided into boroughs (wards).

This administrative-territorial structure is currently undergoing a sweeping reorganization. The basic three-level hierarchy--kraj, okres, and obec--will be retained, although the number of krajs and okreses will be reduced and the borders of the former redrawn to correspond to major economic areas. The new territirial arrangement, presented below, will consist of 10 krajs (7 in the Czech Lands and 3 in Slovakia) and 108 okreses.

Kraj Name	Kraj Center	Number of Okreses
Central Bohemia	Praha	12
Central Slovakia	Banska Bystrica	12
East Bohemia	Hradec Kralove	11
East Slovakia	Kosice	9
North Bohemia	Usti-on-Elbe	10
North Moravia	Ostrava	10
South Bohemia	Ceske Budejovice	8
South Moravia	Brno	14
West Bohemia	Plzen	10
West Slovakia	Bratislava	12

This reform, the most recent in a series of measures aimed at decentralizing economic management, streamlining the central economic apparatus, and eliminating superfluous links in the administrative chain of command, will also involve changes in the national committee system and in the organizational structure of the Party. The present central national committee in Praha will be renamed the "national committee for the capital." It will enjoy the status of a kraj national committee and will direct 10 borough committees (equivalent to okres committees)

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Table III. 3

Major Administrative-Territorial Divisions of Czechoslovakia: January 1960

Administrative Divisions	Subordination	Control Center	Coordinates Latitude	Coordinates Longitude
Bazska Bystrica Kraj	Slovakia	Bazska Bystrica	48 - 44	19 - 09
Bratislava Kraj	Slovakia	Bratislava	48 - 09	17 - 07
Brno Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Brno	49 - 12	16 - 38
Ceske Budejcvice Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Ceske Budejovice	48 - 59	14 - 28
Gottwaldov Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Gottwaldov	49 - 13	17 - 40
Hradec Kralove Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Hradec Kralove	50 - 13	15 - 50
Jihlava Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Jihlava	49 - 24	15 - 35
Karlovy Vary Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Kralovy Vary	50 - 13	12 - 54
Kosice Kraj	Slovakia	Kosice	48 - 42	21 - 15
Liberec Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Liberec	50 - 47	15 - 03
Nitra Kraj	Slovakia	Nitra	48 - 19	18 - 05
Olomouc Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Olomouc	49 - 35	17 - 15
Ostrava Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Ostrava	49 - 50	18 - 17
Pardubice Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Pardubice	50 - 02	15 - 47
Plzen Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Plzen	49 - 45	13 - 22
Praha Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Praha	48 - 22	19 - 31
Presov Kraj	Slovakia	Presov	49 - 00	21 - 15
Usti Nad Labem Kraj	Czechoslovakia	Usti Nad Labem	50 - 40	14 - 02
Zilina Kraj	Slovakia	Zilina	49 - 13	18 - 44

in Praha. The 10 boroughs, in turn, will be subdivided into wards. The central national committee in Bratislava apparently will be abolished. Bratislava, Brno, Ostrava, and Plzen will have city national committees with the rank of okres committees. Subordinate to each city committee will be several borough national committees, having the status of local national committees. Local and urban national committees will serve at the lowest levels of administration. Urban national committees will be set up in kraj and okres centers and other towns, and subordinated to okres committees. Local committees will continue to function at the village level.

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The new kraj national committees will have 80-150 members, while their councils will consist of 15-18 members; okres committess will have 60-120 members and their councils, 12-15. Also, the size of kraj and okres Party committees will be revised upwards and the number of members of their bureaus will be increased. The transition to the new national committee system is to be completed by 1 July 1960.

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D. Economic Administration

Since the Communist seizure of power in 1948, Czechoslovakia has shifted its economy from one of semi-private enterprise to a system based on centralized state planning and extensive public ownership of the means of production. Almost all industry, except for small handicrafts, is state owned. The state also owns the transportation, communications, finance, and most of the distribution systems. Although moderate land reform programs were instituted immediately after World War II, a thoroughgoing reorganization of the farming structure began with the collectivization movement of 1949. In January 1960, Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communist Party, reported that 84 per cent of all agricultural land in Czechoslovakia was in the socialized sector.

In accordance with Communist ideology, the free market as a coordinator of economic activity was replaced by centrally coordinated direction based on national economic plans. Under these plans economic activity has been mobilized to strengthen the industrial and military power of the state. Investment has been channeled, for the most part, into producer and military goods rather than into comsumer goods industries, housing, and agriculture. To meet Communist goals, the economy has been reoriented along Soviet lines under the framework of the Czechoslovak Five-Year Plans. By 1953 all significant Soviet economic institutions had been adopted in Czechoslovakia.

Economic policy is determined by the Politbureau of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, under the influence of the Soviet Union and in collaboration with other members of the Soviet bloc. Because the members of the Party's policy-making group also hold the top positions in the government, they both formulate policy and administer its execution. Indrect Soviet control over Czechoslovak economic affairs has been exercised mainly through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)--formed

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to promote long-range Soviet plans for the economic development of the satellites--and through trade agreements, and Soviet consultants assigned to Czech ministries to observe and supervise the implementation of prescribed economic policies.

1. Centralized Planning and Control

The Moskva-coordinated policy decisions and directives are translated into economic plans by the Czechoslovak State Planning Commission of the Czechoslovak Cabinet. It is composed of a President (a Deputy Prime Minister), his deputies, the heads of some economic ministries, prominent scientists and technologists, and the Chairman of the Slovak Planning Commission. Its members are appointed by the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the Cabinet.

The State Planning Commission exercises control over all economic and administrative activities in the state. It furnishes a guide list of key items to the planning departments of economic ministries, to be translated into goals for their subordinate enterprises. Theoretically, each enterprise estimates its maximum output and minimum expenditures for each operation in the production process. These estimates are then forwarded to the planning departments of the appropriate ministries, where all plans are reconciled. The ministry programs are then translated into quarterly and monthly plans for each type of industry. Meanwhile, a final, revised draft is prepared by the State Planning Commission and presented to the National Assembly for enactment into law. In this way targets are established for investment, production, and other aggregate measures for economic sectors, as well as goals for social, health, and cultural services. The final plan, currently for five-year periods, although ten- and fifteen-year plans are envisioned, constitutes a set of control figures, which becomes the basis for the allocation of national resources. By means of a chain of command extending from the ministry to the enterprise manager, the state supervises fulfillment of planned goals.

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Planning for agriculture is much less detailed than for industry. The State Planning Commission issues directives which establish goals for crop and livestock production, yields, and delivery quotas. Goals for state farms are assigned directly by the Ministry of Agriculture, while those for cooperative and private farms are set by local Communist authorities. Local agricultural plans proceed from the plans of okres Party and government committees. The latter plans are breakdowns of kraj plans, which have been developed by kraj government and Party committees together with the Ministry of Agriculture.

In addition to the control exercised by the various production ministries, the Czechoslovak government has adopted other specialized Soviet-type institutions for economic control. The most important of these are the state budget, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of State Control. Centralized control of the economic system is facilitated by the state budget, which brings all state revenues and expenditures under central authority and gears the state financial program closely to the national economic plan. Revenues, obtained mainly from sales taxes on consumer goods and profits from state-owned enterprises, are allocated by the budget to finance state investment, military expenditures, and other public outlays. Taxes are used to restrict consumption, discourage private enterprise, and encourage state-controlled economic activity. A supplementary control over economic activity is provided by the Ministry of Finance. Banking is centralized under the state-owned National Bank, Investment Bank, and Savings Bank, all of which are subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. All organizations must channel their transactions through this unified system. Investment in plant and equipment occurs through interest-free grants distributed by the State Investment Bank on the basis of centrally established detailed plans.

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Short-term credit is granted by banks to meet working requirements of enterprises in accordance with their approved production plans. The Ministry of State Control, another important economic control agency, was created in 1951 when increased emphasis on heavy industrial production and a high rate of investment necessitated more stringent controls over the factors of production. Functioning as the government's main fiscal auditor, it searches out enterprises guilty of financial mismanagement.

2. Industrial Administration

Nationalization decrees in 1945 brought most of the basic industries in Czechoslovakia into the state sector. On the eve of the Communist takeover, state-owned industry employed 64 per cent of the industrial labor force. Immediately following the coup in February 1948, all industries employing 50 or more persons were nationalized. Nationalization moved so rapidly that by the beginning of 1949 the socialized sector, including state-owned, locally owned, and cooperative enterprises, encompassed all but 3.6 per cent of the employed persons in industry. Large numbers of small producers, as well as medium and large producing firms, were liquidated because of alleged inefficiency. Many other enterprises were later taken over or driven out of existence mainly by discriminating tax and credit policies. By the beginning of 1956 the socialized sector of industry contributed 96.2 per cent of gross industrial production, state enterprises, 92.8 per cent, cooperatives, 3.4 per cent, while the private sector accounted for 3.8 per cent.

The major control elements in Czechoslovak industry are the industrial ministries, the heads of which are members of the Czechoslovak Cabinet. Prior to 1951, the central government exercised control over industry through large networks of intermediate agencies, which transmitted directives from ministries to the actual operating units. In 1951 this practice was dropped in favor of the creation of chief

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directorates within each ministry which were to absorb the functions of the abolished intermediate agencies. Each chief directorate supervised a given geographic area, branch of production, or specific problem, such as supply or construction. The aim of this reorganization was to centralize control over economic sectors formerly enjoying considerable independence, to simplify the administrative apparatus, and to bring individual plant managements into a more responsible position vis-a-vis the central government. Under the direct control of the chief directorates were the national enterprises--the basic economic production units. In some cases, several enterprises or auxiliary organizations (non-productive units set up to perform planning, marketing, and research functions for the production units) were subordinate to a main national enterprise which, in turn, was controlled directly by a chief directorate. Where a large concentration of similar enterprises was involved, an association was formed, with subordinate enterprises and auxiliary organizations. It too was in the direct line of control of a chief directorate. Genreally speaking, industrial management was organized on 3 levels: ministry, chief directorate, national enterprise. However, groupings of subordinate enterprises into one unit often resulted in a fourth layer of administration at the production level.

The existing pattern of organization in the economic production units is built around the all-embracing responsibility of the manager. Managers of main national enterprises, and of national enterprises designated as economic production units, are appointed by and responsible to the ministers of the industries involved. Managers of subordinate enterprises are appointed by and responsible to managers of main enterprises. The manager bears full responsibility for the work of the enterprise as a whole, for the fulfillment of the quantitative and qualitative indices of the state planned tasks, for the correct and

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economical expenditures of resources, and for the correct organization of labor. Immediately subordinate to the manager are the chief of production, who functions as his first assistant, and the chiefs of the planning, enterprise economy, commerce administration, technical control, security, and cadres divisions. Shop chiefs and section foremen are subordinate to the chief of production.

In certain sectors of the economy, national enterprises, associations, and auxiliary organizations may be established by kraj and okres national committees, with the consent of the appropriate ministers. Such production units are subordinate both to the councils of the national committees and to the respective ministers. Enterprises of local industry are under the jurisdiction of the national committees, at all levels, which establish them and appoint their managers.

In June 1956 the first of a series of measures was taken, aimed at decentralizing economic management and planning, and reducing the excessive size of the administrative machinery. Some ministries and other central agencies were abolished and their functions divided among new central bodies and local authorities. Moreover, the organizational structure of the remaining ones was simplified. Much of the ministerial authority and responsibility for planning, organization, wages, reconstruction and machinery overhaul, sales, financing, and credits gradually was transferred to the enterprise and local governmental levels.

A more drastic reorganization of the economic structure occurred in the spring of 1958. Industrial ministries were reduced to small supervisory bodies; day-to-day decision making was transferred to individual enterprises. On 1 April 1958 all chief directorates (178 in December 1957) were abolished and functions related directly to enterprise production were removed from the responsibility of the ministries. The 1,417 industrial enterprises (excluding local and cooperative industries) were regrouped into 929, including 316 main national enterprises, 126 branch

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national enterprises subordinate to main ones, and 487 enterprises united into 67 associations. During the course of this decentralization, 37,000 persons were dismissed from their posts in ministries and subordinate organs.

In January 1960 the regime announced its decision to revamp and simplify the entire administrative-territorial structure of the nation, as a further step in the process of economic decentralization. Under this plan, new kraj boundaries will be redrawn to conform to major economic areas and kraj governmental authorities will have increased responsibilities for control of the economy within their jurisdiction. Industrial enterprises of national significance will continue to be controlled directly by ministries in Praha. Enterprises of kraj, okres, or local importance, however, will be directed by the appropriate national committee council. In addition, kraj and okres councils will assume a large share of the responsibility for the effective location of industrial enterprises in their areas and for the elimination of differences in the level of development between individual okresses and obeces. The transfer of industrial enterprises to local governmental jurisdiction is to be completed by 1 January 1961.

3. Agricultural Administration

Prior to 1949 the ownership of agricultural land in Czechoslovakia was almost entirely in private hands. Most of the farm land consisted of small and medium-sized holdings owned and worked by individual peasants; only some larger holdings, mostly forest lands, were under government control. Beginning in 1949 the structure of land ownership changed radically as the Communist drive to "socialize" agriculture began.

As envisioned by the Communists, the socialization of agriculture means eventual public ownership of all private holdings, centrally organized production and distribution plans, and cooperative farming. Effective control of all agricultural resources by the regime provides means for

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supplying agricultural commodities for the urban and industrial population at relatively low prices, for overcoming the shortage of agricultural labor, and for increasing agricultural productivity by applying the factors of large-scale production.

The socialization of agriculture in Czechoslovakia has been gradual compared to that in the Soviet Union. As in some of the other satellite countries, it has been characterized by periods of rapid collectivization followed by periods of retrenchment during which gains were consolidated. At the end of 1957 the socialist sector, comprised for the most part of unified agricultural cooperatives (collective farms), state farms, and machine tractor stations, had 65.5 per cent of all agricultural land. By mid-1958 the figure was almost 72 per cent and in January 1960 it was 84 per cent (including 65 per cent in collective farms and 19 per cent in state farms). The private sector, which includes private farmers and the two lowest forms of cooperatives, has only 16 per cent of the agricultural land but nearly half of the permanent agricultural labor force (excluding seasonal workers, brigade leaders, engineers, other technical personnel, and administrative personnel). The regime is still heavily dependent upon the private sector for marketable agricultural produce.

Private farms, as well as state and collective farms, and machine tractor stations, are under the supervision of central planning authorities, although the extent and form of control exercised by the regime varies considerably. The socialist sector is controlled indirectly by the regime through local governmental authorities; the private sector is indirectly controlled from the center by means of discriminatory tax and credit policies and manipulation of the price system.

The most important agricultural control agency in Czechoslovakia is the Ministry of Agriculture. Goals for crop and livestock production,

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yields, and delivery quotas are established by the State Planning Commission. Operating within this framework, the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the overall supervision of the agricultural economy. It formulates production and investment programs in accordance with planned goals and directly assigns goals for state farms.

State farms, patterned after Soviet sovkhozes, have been operated under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture since 1953. Other ministries, however, have supervisory functions, particularly the Ministry of Food Industry, which exercises supervision in connection with specialized livestock breeding and fattening farms attached to certain food-processing installations. On 1 January 1957 the supervision and responsibility of directing state farms was transferred to the kraj national committees. A small central unit was maintained within the Ministry of Agriculture to provide a control link with the central government and to provide basic directions and solve construction, production, and management problems. The director of each state farm was given full responsibility for the property and his jurisdiction of operation was expanded. Today state farms represent the leading enterprises in every branch of agriculture. They claim the highest yields of essentially all crops and animal products. Their higher delivery quotas, apart from ideological considerations, attest to the government's interest in fostering and developing state farms. The per unit cost of production for a state farm, however, is probably higher than for any other type of agricultural production unit in Czechoslovakia.

Four types of collective farms (called unified agricultural cooperatives) exist in Czechoslovakia. Beginning with Type I, the lowest form (a preparatory committee) and theoretically progressing through Types II and III, the Soviet model kolkhoz, or Type IV, is eventually attained. Since 1950 the central statistical office has not included

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the land in the "lower types" (I and II) in the socialist sector. By the end of 1956, 98 per cent of all collectives were of the higher, socialized types (III and IV). For the collective farms, the administrative chain of command extends from the Ministry of Agriculture to the departments of agriculture and bulk buying of agricultural produce in kraj and okres national committee councils. The agricultural control responsibilities of local councils has increased in recent years to the extent that they now manage and direct virtually all state and collective farms, and the Soviet-type machine tractor stations, under guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Collectivization has not resulted in a proportionate increase in agricultural production in the collective sector. Some success has been achieved in grain production, but results have not been satisfactory in categories of crop production requiring a large labor force such as potatoes, sugar beets, and livestock. Funds for subsidizing collective farms still make up a significant portion of the annual state agricultural budget. In 1952, only 14.1 per cent of the collectives fulfilled their plan and were able to pay their members the planned remuneration per working unit; 44.2 per cent did not produce enough to cover the cost of the work of their members. The situation has improved somewhat since then.

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E. Control Force

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Czechoslovak Control Force numbered approximately 938,000 persons or about 6.9 per cent of the total population and 20 per cent of those employed in the socialized sector of the Czechoslovak labor force (see Table III. 4). Like the USSR Control Force, it is composed almost exclusively of persons with command responsibilities or in staff positions requiring specialized knowledge which would enable them effectively to exercise supervisory responsibilities in times of crisis.

The individual segments of the control force exercise varying degrees of responsibility. The Communist Party control force, comprised of 75,000 full-time Party professionals, is the most important and influential element. Through their positions in the only effective decision-making group in Czechoslovakia these people are able to control and shape action by all other agencies of governmental, military, economic, and social administration. They range in importance from the members of the central apparatus, who exercise nationwide control over every aspect of life in Czechoslovakia, to full-time secretaries of Party groups in remote agricultural areas.

The second most important component of the Czechoslovak Control Force is made up of the 82,000 persons working in state administrative agencies, including national, Slovak, kraj, okres, city, and obec governments. At each level, the workers in the organs of state administration are under the guidance of corresponding Party organs and are, in effect, the primary executors of the Party's will in relation to the population. The highest echelons of this control force component rank just below the central Party apparatus in power and prestige; at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy the differential increases.

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Table III. 4

Composition of the Czechoslovak Control Force: 1960

Category	Number	Per Cent of Total
Communist Party	75,000	8.0
State Administration	82,000	8.7
Military	134,000	14.3
Economic Administration	358,000	38.2
Industry	(225,000)	(24.0)
Trade, Supply, etc.	(42,000)	(4.5)
Transport and Communications	(37,000)	(3.9)
Construction	(35,000)	(3.7)
Agriculture	(19,000)	(2.1)
Services	289,000	30.8
Education	(179,000)	(19.1)
Health	(80,000)	(8.5)
Housing and Public Utilities	(14,000)	(1.5)
Finance and Credit	(11,000)	(1.2)
Others	(5,000)	(0.5)
Total	938,000	100.0

The military control force includes an estimated 134,000 officers and NCOs of the armed forces and security agencies. They command the major instruments of repression and coercion at the disposal of the regime and thus would play a significant role in a crisis situation.

The largest single segment of the Czechoslovak Control Force is made up of the 358,000 persons in economic administration. They manage or provide technical services for economic enterprises in the fields of industry, trade, transport, communications, construction, and agriculture. Persons with nationwide responsibility in the economic sphere, such as the heads of industrial ministeries, are included not in this category but in the state administration control force.

The services control force consists of 289,000 workers in such activities as education, health, housing, and public utilities. Members of this group supervise agencies responsible for supplying these services and provide technical support for such activities. Under normal conditions,

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this group has little significant command responsibility and is the least influential component of the control force. In wartime, however, its authority and responsibility are considerably increased.

Nearly all members of the Czechoslovak Control Force live and work in urban areas. Praha contains the majority of persons with nationwide responsibility; lesser concentrations are found in the kraj centers.

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Volume Two, Part II

IV. East Germany

A. Introduction

East Germany, the so-called German Democratic Republic, is, like 6 other nations in Eastern Europe, a satellite of the Soviet Union. The basic reason for its existence lies in the fact that Soviet armed forces support it and that the principal authorities in politics and government accept the direction given them by Soviet sources. In politics all guidance comes through the agency of a single political party, highly centralized in organization and barely responsive to public opinion. The governmental machinery uses a democratic facade to hide its dictatorial actions. Most of the economy is directly controlled by the state without the countervailing forces of competitors, labor unions, or the general public being able to play a part. All public discussion is cast in molds originating in the Soviet Union and the Soviet lead is followed even in such matters as the design of uniforms for the armed services.

Such an emphasis upon the great resemblance of East Germany and the Soviet Union should not be taken as a denial of differences between them, or between East Germany and any other satellite. Each of the nations in the Soviet bloc is the product of a long course of development during which each has reacted in its own way to its problems and has built up a national pattern of life. East Germany is perhaps more striking in this regard than any of the other satellites. As the successor to at least a part of the old German Reich, East Germany has inherited a population imbued with German national traditions and accustomed to acting as part of a great power. But East Germany has also inherited only a part, less than 25 per cent, of the population of that great power. The remainder live under a regime which is much more responsive to popular wishes and, to a great

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degree, more deeply imprinted with Germany's past. The regime in East Germany has had to take account of these facts. At least some of the forms of government have had to be adjusted to allow a token representation for accustomed forces and the application of Soviet policy has had to be made with regard not only for local opinion but also for the opinion of that 75 per cent of all Germans who live in West Germany.

There have been some successes in this process, principally from the point of view of the Soviets whose insistence upon their own policy has been backed by the presence of substantial force and whose reserves elsewhere have enabled them to disregard the loss of support among East Germans and of good will among West Germans. Locally, the people are mollified by the fact that some attention is paid to their needs and wishes, for no regime can totally and continuously affront the popular will and survive. In West Germany, some have been pleased by a continuing, if sometimes thin, strain of references to a common, German past, while some voters, 3.2 per cent of those who cast valid ballots in the 1953 elections to the Bundestag, respond to the appeals of the West German Communist Party, which follows the lead of East Germany.

There have also been failures. The full application of socialization has been delayed, principally because of resistance on the part of the populace, and this has marked a falling short of Soviet plans. The East German people have also given substantial indication of lack of support for the regime both singly and in groups, as in the wave of strikes and riots which took place on June 17, 1953, and in the clandestine form of a movement of population to West Germany. This movement has brought about a steady decline in East German population, despite a favorable relationship between birth and death rates, and has deprived the country of a substantial part of those in the younger

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working age groups. And, finally, East German and Soviet attempts to win meaningful support in West Germany have failed. People in that area have been alienated by the abundant evidences of the subservient nature of the East German regime and have not responded en masse to the appeals of Marxist-Leninist socialism or of German tradition offered them in a frequently imperfect amalgam by the East.

If these tendencies are projected into the foreseeable future, the East German regime can be characterized as one which will, because of the support of the Soviet Union, retain a firm control of the country. But it will never be more than a makeshift in meeting the goals set for it by the Soviet Union or in satisfying the overwhelming majority of its own people and more than a bare 3 per cent of the West Germans. East Germany's continued existence rests entirely upon forces external to itself: those of Soviet support and of international disagreement over the reunification of Germany. Pending some change in these factors the present regime will continue in power, perhaps generating shreds of support for itself through manipulation of appeals to German national tradition or to the long-standing socialist current in German thought and through as close conformity to Soviet policies as local situations will permit.

B. Socialist Unity Party

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which is the leading party in East Germany, was formed in 1946 after the merger of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany--KPD) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany--SPD) under pressure of Soviet occupational authorities. The SED joins with other parties and a number of mass organizations to present a joint list of candidates on the ticket of the National Front des Demokratischen Deutschland (National Front of

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Democratic Germany) in all elections, with announced results approaching absolute unanimity among the voters. In spite of the fact that the SED deputies in all elected assemblies are in a minority (usually holding about 35 per cent of the seats), all major policies are controlled by the SED and all political discussion is framed within its Marxist-Leninist terms of reference. The other parties in all essentials conform to its lead.

Note: There are 4 organized non-Communist political parties in East Germany: the Christliche Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union--CDU), which inherits the traditions of the pre-Hitlerian party of similar name; the Liberal Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberal Democratic Party of Germany--LDPD), representing the long-standing tradition of German liberalism; the National Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany--NDPD), founded in 1948 to marshal support among former Nazis and military men forbidden until then to join political parties; and the Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands (Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany--DBD), founded in 1948 in an effort to win support for the regime among the small farmers.

In the outward forms of its organization the SED is a party the policies of which are determined by persons freely elected by its members. Although it supports a Marxist-Leninist policy and aims at the complete socialization of the economy, it justifies these policies by reference to the wishes of its members. In actual point of fact, the SED is a centralized organization, the leaders of which set policy and replenish their ranks with no more than formal observance of the Party's constitutional modes of action.

1. Membership of SED

a. Growth in Membership

The Socialist Unity Party (SED) was founded in 1946 by the merger, under Soviet pressure, of the Communist Party (KPD) and the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD). Despite the fact that 52.3 per cent of its 1,298,415 members had come from the SPD, inheritor of the traditional trade-union oriented socialism of Germany, the new

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party followed a consistently Communist line. In its early years, however, membership policies were such as to encourage enrollment and the building of a large and somewhat amorphous organization in contrast to the typically centralized and elitist group usually favored by the Communists. As a result, by 1948 the 2,000,000 Party members accounted for 10.5 per cent of the total population (see Table IV. 1). Since many of these were former members of the SPD, and thus influenced by a more democratic form of belief, or had joined purely for opportunistic reasons, the SED leadership began a policy of restricting entry and of clearing the rolls of those considered untrustworthy. By 1950, 250,000 persons (or 12.5 per cent of the previous total) had been removed, leaving 1,750,000 on the lists. With that year an even harsher policy was applied and steps were taken to reduce party ranks to 1,230,000. In the following years an increase took place, in large part occasioned by the relaxation of tension after Stalin's death. By 1957 this movement had reached its peak with 1,570,000 members. From that time to 1960 SED membership remained comparatively stable, dipping to 1,472,932 in 1958, and rising slightly to an estimated 1,500,000 in 1960. This is equivalent to 87 per 1,000 total, or 116 per 1,000 adult, population, and is evidence of the fact that the SED is still less an elite organization than the Communist Party is in the Soviet Union, with 40 per 1,000 total population and 60 per 1,000 adult population. This does not, however, indicate that the SED membership is less firmly controlled by central Party authorities, or that any greater possibility of deviant action by a portion of the members is thus opened.

b. Regional Distribution of Membership

Although no information on the regional distribution of the SED membership has been published since 1948, available information strongly indicates that it is distributed in a fashion similar to those

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Table IV. 1

Membership of SED: 1946-1960

Year	Number of Members	Number per 1,000 Total Population	Number per 1,000 Adult Population (18)
1946	1,298,415	71	100
1948	2,000,000	105	146
1950	1,750,000	95	129
1953	1,230,000	68	93
1954	1,413,313	78	107
1956	1,520,000	86	117
1957	1,570,000	90	121
1958	1,472,932	85	114
1960	1,500,000	87	116

of the Communist Parties in other Satellite States. According to data on the occupational composition of the SED membership, most members work in the state sector of the economy which is located primarily in urban areas. Fragmentary data also indicate that they are concentrated in highly industrialized regions and in the administrative centers of the country. As a result, the highest ratios of membership per 1,000 population are probably found in such places as East Berlin, Leipsig, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt and Halle. The lowest ratios are to be expected in the predominantly agricultural areas of Mecklenburg and the adjacent northern provinces.

c. Occupational Composition of Membership

Data on the broad occupational grouping of SED membership indicates that white-collar workers constitute the largest single component in the Party (see Table IV. 2). Furthermore, since 1958, their numbers have more than doubled while total membership was decreasing 16 per cent, reflecting the increasing age of the Party and its resultant bureaucratization. Conversely, non-agricultural bench workers have decreased from 41.3 per cent of total membership to 38.3 per cent or, in absolute numbers, have decreased 27 per cent.

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Table IV. 2

Occupational Composition of SED Membership: 1950, 1958

Occupational Group	1950 Number	1950 Per Cent	1958 Number	1958 Per Cent
Employees	315,000	18.0	636,307	43.2
Non-agricultural Workers	772,750	41.3	564,133	38.3
Agriculture	na	na	na	na
Collective Farmers	na	na	42,715	2.9
Individual Farmers	101,500	5.8	30,931	2.1
Small Farmers and Farm Workers	136,500	7.8	na	na
Agricultural Workers	63,000	3.6	na	na
Others[a]	411,250	23.5	204,737	13.9
Total	1,750,000	100.0	1,472,932	100.0

a/ Includes members serving in the armed forces, Party professionals, and groups for which data are unavailable.

As is the case throughout the Soviet and Satellite world, Party membership in the countryside is weak.

d. Age and Sex Composition of SED

There is no current information available showing the age and sex distribution of members of the SED, but it is believed that data released in 1958 are still applicable. At that time 76.5 per cent of the SED were males and 23.5 per cent females. SED males, therefore, totalled 20.3 per cent of all males over 18 years of age, while only 4.7 per cent of all females over 18 were members of the Party.

In 1958 the overwhelming majority of the SED were over 40 years of age, with the largest component, 33 per cent, being in the ages 50 to 64. Only 7.7 per cent of members were under 24 years of age. If the number of Party members in each age group is compared with the total population in such ages, it will be seen that participation was highest among those from 40 to 49 years with 19.1 per cent being enrolled in the SED. At both extremes of the age scale

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participation was low. Only 5.7 per cent of the population aged 18 to 24 belonged to the SED, and only 3.0 per cent of those over 65. Of the total population over 18, 11.4 per cent were Party members.

Such a distribution of ages would indicate that the SED is heavily weighted with persons who may be presumed to have had direct personal experience with German politics in the period prior to 1933 and whose attitudes were molded then. It also reflects the age distribution of the East German population which includes disproportionate numbers of persons over 40 years of age. Furthermore, the low participation rate of those under 30 may reflect the SED's lack of success in appealing to younger people.

Table IV. 3

Age Composition of SED Membership: 1958

Age Group	Number	Per Cent of Total Membership	Per Cent of Total Population in Age Group
18-24	113,416	7.7	5.7
25-29	110,470	7.5	10.4
30-39	324,045	22.0	16.5
40-49	368,233	25.0	19.1
50-64	486,068	33.0	13.1
Over 65	70,700	4.8	3.0
Total	1,472,932	100.0	11.4

2. Organization of the SED

The basic principle upon which the SED is organized is that of "democratic centralism." Outwardly democratic, in that it provides for election of leadership by the members, it is rigidly centralistic in operation. All lower organizations are firmly under the control of the national apparatus, the central unit of which, the Politburo, is only nominally subordinate to any agency of the Party and which

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perpetuates itself through a policy of cooptation. Decisions taken by this body are not subject to question by lower authorities or by the membership and must be considered absolutely binding. Party authority extends not only to its own affairs, but also into all other spheres of life. It is common practice for persons holding Party posts at all levels also to hold posts in civil government, economic management, or mass organizations, acting as channels through which Party decisions are conveyed to those working in these fields. (See Figure IV. 1 for examples of interrelationship of Party and government.) In cases of conflict of interest between the interests of the Party and of other agencies, it is the former which prevail.

The SED is not, however, totally free from the need to respond to outside pressures. It must take account of the state of public opinion, never pressing its policies so far as to generate widespread discontent which might lead to open opposition. Nor can it go so far in meeting public opinion as to depart from its basic Marxist-Leninist orientation for that would entail a conflict with the Soviet Union, which through its exercise of its paramount military and economic power, sets the basic policies for the SED to follow. As a result, SED policies sometimes exhibit signs of response to varying forces, but in general the Party conforms to a "democratic centralist" policy.

a. National Organization of the SED

In public pronouncements, especially those designed to have persuasive or propaganda effect, the national organization of the SED (see Figure IV. 2) is presented as the agency which concentrates and coordinates the policy wishes of Party members, basing its actions upon their democratically determined opinions. The central offices of the Party exist to serve the members and to give proper formulation to the needs of the country and its workers. Yet in actual operation,

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FIGURE IV.1

INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT: EAST GERMANY



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FIGURE IV. 2

CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE SED: 1960



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all power to make effective decision is located in the central apparatus of the Party and local units have no reason for existence but to give effect to centrally made decisions. The role of the national organization of the Party thereby increases to the point of overriding all others and of overwhelming any possibility of opposition.

(1) The Politburo

The central agency of authority in the SED is the Politburo. This body consists of 9 regular members and 5 candidate members. It is the principal policy shaping and decision-making group in the Party, exercising influence on all levels of Party and governmental action. Since the members of the Politburo hold other posts in public organizations, or in government and Party agencies, coordination at the very highest levels is assured. There is a formal subordination to the Central Committee and to the National Party Congress, but the Politburo is subject to few limitations in its shaping of decisions. The most important single person in the present Politburo is the First Secretary who also holds the governmental post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and is thereby the most influential person in East Germany. It is clear from the pattern of past action that the Politburo of the SED follows policies adopted by the corresponding unit in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but the exact mechanism whereby instructions are transmitted cannot be clearly determined. The Politburo, although the most important agency of control in East Germany, is, therefore, not an independent force in political affairs, but is controlled by the Soviets through their preponderance of military force and through a commonly shared ideology and philosophy of government.

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(2) Secretariat

The Secretariat, composed of a First Secretary (incumbent-Walter Ulbricht) and 7 secretaries, is the next most powerful body in the SED.. It has responsibility for day-to-day party administration, acting through 19 operational divisions in supervision of specific fields of activity. Together with the Politburo, the Secretariat is chosen by, and theoretically responsible to, the Central Committee, but it is guided only by the Politburo and makes few concessions to the wishes of the membership. Although the Politburo is more powerful in determination of policy, the Secretariat, acting through the operational divisions, is able to shape Party work in all lower echelons of government and economy, as well as politics. It has important responsibility in the fields of propaganda and agitation through which it influences to some degree even those most uncommitted to the support of the regime. The First Secretary, Walter Ulbricht, is also a member of the Politburo as well as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

(3) Central Committee

The Central Committee, composed of 110 members and 44 candidate members, is, according to Party statute, the body which, in intervals between meetings of the National Party Congress, assures a continuous control over the activities of the Party to maintain conformity with democratically determined policy. In point of fact, the Central Committee serves principally a consultative function. It is too large, and its members too widely dispersed in the various areas of the country in which they have important local governmental or Party positions, to carry out this task effectively. Meetings of the Central Committee take place too infrequently to permit it to do more than confirm decisions already taken by the Politburo or

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Secretariat. Only rarely, and particularly in times of crisis, has it any effectiveness as a decision-making institution.

(4) Central Audit Commission

The Central Audit Commission is elected by the Party Congress but is under actual control by the Politburo. It directs Party finances and administrative procedures in the fields of accounting control of dues collections, party expenditures, Party property, financial control of semi-independent SED enterprises (such as publishing agencies), and in management control of the technical efficiency of such SED functions as communications, records, and investigations. Similar audit commissions are set up on Bezirk and Kreis levels, and are supervised by the Central Audit Commission.

(5) Central Control Commission

The Central Control Commission, elected by the Party Congress, but controlled by the Politburo, has the responsibility of maintaining the internal security of the SED. It consists of 8 members, 5 candidate members, and a chairman who is also a member of the Politburo. It examines the cases of those accused of infraction of Party rules and departures from the Party line, principally on appeal from the smaller commissions attached to Bezirk or Kreis Party organizations. Penalties of suspension from Party or official duties, reduction to candidate status, or of expulsion may be imposed. In many cases there is close, although unofficial, coordination with organs of the Ministry of State Security.

(6) National Party Congress

The National Party Congress which is made up of one delegate (with full voice) per 1,000 members and one delegate with advisory vote per 1,000 candidate members is elected not by the members directly but by the Bezirk Party Conference, which in turn are indirectly

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chosen. It meets at least once every 4 years in order to set Party policy and choose officials. Theoretically it is the highest policy-making body in the Party and the organ whereby members make their wishes known. Actually, it meets too infrequently, and its proceedings are too much under the control of the Politburo, to be effective. Its chief function is to act as a sounding board for the enunciation of new policy and to provide a formal approval for the self-perpetuating and non-responsible Party authorities.

b. Intermediate Organization of the SED

The SED, in order to maintain control over the basic units of the Party, is organized at levels intermediate between the central apparatus and the primary groups of members. These levels correspond to the major civil divisions of the government. Thus there are 14 Bezirk (province) organizations, and 215 Kreis and Stadtkreis (district and cities of district rank) organizations. Each of these repeats in its general forms the pattern set by the national apparatus, with such differences as the smaller number of members and varying importance of economy in the region make necessary. Despite formal proclamation of large rights of independent action for Party agencies at the lower level, each one is closely controlled by higher authority, the province organizations being directly subordinate to the national Party and in turn exercising a comparable supervision of the district bodies. The responsibility of these organizations to the membership, theoretically a major determinant of Party action, is entirely external, as all decisions on basic matters come from above.

(1) Buro

In each of the 14 provinces and their subdivisions, the 192 districts, and 23 cities of district rank, of the East German

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Republic, the most important agency of the SED is the Buro. There are from 9 to 11 members and 3 to 5 candidate members in the Province Buro and from 7 to 9 members and 2 or 3 candidates in the District Buro. They usually hold other posts in addition, such as those of Party First Secretary, Chairman of the Executive Council (chief local civil administrative functionary), Chairman of the Party Control Committee, Chairman of the Executive Board of Trade Unions, Chief of the local office of the Ministry for State Security, and the First Secretary of the City Party Committee of the seat of the province or district government. The head of the executive body of the Free German Youth (FDJ) is usually a candidate member of the Buro. The Buro's activities are closely controlled by national Party agencies which set the policies which the Buro has the duty of applying. Each member, though nominally chosen by the Party Conference, must be confirmed in his post by the Politburo and changes in Buro membership are frequently made by higher authority without preliminary consultation with the Party Committee which has statutory power in the field. In spite of such limitations on its independence, the Buro is the most powerful local agency and its head, the First Secretary, is the most influential personage in the area.

(2) Secretariat

The principal operative organ of the Buro is the Secretariat. It is composed of the First Secretary, who is also a member of the Buro and, thereby, the most important single party official, and of a varying number of rank and file secretaries. The Secretariat supervises Party activity through the agency of some 8 operational divisions in the provinces and 4 in the district. Each of these divisions is guided in its work by a corresponding division of the national Secretariat. The First Secretary heads an operational

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department charged with supervision of the State apparatus and the SED press, cooperation with the State police, the State security police and the public prosecutor. Each of the other secretaries supervises an operational department in the field of mass organizations, youth organizations, agitation and propaganda, economic affairs, agricultural affairs, culture and education, public administration, and Party activities. As is the case with the Buro members, all officials in the Secretariat are subject to confirmation by national Party authorities.

(3) Party Committee

The Party Committee, consisting of 60 regular members and 15 to 17 candidate members in the Province and of 35 to 45 members and 9 to 12 candidates in the districts, is elected by the Party Conference. A large proportion of its members hold important full-time positions in local Party and governmental agencies which, as in the case of the national Central Committee, reduces their function to one of consultation and of providing formal approval for the acts of the Buro and Secretariat.

(4) Audit Commission

The Audit Commission carries out at the local levels those functions of financial and administrative supervision performed by the Central Audit Commission at the national level. It supervises the receipt and expenditure of Party dues, the management of Party property, and the operation of semi-independent Party enterprises, as well as reviewing the functioning of communications, record-keeping and investigative agencies. It is elected by the Party Conference but is under actual control by the Buro.

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(5) Control Commission

The Control Commission, with 5 members and 2 candidate members, formally elected by the Party Committee but actually controlled by the local Buro, has the function of assuring conformity by Party members to the decisions and policies of the Party. It does so through the investigation of members' actions, imposing penalties, ranging from reprimands to expulsion, against those guilty of deviant actions.. There is close, but unofficial, coordination between the Control Commission and the Ministry of State Security.

(6) Party Conference

The Party Conference, elected by delegates to the Party Conferences at the next lower level and not by the members directly, is theoretically the most important local Party body. Actually it meets too infrequently to do more than give a stamp of approval to the actions of the Buro and Secretariat and to go through the forms of electing Party officials. It plays no part in making policy, or even in offering suggestions for needed changes, limiting its work to the hearing of a few days of speeches by important officials proclaiming the virtues and wisdom of the Party system.

c. Primary Party Organizations of SED

Primary Party Organizations (Grundorganisationen) of the SED are formed in each economic enterprise, governmental or public institution, or locality in which 3 or more members are to be found. In large enterprises or institutions sub-sections may be formed. Each such group elects a secretary and, should the size of the Primary Party Organization warrant, a number of others as assistants. Each person elected must be confirmed by higher Party organs. Since Party policy prefers that Primary Party Organizations be formed among those sharing

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a common work situation, the principal duties of such a group are connected with the operations of the agency or enterprise in which its members work acting as watchdogs over Party interests. Furthermore, a Primary Party Organization has the duty of guiding members in their personal life and political training. Although Party policy is supposed to be determined by the needs and wishes of its members, primary organizations have no influence on shaping policy and its members are not encouraged to discuss larger matters in any critical sense.

d. Trends in SED

Membership in the SED has not grown markedly in the years since 1954. It is likely that, as former members of the Socialist Party leave the SED, a decline will take place in the future. The regime has sought to counter this through efforts to expand the FDJ and to win over the young people of the state to support the Party. The probability of success is not great. The average age of Party members will therefore continue to rise. The SED, in spite of efforts to bring a representative sample of production workers into its ranks, will continue to be predominantly made up of employees, thus remaining an agency of a power elite newly risen to power on the ruins of Hitler's Germany through the support of the Soviet Union and under the cover of a so-called socialist policy.

C. Civil Government

Government in East Germany, like the SED, possesses all the outward characteristics of a democracy, based upon the will of its citizens and devoted to the furtherance of their freely expressed opinions. In actual practice, however, the East German government is a highly centralized organism, controlled by a small inner group of leaders, who also hold high posts in the SED, and is only minimally responsive

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to popular pressures. Officials are actually named by the SED and elections are but formal ratifications of this action. Public opinion may be expressed only so long as it indicates complete agreement with governmental policy. Although non-Communist parties exist and have their members in elective posts they have a paper existence and in all essentials conform to SED policies. All these factors are operative in every level of government from the central bodies in East Berlin to the most remote rural Gemeinde (commune).

Forms of organization and interrelationships of institutions at all levels are much alike. A rural commune is administered through bodies which are simplified copies of those governing the whole East German republic. Furthermore, the entire system of government is quite similar to those in the Soviet Union and in the other 6 European satellites. Concessions to traditional forms are made, principally in titles given to specific offices and in other externals, but this does not affect the realities of governmental operations.

1. National Government

Civil government at the national level in East Germany, like the corresponding levels of the SED, has an organization which is formally democratic and parliamentary, but which works in a centralized and totalitarian fashion. All acts of government, despite the democratic facade, are conditioned by the fact that primary decisions and policies are set by the SED, theoretically a non-governmental organization of citizens possessing no priority over any other group.

a. Presidium of the Council of Ministers

The principal authority in the government of the East German republic is the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (see Figure IV. 3). This body is in form a steering committee for the larger Council of Ministers and is made up of the Minister-President (Chairman of the

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FIGURE IV. 3

EAST GERMAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: 1960



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Council of Ministers), the First Deputy Chairman of the Council, 8 deputy chairmen, and 3 rank-and-file members of the Council of Ministers. This body has the function of providing a continuing control over policy which the larger and more unwieldy body of the Council of Ministers cannot conveniently exercise. Although there is token representation of the 4 non-SED parties, the major influence on the actions of the Presidium is that of the SED, exercised through the 5 members who conjointly hold high posts in Party organs. The most important person in this group is Walter Ulbricht who, although he is only First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and thus second-ranking member of the Presidium, is also First Secretary of the Party. He is, therefore, the single most important official in East Germany, joining as he does high governmental and Party posts. Grotewohl, the Minister-President, and highest civil official, occupies only a secondary position in the Politburo and is not a member of the Secretariat. Thus, his rank is lower and his influence less. These 2 instances, and those of other members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers who hold Party posts, illustrate how closely Party and governmental actions are linked and show that there is no real separation of functions between them.

Basically the Presidium's task is to apply policy adopted by Party officials to the very highest levels of government. It sets the agenda and determines the times of meeting for the Council of Ministers, and to a large extent predetermines the decisions to be taken by the latter. Many decrees and regulations which are formally issued by the Council of Ministers have actually been drawn up by the Presidium.

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b. Council of Ministers

In addition to the Minister-President, First Deputy Chairman and 8 Deputy Chairmen who are in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, there are 15 ministers (3 of whom are also in the Presidium), 3 commissioners, 3 state secretaries, the chairmen of the Central Commission for State Control and of the State Planning Commission, and the President of the German Bank of Issue in the Council of Ministers. Attached in an advisory capacity are 9 central agencies, whose chief responsibilities are in matters of scientific, cultural, and propaganda nature.

Each Ministry is organized into several specialized divisions, in addition to a central division with general administrative functions. The minister, his deputy, and the division chiefs constitute the collegium of the ministry, deciding many matters by common action. In spite of the wide formal jurisdiction granted to a ministry, its powers are greatly limited in practice. Important policies are formulated by agencies of the SED, elaborated by the State Planning Commission and adopted by the Presidium, leaving little for the determination of the ministries except administrative detail.

Some central agencies, such as the ministries of Communications, Transport, and State Security, maintain regional offices independent of local government agencies, but most act in local situations through the administrative departments at those levels.

Although a number of ministers are members of the puppet non-Communist parties, the chief influence upon decisions taken by the ministries is that of the SED. Surveillance of ministry activities, both by higher Party agencies, and by Primary Party Organizations in governmental institutions, is constant and effective.

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c. Legislative Assembly

The legislative assembly of East Germany is composed of 2 houses, the Volkskammer and the Landeskammer. The former is elected by the voters in direct, universal elections, in which opposition candidates never run and no "coalition" candidates ever fail. The Landeskammer, elected by the Bezirk or provincial assemblies, is a powerless token survival of the traditional German federalist system of government.

There are 466 members of the Volkskammer, 400 from the 14 Bezirke with full voice, and 66 from East Berlin with a consultative voice (1958). Only 117 of these are members of the SED, while 208 are listed as members of the other 4 parties. In addition there are 53 from the Free German Trade Union Federation, 29 from the Free German Youth, 29 from the Union of Democratic Women of Germany, 18 from the Cultural Union, and 12 from the Union for Mutual Assistance of Peasants. All candidates are presented as participants in the National Front of Democratic Germany, a nominal coalition of political parties and social organizations whose aim is stated as that of preserving democracy in East Germany. Despite the formal position of minority in which the SED finds itself, the Volkskammer is as fully under its control as any other agency of government. No hint of opposition to SED policies disturbs the smooth and formal performance of its duties.

According to the constitution, the Minister-President is chosen by the Volkskammer, as leader of the largest party, and the Volkskammer must approve his choice of ministers. Failure to approve a government measure would, as in the case of other parliamentary regimes, mean the fall of the cabinet and perhaps new elections. All measures must have the approval of the Volkskammer in order to become law. In practice, however, the Minister-President is the agent of,

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and chosen by, the Politburo of the SED, government measures never fail to pass unanimously, and most legislation is issued by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, in the name of the Council and with only token confirmation by the Volkskammer.

The Landeskammer has no effective function to perform, other than that of seconding the Volkskammer's formal approval of government measures. They act together in choosing the President of the East German Republic, an official of purely ceremonial function. The present holder of that post, Wilhelm Pieck, is an honored but powerless survival of the second rank leaders of the pre-Hitler Communist Party of Germany.

2. Intermediate Levels of Government

The administration of the 2 intermediate levels of government, those of the Province (Bezirk) and of the District (Kreis), is carried out through institutions and with processes modeled after those at the national level. (See Figures IV. 4 and IV. 5.) Names of institutions, number of officials, and the territorial scope of action vary, but the basic presuppositions of government are the same, including a controlling role for the SED and its agencies. As at the national level, there is a facade of democracy behind which control is actually highly centralized and dictatorial.

a. Council

The principal authority in local administration belongs to the Council. In the Province this body consists of a Chairman, a First Deputy Chairman, 4 deputy chairmen and from 7 to 10 rank-and-file members. In the District, there are but 3 deputies and from 5 to 8 members. These bodies correspond in general to the Council of Ministers in the national government. Each member has responsibility for supervision of one or more of the 13 administrative sections of the local

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FIGURE IV. 4

EAST GERMAN PROVINCIAL (BEZIRK) GOVERNMENT: 1960



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FIGURE IV.5

EAST GERMAN DISTRICT (KREIS) GOVERNMENT: 1960



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government. They are guided in their actions by the corresponding ministries of the central government and are subject to confirmation in their posts not only by higher officials but also by agencies of the SED. Party supervision is exercised even over those who are nominally members of one of the other paper parties. Many leading officials also hold important posts in the local SED, and are subject to its discipline. Finally, all actions of local councils are subject to control by the Council of Ministers and, in case of District administrations, by the Province Council. Responsibility of the Councils to the elected Assemblies is quite nominal.

b. Assembly

Nominally, control of local government is in the hands of assemblies (Bezirkstag or Kreistag) elected through universal, direct, secret balloting, which have, according to the constitution, the right to choose local officials and set policies. In actual practice the assemblies exist only to give a formal approval to the acts of the Council and to provide a forum for enunciation of new policies. Action is firmly controlled by the SED, despite the formal fact that a majority of deputies are members of the puppet non-Communist parties.

c. Standing Commissions

As a device for giving a broad impression of popular participation in the work of local government there have been set up a number of so-called Standing Commissions, composed of deputies to the Assemblies and aided by non-official persons with special competence in one or another of the fields of local activity. These Commissions correspond to the administrative sections of the Council and are supposed to advise and assist in carrying out its duties. They have no right of control, but may ask questions and offer suggestions. In some cases they may aid in securing palliative changes in

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the work of local government, as well as in securing cooperation from experts among the general populace.

3. Communal Administration

There are 9,502 Gemeinden (communes) in East Germany. These units, which may be wholly urban, wholly rural, or mixed, are the basic administrative units through which the populace at large is governed. Forms of administration and organization are similar to those at higher levels, and the difference between constitutional theory and practice are as striking. Management of local affairs is in the hands of the chairman of the local council, who is assisted by a secretary and an executive committee the number of which varies in accordance with the size of the commune. Each member of the latter group has responsibility for one or more phases of local administration within a framework of basic rules and regulations set by higher agencies of government and Party. The Council of Ministers and the Bezirk and Kreis Councils may suspend or annul actions taken by the commune administration. The Communal Assembly (Gemeindevertretung) is, on the model of those in provinces and districts, nominally the controlling agency of local affairs. Patterns of Party membership in the Communal Assembly are like those on higher levels in that the SED is in the minority. In actual practice however, the Communal Assembly is a powerless organization, serving as a forum for policy declarations and as a means of giving formal approval to local measures, and the SED's control over its actions is not hindered by any consideration of the Party's minority status. Standing commissions exist in the communal administration for the purpose of seeking a broader public support of governmental policies. Their effectiveness is limited.

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4. East Berlin Administration

The Soviet policy has been to give East Berlin a special position in order to maintain the fiction of adherence to Berlin's status as a city under joint Four-Power occupation. Administrative separation of the eastern part of Greater Berlin came about in 1948 after failure of the Soviet effort to take control of the whole city. The present system of administration is based upon measures taken in 1953 to apply to East Berlin the principles whereby East German local government was reorganized in 1952.

East Berlin is not, however, officially a part of East Germany. Its administration is called that of a city government, the functions of which are largely those of a typical German municipality. Actually the East Berlin administration has many of the privileges of a Province (Bezirk) and its legislative and judicial structure is like that of the East German central government (see Figure IV. 6). The role of the SED in East Berlin is comparable to that which it plays in East Germany, for the Party uses the same means of implementing its policies and has the same structure.

a. East Berlin Magistrat

The executive authority in East Berlin is the Magistrat (city council) which corresponds in general function to a Bezirksrat. Its chairman, the Oberburgermeister, is the chief local official. He is assisted by a secretary, 8 deputy mayors, and 7 rank-and-file members. The Oberburgermeister supervises the following departments of the city government: planning commission, finances, press office, youth, church affairs, police, justice, commission for state control, post and telecommunications, and statistics. The secretary is in charge of a number of general administrative departments. The other members of the Magistrat supervise additional departments, most of them counterparts

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FIGURE IV. 6

EAST BERLIN GOVERNMENT (MAGISTRAT): 1960



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of East German administrative entities: general administration, local industry and crafts, traffic, labor and vocational training, city planning, construction, trade and supply, agriculture, health, welfare, housing, education, art, and sports. In some functions, such as those of the planning commission, the police, the postal and telecommunication agencies, and the statistical organs, the East Berlin government probably has only nominal powers of supervision, following the lead of corresponding organs of the East German government.

The city government of East Berlin has no jurisdiction over the central agencies of the East German government located on its territory, but, on the contrary, it is subordinated for practical purposes to agencies of the "German Democratic Republic."

b. East Berlin Legislature

The East Berlin legislative body, the People's Assembly (Volksvertretung), consists of 180 members, the majority of whom are not members of the SED, but it conforms in all essentials to the policies laid down by that Party. It has theoretically the power to choose city officials and to enact legislation to meet city needs. It limits its actual functions to confirming in office those officials who have already been selected by the Magistrat, acting under guidance of the SED, and to the formal enactment of most East German statutory law. Its existence serves only to give a facade of popular acceptance to the regime and to maintain the fiction of East Berlin as an autonomous unit in German political life.

c. Standing Commissions

It is probable that, following East German models, standing commissions are formed in East Berlin, staffed by members of the People's Assembly and aided by experts or specially interested persons from the general populace. These commissions have the duty of examining the

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work of governmental institutions, making suggestions for improvements, and of explaining to interested members of the public the policies and changes which might be involved.

5. Judicial System

The judicial system of East Germany is organized in territorial units parallel to those of the civil government. A system of regular courts includes the Supreme Court in East Berlin and courts in the provinces and districts. Judges of the Supreme Court are elected by the Volkskammer for a term of 5 years and those in inferior courts are appointed by the Minister of Justice for 3-year terms. Special courts, functioning as sections of provincial or district courts, operate as juvenile or traffic courts, and one section of the Leipzig Bezirk court has jurisdiction over patent cases. Labor courts are organized at provincial and district levels. Contract courts, at the Bezirk and national levels, are subordinate directly to the Council of Ministers.

State attorneys in the provincial and district levels are administratively subordinate to the Attorney General, and not to the Minister of Justice. They have the duty not only of prosecuting criminals, but also of supervising the operation of courts and of the regular administration.

The functioning of courts at all levels is under close control by governmental and Party authorities. Steps have been taken to remove judges handing down decisions unfavorable to the regime and replacements have been selected from among untrained but zealous supporters of the state. Popular acceptance of the legality and justice of court proceedings is not high.

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6. Administrative-Territorial Organization

East Germany is divided for administrative purposes into 14 Provinces (Bezirke). The latter are made up of 192 Districts (Kreise) and 23 cities of District rank. The smallest unit of local administration is the Commune (Gemeinde), which may be rural, urban, or mixed. There were 9,502 Communes (Gemeinden) on January 1, 1959. (see Table IV. 4)

Table IV. 4

Administrative Territorial Divisions: East Germany

Province (Bezirke)	Cities of District (Kreis) Rank	Number of Districts	Communes (Gemeinden)	Province Control Center	Coordinates Lat.	Long.
Cottbus	1	14	757	Cottbus	51 46	14 20
Dresden	2	15	834	Dresden	51 03	13 45
Erfurt	2	13	812	Erfurt	50 59	11 02
Frankfurt am Oder	2	9	495	Frankfurt am Oder	52 21	14 33
Gera	2	11	636	Gera	50 52	12 05
Halle	2	20	761	Halle	51 30	12 00
Karl-Marx-Stadt	3	21	717	Karl-Marx-Stadt	50 50	12 40
Leipzig	1	12	643	Leipzig	51 20	12 20
Magdeburg	1	20	788	Magdeburg	52 07	11 38
Neubrandenburg	--	14	665	Neubrandenburg	53 34	13 16
Potsdam	2	15	867	Potsdam	52 24	13 04
Rostock	3	10	492	Rostock	54 05	12 07
Schwerin	1	10	623	Schwerin	53 38	11 23
Suhl	--	8	411	Suhl	50 36	10 42
East Berlin	1	--	--		52 31	13 24
Total	23	192	9,502			

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The eastern sections of the city of Greater Berlin are not de jure part of East Germany. Their international status remains that of a portion of a city under the Four Power occupation. East Berlin is, however, the de facto capital of East Germany and apart from a few governmental and administrative anomalies, such as the fact that the 66 deputies elected by East Berlin to the East German parliament have only a consultative voice, it is governed as a constituent part of the country.

D. Economic System

East Germany, as a Marxist-Leninist country, has as its ultimate goal a completely "socialist" state in which all means of production are owned by society. It is hindered from complete realization of this aim by the fact that the ruling class wish to extend their power over the larger and economically more important section of the country which makes up the Federal Republic of Germany (Deutsche Bundesrepublik --DBR) in which the major elements of the economy are controlled by private persons or groups. The East German ruling class cannot afford to affront West German opinion by too rigid an application of their beliefs. Furthermore, the East German people, possibly because of the existence of the safety valve of flight to the West, have been more resistant than other countries of the Soviet bloc in failing to achieve complete socialization.

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In spite of these limiting factors, the SED has not swerved from its chief end. By 1958 the "commanding heights" of the economy were firmly in the hands of the regime, so that only fringe areas of small scale production were held privately and these were under increasing attack. The prospects for the future were that they would disappear, more slowly than they had elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but with all deliberate speed.

1. Industrial Control

Before 1939 the eastern sections of the German Reich were predominantly agricultural. Natural resources were insufficient for extensive development of most of the major branches of economy. Fuel supplies were limited chiefly to low grade brown coal unable to meet the competition of the readily available bituminous deposits of Western Germany. Some important industrial installations did exist in the area around Berlin, a large population and communications center as well as the national capital, and in the areas of Land Sachsen and Thringen. Here important industries requiring inputs of highly skilled labor, but only small amounts of raw materials, developed in such fields as precision mechanics and optics. The war brought extensive damage to productive facilities and was followed by widespread looting, under the name of reparations, on the part of the Soviet authorities. Following that, movements of population and an economic policy not supported by a majority of the people brought further disruptions. The founding of the "German Democratic Republic" in 1948 and its being "granted" control over its own economy took place, therefore, in an area in which both the material resources, and the popular will necessary for a smoothly functioning industrial system, were lacking.

In spite of these limiting factors, the East German regime has continued to press toward an industrialized economy which would

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be highly autarkic in respect to raw materials and socialist in form of ownership. By 1958 they had attained a marked degree of success in both endeavors. Much use was being made of sources of raw materials which had been left untouched in pre-1939 Germany, and the process of socialization of industry had gone so far that 88.3 per cent of the workers, producing 92.15 per cent of the total industrial product, were in publicly owned enterprises. The proportion of workers and of total product in the public owned sector varied by branch of production from 100 per cent of the electric power industries (both workers and production) to 64.7 per cent of the workers and 72.2 per cent of the product in the clothing industry.

Control over the state-owned sector of industry has been modeled closely upon that exercised in the Soviet Union. Until 1958 each major branch of industry was controlled by an economic ministry, the head of which was a member of the Council of Ministers. Smaller enterprises, principally producing consumer goods or utilizing by-products and small raw material resources, were managed by provincial or, in the case of the smallest plants, district administrative bodies. Administration of industry was complex, particularly since the intermediate levels between the ministries and the producing enterprises were numerous and inefficient. Despite all efforts of the Council of Ministers, and particularly of its planning and coordinating organ, the State Planning Commission, industrial production suffered from over-control and a great deal of under-fulfillment.

In 1957 the Soviet Union adopted a system whereby many planning and coordinating functions were devolved from central authorities in Moskva to local authorities in the republic and/or

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oblast capitals. Following the lead of the USSR, the East German regime adopted a similar form of organization.

In general outline, the steps taken in East German parallel those of the Soviet Union, although they differ in detail. The 8 ministries which had formerly controlled the major share of the German industrial establishment (Chemical Industry, Mining and Smelting, Heavy Machine Construction, General Machine Construction, Coal and Power, Food Industry, Light Industry, and Labor and Vocational Education), together with their main administrations were abolished. Control over the operations of enterprises subordinate to these ministries was delegated to 74 Associations of State Enterprises (VVBs) which were formed on a category basis and geographically located at or near the major concentrations of their respective enterprises.

The central government retained control over those VVBs in the heavy industrial sector through their subordination to the State Planning Commission (see Figure IV. 7). This agency, therefore, in addition to its planning function for the entire economy, now has operational control over heavy industry and acts as a supreme economic council in this sector. The number of its departments was increased to include basic industry and machine construction, consumer goods, traffic, and regional planning. Other departments are concerned with long-range planning, material balances and allocations, investments, finances and prices, and other similar activities.

The State Planning Commission coordinates the operations of light and food industry enterprises through the newly formed provincial economic councils which are subordinate to both the provincial executive committee and to the State Planning Commission. The provincial economic councils, composed of the leading officials at the provincial level,

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FIGURE IV.7

INDUSTRIAL SUBORDINATION IN EAST GERMANY: 1960



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directs the operations of VVB (B)s in the non-heavy industrial field subordinate to them. The provincial executive committees also contain functional departments which administer economic activities not subordinated to VVBs, including ones for handicraft and private industry. Although VVBs subordinate to the central government are supposed to coordinate their activities with the provincial economic councils, it is believed that what coordination exists is exercised through SED rather than government channels.

At the district level, the ranking economic agency is the district State Planning Commission which is dually subordinate to the provincial economic council and to the district executive coommittee. It plans for all agencies subordinate to the district executive committee and directs the operations of VVB (K)s subordinate to it. Industry at this level consists, for the most part, of local consumer goods, municipal services, local construction and building materials, and water management. The district planning commissions, like the provincial economic council, cannot interfere in the operations of enterprises and organizations subordinate to central organs. Coordination, while required by the enabling act for VVBs, is probably limited and exercised again primarily through SED channels.

Although, as noted above, publicly owned industry plays the major role in the economy, private enterprises still exist. In some fields, such as that of clothing production, they are of importance, but major branches of industry are almost totally socialized. The regime has consistently pressed for a conversion of the remaining private plants into semi-public ones in which the State participates through investments of capital and then strives to retain control by regulating their supply of raw materials and their output. Only

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tactical considerations have prevented the State from using its power to bring about a complete socialization of the economy.

2. Agricultural Control

At the end of the war steps were taken by the new regime in East Germany to confiscate all large land holdings. Most of the land was then distributed to former tenants or laborers, and by 1950 the bulk of the land was held in units of less than 50 acres. Since this was not the most efficient distribution of land, for it did not permit proper utilization of machinery and investments, and since it gave what the regime regarded as too much support to the idea of private ownership of the means of production, a campaign was begun to bring about the collectivization of land. Although the Soviet pattern was followed in most details, it was impossible to bring about a completely collectivized agriculture. By 1960 46.4 per cent of the land was held by some 9,520 so-called cooperatives and 8.0 per cent by state farms making a total of 54.4 per cent of the land in the socialized sector. In the organization of collectives substantial concessions had to be made to peasant reluctance to give up the land. The principal concession was that payment to members at the end of a crop year is based in part upon work done and in part upon the amount of land each member contributed, a token recognition of peasant wishes which was not granted in the USSR. These cooperatives, controlled by communal, district, and province authorities, as well as through agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the SED, were given various benefits not available to private farmers, and every effort was made to win more members. In actual operation these units are not cooperatives, in that the members have no independence of action and are limited to placing formal approval upon measures of government and Party authorities.

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The state farms are usually large, specialized units devoted to a single crop or some activity such as livestock breeding or seed production. These are directly subject to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Private farmers continue to hold 45.4 per cent of the land. Holdings generally are less than 50 acres, although there remains a significant number of larger farms. All private farms are under heavy pressure by the government to make deliveries of various agricultural items on a scale which placed a greater burden on the larger farms. These are under the additional burden of paying a higher rate than the owners of smaller farms for the use of machinery from the 600-odd Machine-Tractor Stations, which have a near monopoly on major agricultural implements. The regime has the clear goal of forcing the larger farmers into such a position that they will join the collectives, after which it would be possible to apply similar pressures to the small farmers. It cannot, however, act too harshly in this, for a similar policy, when applied in the period prior to 1953, brought about serious disruptions in agricultural production. Therefore, a more cautious procedure has been adopted, acting against one segment of the farm population at a time and holding out to the smaller peasants some intimation that perhaps they might be exempt.

Except for declining number of obsolescent tractors and other machines remaining in the hands of private farmers from pre-World War II days, all major agricultural machinery in East Germany is controlled by the 600-odd Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) controlled by agencies of the Minister of Agriculture. These organizations carry out work on the land under contract with both collective and private farms. Efficiency of the Machine-Tractor Stations is not high and there are often interruptions to the supply of fuel and spare parts. In 1959 the regime instituted a policy of transferring machinery from the MTS

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to the collective farms in those areas in which at least 80 per cent of agricultural land is in the "socialist sector." This parallels the action of the Soviet Union in selling MTS machinery to the kolkhozy in an effort to simplify agricultural administration.

Prospects are that the East German regime will continue to press for the collectivization of agriculture, but that it will seek to present the process as a voluntary move on the part of the peasants. It is prevented from moving too rapidly by fear of serious disruptions to the food supply, such as occurred in 1953, as well as by the possibility of loss of any possible influence among the peasantry of West Germany. As a result, East Germany lags behind all countries of the Soviet bloc save Poland, in which special forces have been operative, in degree of collectivization.

E. Control Force

The East German regime maintains itself in power and controls the actions of the populace through the agency of a control force numbering 1,145,000 (see Table IV. 5). This is equivalent to 14.1 per cent of the labor force and to 6.7 per cent of the total population. The control force includes all persons who because of their administrative positions, military rank, or specialized technical training direct or advise others in the performance of one or more activities of life. The control force includes persons at widely disparate levels of power, ranging from the First Secretary of the SED to a foreman in a small toy factory, or from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to the principal of a rural school. Each one, however, has by virtue of his job some degree of authority or influence over the actions of others.

The control force may be divided into 3 major components according to the extent of the influence each possesses. The primary control

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force, numbering less than 10,000, includes those persons who hold positions in the central agencies of the Party or the civil government or who are flag or general officers in the armed forces and militarized police. At this level of power a person in the control force exercises influence over national institutions and throughout the whole territory of the republic. There are, of course, finer internal divisions of power, for the First Secretary is more influential than a member of the cabinet or than a general officer of the armed forces. But, in general, they share a national responsibility.

The intermediate control force, with approximately 270,000 members, includes those persons whose responsibility is limited either to control of a specific branch of activity or to administration of one of the major areas of the country. Typical members of this group are the chief administrators of the 14 provinces, heads of important regional aggregations of economic enterprises, field and company grade officers of the armed forces, persons at the sub-ministerial level in the Council of Ministers, or directors of territorial units of social service agencies.

The lower control force includes more than 865,000 persons. Their chief duty is to carry out direct supervision of the activities of state and economic agencies. Among them are clerical workers in the state administration, NCO's in the armed forces, supervisory workers within factories and collective farms, and certain professionally and technically trained persons who, although without formally ascribed rights of command, are important influences in determining the activities of others.

The primary control force is largely composed of males, members of the SED, and is probably slightly older than the general population. It is overwhelmingly located in urban areas, principally in East Berlin,

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Table IV. 5

East German Control Force: 1960

Category	Number		Per Cent of Total	
Party Administration	80,000		7.0	
State Administration	200,000		17.5	
Economic Administration	530,000		46.3	
Industry		(265,000)		(23.1)
Construction		(35,000)		(3.1)
Transportation and Communications		(53,000)		(4.6)
Trade		(80,000)		(7.0)
Agriculture		(97,000)		(8.5)
Military Command	40,000		3.4	
Services	295,000		25.8	
Credit and Insurance		(30,000)		(2.6)
Education, Culture		(97,000)		(8.5)
Health		(122,000)		(10.7)
Others (Housing, Public Utilities, Police and Fire Protection, etc.)		(46,000)		(4.0)
Total	1,145,000		100.0	

with most of those in other cities to be found in the province capitals. The intermediate control force is also largely male and membership in the SED is high. Age composition probably shows a prevalence of the persons past 40 years of age. It is again an urban group, although it is distributed somewhat more widely throughout the country. The lower control force probably has a higher proportion of female members than the others, although not as many as the sex composition of the population would suggest. Membership in the SED is lower than in the primary or intermediate groups, but higher than in the general population. It is possible that the level of education in this group is higher than the average of the upper levels, particularly since power on those levels is granted as an attribute of political service and not of technical or professional skill. The lower control force

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is more evenly distributed throughout the country, in both urban and rural locations, than the other groups, but, because of the character of occupations of the majority of its members, it is also largely urban in composition.

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Volume Two, Part II

V. Hungary

A. Introduction

Hungary, like 6 other nations of Eastern Europe, is a satellite of the Soviet Union. Unlike those nations it has made a violent armed effort to escape from Soviet control and, having failed, suffers the consequences. This is part of a pattern of Hungarian historical experience, for it has made similar efforts against the Turks almost 500 years ago and against the Austrians in 1848 only to fail and to be forced once again into subjection. The present failure to assert national independence is probably the most bitter, for after the previous revolts the conquerors left many areas of traditional Hungarian life untouched, but the Soviets, and their Hungarian puppets, support an ideology the realization of which would bring deep changes in all spheres of life. Political expression is channeled into fixed and externally shaped forms foreign to the Hungarian way of life. Only faint and superficial remnants of traditional Hungarian forms of government mask the basic lines of Soviet models. Economic institutions repeat Soviet counterparts. The Hungarian peasant, after centuries of striving for land of his own, now finds himself forced into an alien collective farm upon which he is as much a serf as he was under the Hapsburgs.

Only a small segment of the Hungarian people actually accept this order of things as right and just. It was clearly demonstrated during the October-November events of 1956 that the majority wanted to be rid of Soviet controls in order to follow a more truly national path. Now that the former controls have been reimposed, the nation finds itself deeply antagonistic to those who govern it. They obey, it is true, and, furthermore, they do it well enough to assure a reasonably smooth operation of the state and the economy. But they obey not through conviction that it is morally right to do so but through the need to

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maintain life, both personal and national, whatever the cost. There have been some benefits, principally in the form of a somewhat improved standard of living, which have come to them through obedience, but it is evident that neither benefits nor obedience have generated a true attachment to the present regime.

The regime exists. It will exist as long, and as far, as Soviet bayonets stand behind it. Once they are removed, it will fall. The people, moved both by memories of the bitter past and by realization that Soviet force is overwhelming, can only continue giving outward obedience while waiting the outcome of events which they cannot control.

B. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

The ruling party in Hungary is the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. This body is a direct descendant of the Hungarian Communist Party, founded in 1918 by a group of returned prisoners of the Russians. For a period of 4 months in 1919 the Communist Party, in uneasy alliance with the Social Democrats, held power in Hungary but it was forced out by a conservative counter-revolution led by Admiral Horthy. From 1919 to 1944 the Communist Party was illegal in Hungary. Its members were scattered refugees in deep underground and its activities were limited to a pointless groping for some shred of support. The invasion of the Soviet armies in 1944 brought with it a number of Communist Hungarians who took advantage of the support of the Soviet Union to build up their party. They did not meet with great success, as evidenced by the fact that the first post-war elections, the least heavily influenced of any in all Hungarian history, returned a majority for the non-socialist, agrarian oriented Small Holders' Party, and left the Communist with less than 20 per cent of the vote. Increasing Soviet pressure was employed to "correct" the situation and by June 1947 the Communists had taken full control. In May 1948 the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party and of the Communist Party was brought about, much

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against the wishes of the members of the former body, and the new organization was renamed the Hungarian Workers' Party and under its control Hungary was quickly converted into a standard member of the Soviet bloc. Rigid controls were imposed and strong measures were taken against opposition groups in the population and against possibly deviant members of the Party. As was the case in the Soviet Union, the period after the death of Stalin saw a relaxation of some of the harsher forms of control and some measures were taken to meet the evident wish of the people for a larger area of independent activity. This era culminated in an uprising of the whole population, save for a few thousand confirmed supporters of the regime, which for a few days late in October and early in November 1956 seemed destined to take Hungary out of the Soviet-Satellite Bloc. Moskva intervened, however, and Soviet troops were used to crush the uprising. This effectively destroyed the Hungarian Workers Party and all real support for its policies. The reorganization of the Party which took place after the revolt did nothing to alleviate the situation; a new name was adopted, that of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, a few new people (or rather resurrected tools of the Soviets) were put in positions of power, and the regime continued to follow a policy based upon considerations other than those of winning popular approval of its programs.

The Party exists by virtue of Soviet support and the cooperation of those too deeply committed to leave it. It maintains its hold on the country only because all realize the overwhelming force which would be directed against any effort to take another course. It represents no important segment of public opinion and has no future beyond the day when Soviet force ceases to support it.

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1. Membership

a. Total Membership

Membership in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party reflects the low estate in which it has found itself since the revolt of October 1956 for only slowly has it been able to recruit half as many members as it had in September 1956 (see Table V. 1). In 1948, at the time of the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party there were 1,500,000 members. Action was begun to rid the Hungarian Workers' Party of those who, through their belief in a democratic, trade union-oriented socialism, might prove susceptible to oppositionist thinking. At the same time measures were taken to purge the Party of those long-time members of the Communist Party whose devotion to the Soviet Union and its plans for Hungary might be less than total. Within a year the number had fallen to 1,000,000 and by 1950 there were only 800,000. In 1952 membership was at its lowest for this period, an estimated 762,000. A small increase occurred after that, following the slight relaxation which occurred throughout the Soviet Bloc after the death of Stalin. In 1954 there were 864,000 members and candidates, a figure

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Table V. 1

Membership of Hungarian Workers Party: 1947-1960

Year	Number	Number Per 1,000 Total Population	Number Per 1,000 18 Years and Older
1947	650,000	71	102
1948	1,500,000	164	232
1949	1,000,000	109	153
1950	800,000	85	122
1952	760,000	80	117
1954	864,607	90	130
1956 (Sept)	900,000	91	131
1956 (Dec)	103,000	11	15
1958	380,000	39	56
1960	403,000	41	59

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which remained approximately stationary for two years. After the uprising in October 1956 Party ranks declined sharply. In early November, in fact, the machinery had fallen to pieces and only those few thousand who had too deep a commitment to the regime or its ideology to risk an open break remained with it. At the end of 1956 there were 103,000 persons on Party rolls. Thereafter the ranks grew, but only slowly as steps were taken to assure the reliability of new members and to investigate their position during the October days of 1956. In September 1958 the announced membership was 380,000, and by the time of the Party Congress late in 1959, only some 20,000 had been added to bring the total to 402,456. Such a total means that 4.1 per cent of the total population and 5.9 per cent of that, over 18 are members.

b. Regional Distribution of Membership

There is only fragmentary information available concerning the regional distribution of members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; 130,000 (13.2 per cent of total membership and 6.8 per cent of the city's population) were located in Budapest in mid-1953. The remaining two-thirds of the membership is undoubtedly thinly scattered throughout the nation, roughly parallel to the degree of urbanization and industrialization, and that in agricultural areas tend to be concentrated in administrative centers.

c. Occupational Composition

According to a June 1959 announcement by a member of the Hungarian Central Committee, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is predominantly made up of workers (see Table V. 2). It is unclear whether this refers to present occupation or to social orgin. In the latter case, the 60.9 per cent who are "workers" would include a large number who, though coming from a working class background, now hold administrative positions. The same stricture would apply to the 12.8 per cent listed as peasants. None of the categories given correspond

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with those used to list the Hungarian labor force; therefore it is impossible to determine the incidence of Party membership per 1,000 employed persons in any category. Fragmentary data, however, indicate that it is highest among the office employees and intellectuals, a little lower among the workers, and lowest among the peasants.

Table V. 2

Occupational/Social Origin (?) Composition of Membership of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: June 1959

Category	Number	Per Cent of Total
Workers	253,950	60.9
Peasants	53,380	12.8
Intellectuals	31,690	7.6
Office Employees	50,460	12.1
Students, Housewives, Pensioners, etc.	27,520	6.6
Total	417,000	100.0

d. Age-Sex Composition of Membership

Data supplying the age or sex of members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party are few, and most date from the period before the uprising of October-November 1956. It is possible to determine that between 55 and 60 per cent of the members at the beginning of that year were over 36 years of age, while 28.7 per cent were women. No information gives the age composition in the years since 1956, but it is estimated that women comprise only about 15 per cent of total Party members. On the basis of such an estimate, and given the 1960 membership of the Party, probably some 10.0 per cent of all Hungarian males over the age of 18 and less than 2 per cent of all Hungarian females in the same age category are members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

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2. Organization of the Hungarian Workers' Party

Although the organization of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is, according to Party statute, designed to give expression to and implement the wishes of all members with regard to the shaping of political life, it is in actuality merely the instrumentality with which the policies and plans of a small group are applied to the whole country. This state of affairs in the Party has been particularly marked since 1956 when the present rulers forcibly suppressed the Nagy regime which, among other aims, had attempted to make the machinery of state and politics more responsive to popular wishes rather than to a small group of Marxist-Leninist oriented politicians.

a. National Organization

(1) Political Committee

The chief policy and decision-making body in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is the Political Committee, a body composed of 11 members and 2 alternates. In the words of the Party statute, "It guides and leads the party between the meetings of the Central Committee." In reality, because of its day-to-day control of Party work, it is the chief policy making body in the Party, far overshadowing the Central Committee to which it is nominally responsible. The Political Committee has freedom to shape policy only within the limits of the larger decisions made by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Control of the action of the Political Committee was particularly close during the period just after the uprising of October 1956 when it was evident that Soviet authorities were issuing direct and detailed orders to Hungarian Party agencies. Members of the Political Committee also hold high-level posts in government, public, or other Party agencies and thereby exercise a major influence in the operation of these bodies (see

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Figure V. 1). The most important member of the Political Committee is Janos Kadar, who is also First Secretary of the Party Secretariat and a Minister of State (without portfolio) in the civil government. Kadar, by virtue of such a position and combination of offices, is the most influential person in the country; Istvan Dobi, President of the Presidential Council and thus titular head of state, and Ferenc Muennich, Premier, are much less important figures.

(2) Secretariat

The Secretariat, headed by First Secretary Janos Kadar and with 4 additional secretaries, is responsible for supervising the implementation of decisions taken by the Political Committee. Although the Secretariat, as well as the Political Committee, is nominally responsible to the Central Committee, they act first, looking to the Central Committee later for a token approval of their actions. Detailed information about the internal organization of the Secretariat is lacking, particularly since the reorganization of the Party after the 1956 uprising, but it is probable that each member of the Secretariat is responsible for supervision of one or more operational divisions in the various specific fields of public and economic life. These operational divisions have the duty of amplifying policies adopted by the Political Committee to fit a given situation and of checking the way in which decisions are carried out. They also guide the corresponding divisions of local Party bodies in their work.

(3) Central Committee

The Central Committee, to which both of the bodies described above are theoretically subordinate, has 53 regular and 9 alternate members. These have, as a rule, important positions in Party and governmental agencies, both at the national and the local level. All members of the Political Committee and of the Secretariat are also members of the Central Committee. Because of the responsible

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FIGURE V. I

HUNGARIAN PARTY - GOVERNMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS



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nature of their other positions and the physical location of some in centers outside Budapest, the members of the Central Committee cannot exercise the continuing supervision of Party work which is theoretically the duty of the Committee. Its meetings are therefore forums for the enunciation of policy and for ex-post-facto ratification of decisions of the Political Committee and the Secretariat. The power of electing national Party officials, granted it by the Party statute, is exercised only in ratification of a slate of candidates pre-selected by the Political Committee.

(4) Central Control Committee

The 9 members of the Central Control Committee, who are elected by the Central Committee (at the nomination of the Political Committee), have the duties of watching over the political actions, moral integrity, and loyalty of Party members. They are to wage "war" against all forms of undisciplined, factional, corrupt, and "unpartylike" activity. They are to be particularly on guard against the infiltration of the Party by undesirable elements and may institute investigations of Party members accused of deviation and can impose punishments ranging from simple reprimand to expulsion from the Party. The Committee also confirms similar actions begun by the Control Commissions of regional Party organizations.

(5) Central Audit Committee

The 7 members of Central Audit Committee, elected in the same manner as the Central Control Committee, are responsible for the audit of Party financial activities, including the receipt and accounting of dues, management of Party property, and the control of seim-independent Party activities. This committee may also have the duty of supervising Party record keeping and management practices. Similar bodies in lower Party organizations are under its supervision.

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(6) Party Congress

The Party Congress, which according to the Party Statute is to meet at least every 3 years, is theoretically the controlling agency in Party affairs, setting policy and electing officials. In point of fact, the Party Congress serves only to provide a further forum for officials and a means of giving a surface coloration of approval to their actions. The Congress, elected by county and precinct Party organizations is composed of delegates with full voice in the proportion of one for each 1,000 members of the Party, and of delegates with consultative voice for each 1,000 candidate members. The most recent meeting was held in December 1959.

b. Intermediate Levels of Party Organization

There are 2 levels of authorities between the national apparatus of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and its 16,805 "cells." They correspond to the counties (Megyek) and districts (Jaras) into which the country is divided. They share many organizational forms, on a reduced scale, with the national Party apparatus. They have theoretically wide powers of control of local activities but the highly centralized nature of decision-making in the Party reduces the role of local agencies to the unquestioning application of policies handed down to them.

(1) Executive Committee

Principal authority in county and district Party affairs belongs to the Executive Committee. This body, with from 9 to 11 members in the district and from 15 to 20 in the county, is nominally elected by a local Party Committee, but its members are subject to confirmation by higher Party agencies and there is probably a high degree of pre-selection which nullifies any local freedom of choice. Within limits determined by national, or, in the case of district, by county authorities, this Executive Committee sets local policies.

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It is usual for at least some of its members to hold other posts in Party, government, or economic institutions, thus providing channels for information about and control of other spheres of public life.

(2) Secretariat

Day to day control of Party activities at these levels is in the hands of a Secretariat, with at least 3 secretaries who are nominally elected by the Party Committee of the membership, but actually chosen by the Executive Committee at the suggestion of higher authorities. Each secretary has responsibility for supervising Party work in one or more fields of activity. The exact division of responsibility among the secretaries has not been made public for the period since 1956. Principal authority in the Secretariat is in the hands of a First Secretary who, as member of the Executive Committee and as the major continuing official, is the chief personnage in local Party and governmental affairs.

(3) Party Committee

The Party statute provides that basic control of local Party affairs in the intervals between meetings of the Party Conference is in the hands of a Party Committee. The body numbers from 25 to 31 members and from 5 to 25 alternates in the district and from 31 to 41 members and from 5 to 25 alternates in the county. Its members as a rule have other responsible posts, often at some distance from the county and district seats, and it is impossible for them to meet for longer than is necessary to lend formal approval to the actions of the Executive Committee and Secretariat. There is probably a degree of pre-determination on the part of higher Party authority as to who shall be selected for positions on the Party Committees.

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(4) Control Committee

Both county and district organizations of the Party have Control Committees attached to them. Like the similarly-named body in the national apparatus, this has the duty of carrying on surveillance of Party members to guard against ideological deviations and the infiltration of undesirable elements. It may initiate action against persons accused of such crimes and, subject to confirmation by a higher ranking Control Committee, impose sanctions ranging from a simple reprimand to expulsion. It is probable that there is close, though unofficial, liaison with local organs of the security police.

(5) Auditing Committee

At both county and district levels there is an Auditing Committee. Its duties are similar to those of the national Auditing Committee, namely, the supervision of Party financial operations and, probably, of reviewing record keeping and management procedures.

(6) Party Conference

The Party Conference is, according to Party statute, the highest local organ of the Party, elected by the members and controlling actions of the officials. The meetings are, however, infrequent and the Party Conference serves principally as a forum for the enunciation of new policy and to give a surface stamp of approval to official action. As a further barrier to prevent the Party Conference from becoming a true exponent of the wishes of the membership, it should be noted that delegates are elected by lower ranking Party Conferences and not by the membership directly.

3. Primary Party Organization

The Primary Party Organization (PPO), numbering 16,805 in December 1959, is the basic unit of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. It may be organized in plants (or their subdivisions), city precincts, villages, cooperatives, offices, institutions, and armed

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force units, wherever at least 3 members of the Party are to be found. Although the Party is claimed to be an organization controlled by its members, with the PPO as the nucleus from which such control stems, the list of functions set forth by the Party statute makes it clear that the PPO is basically an agency for the final implementation of tasks assigned it from above. Among the duties listed are: (a) the implementation of resolutions of higher Party units, distribution of Party literature, collection of Party dues; (b) agitation in productive enterprises for efficiency, production competitions, discipline, establishment of producers' cooperatives, and raising of production by individual farmers; (c) exercising of cultural and social leadership among workers; (d) indoctrination of members and criticism of cases of indifference, neglect, or revisionism; (e) supervision of management of state enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and retail trade agencies. In state institutions, the PPO has no right of direct control of managerial actions, but it may make representations to higher Party organs who can then enter the case.

Each PPO elects a committee with a 2-year term to manage its affairs. Those PPOs with less than 10 members elect a secretary only. All such persons must be approved by higher Party organs. Within the PPO, groups may be formed for propaganda and educational purposes under the leadership of Party activitists.

4. Trends in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

Before 1956 the Hungarian Workers' Party (as it was then named) had departed in its membership policies from the line laid down by Lenin that the Communist Party should be a small, disciplined group of convinced supporters of Marxism as interpreted by Lenin. The pre-revolt Hungarian Party had expanded into an amorphous body of those who were moved through conviction or, which is more probable, through a desire to serve their careers to join the Party. The revolt

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in October-November 1956 demonstrated with overwhelming force the real lack of true devotion to Party aims and made it clear that only Soviet influence had enabled it to hold power. After 1956 the Party adopted the policy of careful control of its ranks in order to insure against the presence of deviationists. It could not, however, cease all efforts to win over the workers, thus giving a semblance of legality to its regime and making some concession to the theory that it is the avant garde of the working class. The chief center of its power remained, in spite of these efforts, in that group whose personal fortunes and security were indissolubly connected with the pre-revolt regime. These were the members of the new privileged class, the government, economic, and army bureaucrats.

This group is likely to remain in control in Hungary during the foreseeable future, for it is the only segment of Hungarian society upon which the Soviet Union can rely for the maintenance of its influence. There may be attemps to mask this by appeals to a wider public, particularly through various mass organizations to which a coalition color can be given, and some of the rigidities of control from above may be masked by an increase in speed and flexibility in dealing with minor matters appealed to higher Party authorities from lower agencies. Total membership may grow somewhat, particularly since the difference between the pre-1956 and post-1956 membership is so striking as to vitiate arguments that the Party represents the workers of the country, but the control positions are going to remain in the hands of the present small group of convinced Communists and supporters of Soviet policies. A repetition of the October-November 1956 events is most unlikely.

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C. Government

The governmental structure of the Hungarian People's Republic shares with that of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party a wide difference between constitutional provisions as to the distribution of power and its actual exercise. The government is, on paper, a constitutional democratic and parliamentary republic, ruled by persons chosen by and responsible to the electors. Elections are universal and the ballot is secret. Freedom of the people to engage in political activity is assured by a constitution clearly granting a wide range of rights and liberties. In practice, the government is a strongly centralized organization controlled by agencies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and scarcely responsive to popular pressures. There is no public opposition movement and all candidates for elective office are presented by the Party or have its specific approval. Many governmental activities, particularly the meetings of the representative assemblies, are carried only formally and all real decisions are made by persons not directly subject to public control. Such a state of affairs does not, however, deprive the national government of Hungary of all significance, for it is a national agency which has the power to guide and direct in some degree all persons in the country.

1. National Government

a. Council of Ministers

The principal executive authority in the country is that of the Council of Ministers. (See Figure V. 2) It consists of a President (Prime Minister), a first vice-president, 3 ministers of state without portfolio, and 17 ministers in charge of the various departments. The Council of Ministers may issue decrees and resolutions as a corporate body or as individual ministers. These decrees and directives actually constitute the bulk of legislation and the role of the Parliament in this process is limited to a passive confirmation of ministerial action.

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FIGURE V.2

HUNGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: 1960



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To a large degree the power of the Council of Ministers rests upon the extra-constitutional fact that its leading members are also highly placed officials of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The Prime Minister, Ferenc Muennich, is a member of the Political Committee of the Party, while Janos Kadar, a Minister of State, is also First Secretary of the Party which makes him the most powerful single person in Hungary.

The ministries do not follow a uniform pattern of organization. Some of those which were in existence before the Communist seizure of power have retained their old internal structure. In others, particularly those in the economic field, structure has been conditioned by the need for controlling widespread production activities. Each ministry has a planning section, which supervises, coordinates, and revises the plans of subordinate agencies in order to present a plan to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the President of the National Planning Board for further consideration. Various control organs of the ministry assist in the supervision of financial, political and personnel matters. The ministers and heads of major subdivisions of the ministries are regularly chosen from Party ranks, or after consultation with Party authorities. The authority of the minister is limited to the implementation of policies already thoroughly outlined by Party as well as governmental agencies.

b. Presidential Council

The Presidential Council is the collective head of state. It has a president, the ceremonial head of state, 2 vice presidents, a secretary, and 17 members. All are nominally elected by Parliament for a 2-year term. In the interval between meetings of the Parliament the Presidential Council has interim legislative powers, promulgating edicts subject to later confirmation by Parliament, and it can call elections or convene Parliament, appoint and recall diplomatic representatives, grant

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pardons, and supervise the work of local administrative agencies. In actual operation, the Presidential Council is a device for providing formal representation of Parliamentary control over governmental actions while all major decisions are made by the Council of Ministers.

c. National Assembly

The National Assembly or Parliament, is an elected organ with a membership of 338 deputies with full powers and 171 alternates. In the words of the 1949 Constitution, "/it/ exercises all rights deriving from the sovereignty of the people and determines the organization, directions, and conditions of the government." It usually meets twice a year, upon call by the Presidential Council. Sessions are short, limited to the hearing of a major governmental figure and to the passage of resolutions approving decrees and other governmental acts. There is no debate over matters of substance and opposition votes are never cast. This method of procedure effectively nullifies the National Assembly's theoretical power to control governmental action and to elect the major officials of state. It does enable the leading figures of the regime to claim the backing of the elected representatives of the people, without forcing them to undergo the dangers of possible adverse parliamentary action or of failure to justify their actions.

d. Central People's Control Committee

The Central People's Control Committee consists of 10 members elected by the Parliament for the purpose of carrying out investigations of the operation of government agencies to detect corruption, malfeasance and other irregularities. It has the power to investigate but not to apply sanctions or give orders directly. If cases requiring action are uncovered, it is the Central People's Control Committee which informs the requisite authorities who then take action.

2. Intermediate Administration

There are 2 levels of administrative organs which stand between

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the national government of Hungary and the purely local institutions. These are the 19 counties (Megyek) and 5 cities of county rank, and the 128 districts (Jarasok) and 57 towns of district rank. Each is administered through agencies which are modeled after those of the national government and all forms and procedures are similar. (See Figures V. 3 and V. 4). Like the national government, the intermediate levels of administration, although claimed to give expression to the wishes of the people, have more the function of giving local application to policies determined at higher levels and without public discussion. In all cases of dispute or of doubt the deciding voice lies with the representatives of the Party, whose control is maintained by an extensive system of "interlocking directorates" (membership of Party leaders in high government institutions).

a. Executive Committee

In each county and district continuing control over local administration is in the hands of an executive committee, composed of from 9 to 17 members, of which there is a chairman, 2 or 3 vice chairmen, a secretary, and a number from the rank and file. Each member is responsible for supervision of one of the administrative sections which control activities of subordinate economic, cultural, and administrative institutions. As a rule one or more of the leading officials holds an important post in the local Party organization. Formally, the Executive Committee is subordinate to the elected Council, but the latter's powers are, in practice, quite small. Each of the administrative sections, in addition to its control by the Executive Committee and, in form, by the Council, is required to follow the directions given it by the corresponding ministry in the national government or, in case of district administrations, by the county administrative section.

b. Council

The elected body corresponding to the National Assembly is called a Council. There are from 30 to 60 members in the district and

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FIGURE V. 3

COUNTY (MEGYE) ADMINISTRATION: 1960



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FIGURE V. 4

DISTRICT (JARAS) ADMINISTRATION: 1960



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from 70 to 100 in the county all elected through universal, direct balloting. Meetings are infrequent and supervision by Party agencies is strong, and the constitutionally granted power of the Council to choose local officials and control administrative action is, in effect, purely formal. Council meetings serve officials as forums for making announcements of new policy and for obtaining a surface approval of their actions.

c. Control Committee

At both district and county levels, there are Control Committees, whose duty it is to supervise the performance of governmental functions, reporting any derelictions to the proper authorities. In theory, these bodies are elected by the Council, but, in practice, they are appointed by the Executive Committee with the advice and consent of the local Party organization.

d. Permanent Committees

In each district and county are a number of so-called Permanent Committees, usually corresponding to the administrative sections of the local Executive Committee. Members are also deputies to the local Council chosen because of their special knowledge of, or interest in, the work of an administrative section. These committees are also aided by volunteer workers, called activists, from the general public. The Permanent Committees have only the power to observe and to make proposals. Their chief functions are to offer a way through which expert assistance from the public can be obtained and to suggest palliative changes in the work of local institutions.

3. Local Administration

Rural Hungary is administered through the agency of 3,202 townships (Kozsegek). In major outlines, the system of administration at this level is like that in the county and district. Provisions which seemingly permit a democratic control of local affairs are nullified by

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the close controls imposed by higher administrative and Party agencies, although there is a somewhat less pervasive control at this level, as each unit is so small and so separated from the others.

a. Township Executive Committee

Each township is administered by an executive committee which at the lowest level consist of a paid chairman and secretary, a vice chairman (paid only if the population of the township is over 3,000), and 2 to 6 other members (exact number set by district executive committee). In townships with population from 3,000 to 10,000, the executive committee has subordinate to it sections for finances, general administration, and for industry, crop collection, trade, and agriculture. Those with more than 10,000 population have a fourth section dealing with training, education, public health, and welfare. Each section is supervised by a member of the executive committee as well as being subject to control of the corresponding section in the district administration.

b. Township Council

The township council is made of from 21 to 101 members, elected by the voters. The same wide difference between actual and theoretical rights of elected bodies noted at all higher levels is to be found here. The council hears reports and gives its formal approval. Only in some cases in which it suggests minor, palliative changes, does it have any measurable influence upon local affairs.

c. Permanent Committees

As at higher levels, the township administration is assisted by a number of so-called permanent committees, made up of deputies to the council with the assistance, on an unofficial basis, of those who have special knowledge or interest in a given field of action. These committees have value as offering a means by which some of the more interested members of the general public can take part in the control of

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local operations, although they do not provide opportunity for criticism of major policy or for more than minor readjustments in local administration.

4. Administrative-Territorial Divisions

The major administrative-territorial divisions of Hungary (see Table V.3) are its 19 counties (Megyek) and 5 cities (Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc, Pecs, and Szeged) of county rank. The latter are directly

Table V. 3

Hungary: Administrative-Territorial Divisions: 1960

Administrative Division	Districts	Cities	Control Center	Coordinates Latitude	Coordinates Longitude
Capital					
Budapest	7	1	Budapest	47 - 30	19 - 05
Cities of County Rank					
Debrecen	--	1	Debrecen	47 - 31	21 - 38
Miskolc	--	1	Miskolc	48 - 06	20 - 47
Pecs	--	1	Pecs	46 - 05	18 - 13
Szeged	--	1	Szeged	46 - 15	20 - 09
Counties					
Bacs-Kiskun	8	5	Kecskemet	46 - 54	19 - 41
Baranya	7	2	Pecs	46 - 05	18 - 13
Bekes	8	3	Bekescsaba	46 - 39	21 - 05
Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen	11	3	Miskolc	48 - 06	20 - 47
Csongrad	3	4	Hodmezovasarhely	46 - 25	20 - 20
Fejer	6	2	Szekesfehervar	47 - 12	18 - 25
Gyor-Sopron	5	3	Gyor	47 - 41	17 - 38
Hajdu-Bihar	6	3	Debrecen	47 - 31	21 - 38
Heves	6	3	Eger	47 - 54	20 - 22
Komarom	3	5	Tatabanya	47 - 33	18 - 26
Nograd	5	2	Salgotarjan	48 - 07	19 - 48
Pest	11	4	Budapest	47 - 30	19 - 05
Somogy	8	1	Kaposvar	46 - 21	17 - 47
Szabolcs-Szatmar	10	1	Nyiregyhaza	47 - 58	21 - 43
Szolnok	7	7	Szolnok	47 - 10	20 - 11
Tolna	6	1	Szekszard	46 - 21	18 - 42
Vas	6	2	Szombathely	47 - 14	16 - 37
Veszprem	7	4	Veszprem	17 - 05	17 - 54
Zala	5	2	Zalaegerszeg	46 - 50	16 - 51
Total	135	62			

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subordinate to national authorities and are governed by city administrations whose organization is comparable to that of counties. Budapest is subdivided into 7 urban districts. Except for Szeged these cities are the administrative centers for a county, although the county administration has no jurisdiction over them.

The counties are further divided into 128 districts (Jarasok) and 57 cities of district rank. The latter are, like the cities of county rank with respect to national agencies, directly subordinate to the county government and may serve as centers of counties or districts.

The lowest level of administration is to be found in the 3,202 townships (Kozsegek), some of which, because of rural settlement patterns, have much more than 10,000 population.

D. Economic Administration

Before 1945 Hungary was, as it had been for centuries, primarily an agricultural country. It had played an important part in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as its chief producer of grain, but its industry had been unimportant and chiefly light. Between World Wars I and II, as a result of the territorial and economic changes following 1918, it was forced to undertake some new industrial development, particularly electric and telecommunications equipment, while agricultural production suffered somewhat from unfavorable world conditions and from loss of markets in former Austro-Hungarian territory.

The economy before World War II had developed without major intervention by the state. Both in agriculture and in industry private ownership was the rule, and many of the industrial firms had connections with foreign capital, principally German. Despite pressures from the rural population for a wider distribution of land, the overwhelming portion of tillable land remained in the hands of large landowners, most of whom were the nobility. World War II witnessed the defeat of the former

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Hungarian ruling class and brought great changes to both fields of activity. The large estates were abolished, their land being distributed to former tenants and landless laborers. Many industrial enterprises were confiscated on the ground that they were German-owned and thus enemy property, while other owners were accused of complicity with anti-national forces, failure to pay taxes, or of exploitation of labor and were forced to cede their property to the state.

In addition to the influences of a sweeping reform of the land system and the socialization of industry, Hungary felt the impress of Soviet economic policy, both with regard to "reparations" which were demanded in recompense for damage allegedly done in the USSR by Hungarian forces and with regard to a growing integration of Hungary into the Soviet economic orbit. Many existing installations were disrupted by this, while other plants were constructed under forced draft in order to meet Soviet demands; very often these plants made use of high cost resources or were planned on a scale entirely unsuited to the country. Management methods were modeled after those of the USSR and workers' interest were frequently disregarded.

Agricultural production also suffered. The new, smaller farms, while giving their owners a sense of triumph, satisfying a long-standing urge for the acquisition of land, marketed a smaller proportion of their total crop than had the large estates. Deficiencies in supply of fertilizers and machinery worsened the situation. In common with industry and trade, agriculture suffered from serious inflation, failures in supply and distribution, and from the application of exceedingly doctrinaire views by the state; such as collectivization, which was one of the main goals of the Communist regime.

As a result of these policies of nationalization and of integration of Hungary into the Soviet economic system, the economy of the country had,

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by 1956, developed in a distorted manner. There was much resentment among the populace, a resentment which found expression in widespread strikes and economic dislocation at the time of the revolt in October-November of 1956. The following reconstruction was not easy, in spite of some relaxation in agriculture and of large Soviet subsidies in other fields. However, by the beginning of 1958 losses had been made good and production was beginning to rise above 1956 levels.

The Hungarian economy is now one in which industry is almost totally socialized, but only 60 per cent of agriculture is collectivized or otherwise state controlled. Although the time limits for completion of the process may have been lengthened, the regime has as its final goal total socialization of agriculture, as well as industry, and it is only for fear of provoking serious dislocations in food supply that it has shown so much self-restraint.

1. Industrial Control

The central planning authority of the Hungarian Economy is the National Planning Board, which lays down regulations and directives for production planning. Under its control, the industrial ministries draw up estimates of expected production, given plant capacity and other factors. Marketing and supply agencies provide estimates of requirements, and the National Planning Board coordinates them in order to arrive at a balance. Once a plan has been put into effect, only the National Planning Board can change it.

The National Planning Board is kept informed of high level Party and government decisions through its Chairman who is a member of the Council of Ministers and thus cognizant of high-level policy making. It does not have direct supervision of the financial operations of industry, which are the province of the Ministry of Finance, of its accounting division, and of the State Bank. Operational control of industry is in the hands of the ministries, of Metallurgy and Machine Industry, Heavy

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Industry, Light Industry, Food Industry, and Construction. In order to make the ministries' control more effective, each is divided into directorates which are in charge of broad groups of industries. The directorates are in turn subdivided into industrial trusts, each of which consists of a number of enterprises which produce similar end items.

Within each industrial enterprise, except for the very smallest, control rests with a triumvirate composed of the manager, the first deputy manager (highest ranking technician), and the chief accountant. The manager is responsible for the assigned segment of the overall economic plan, improvements in production and administration, control of the employees, and proper distribution of wages. He is appointed by the Ministry, usually after consultation with Party officials. The first deputy manager is responsible for quality of production, economy of labor, and employee training. As a rule his technical training for the position is higher than that of the manager, who owes his position to his political and administrative skill. The chief accountant is guardian of the financial affairs of the enterprise and has the right to protest against any measures which might harm the interests of the state or the economic plan.

In industrial enterprises there are so-called plant councils of from 15 to 21 members. One-third of the members are elected by the workers and the remainder by a plant committee dominated by the manager, deputy manager, chief accountant, the Party secretary, and the secretary of the Youth Federation. The plant council has a theoretical subordination to the trade union and is concerned with both labor and management affairs. It is in practice a means of providing a veneer of consultation with the workers and was instituted by the government in order to replace the Workers' Councils which sprang up spontaneously during the revolt in October-November 1956.

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There is little evidence that the regime has attempted to institute measures providing for a decentralization of industrial management which might be compared to those undertaken in the USSR since 1957. This failure to make at least a token enlargement of the economic powers of local government probably stems in part from the situation which followed the 1956 revolt in which it was governmental policy to tighten its controls in order to overwhelm the centrifugal tendencies then manifesting themselves. Furthermore, Hungary is a small country with little of the marked regional differences characteristic of the USSR, and problems of management from the center are correspondingly less.

2. Agricultural Control

As noted above, pre-1945 Hungary was characterized by the prevalence of large-scale landholding, chiefly by the nobility, whose lands were worked by a mass of near landless agricultural workers. The breaking up of the estates in 1945 met a favorable response among the majority of rural inhabitants, to whom ownership of land had been a historic, if seldom realized, goal. To the regime, however, this land distribution was only an interim solution of the problem, for the new rulers of Hungary, following the example of the USSR and the teachings of the Communist Party, sought as their goal the collectivization of all land and state control of its product. Measures, ranging from persuasion through application of discriminatory tax rates to outright administrative fiat were used to bring this about. At the same time, however, the regime could not apply its policies too vigorously for fear of disrupting the supply of agricultural products, the larger portion of which came from the remaining private farms. Furthermore, shifts in the ideological climate of the regime, when coupled with the need for a continuing supply of foodstuffs, gave rise to a series of fluctuations as to just how far collectivization was pushed. As a result, the rate of collectivization

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has been quite irregular. In September 1950, for instance, 4.3 per cent of all farm families were in collectives and in April 1953, 16.5 per cent of families, with 26 per cent of the country's arable land, were collectivized. The relaxation of tension that followed Stalin's death permitted peasants to withdraw from collectives at the end of the 1954 economic year and reduced collectivization to 9 per cent of all families, although the amount of arable land under collectivization remained the same as it had been in 1953.

A new approach by the regime was then undertaken attempting to provide collective members with some substantive inducements to stay. This met with some success, for by July 1956 22 per cent of the arable land and about 14 per cent of all rural families were in the collectives.

In addition to the collective farms, the "socialist" sector in agriculture included a rising percentage of land in the form of state farms, directly owned by the state without any of the collectives' outward trappings of cooperative control. At the end of 1955, 13.1 per cent of all arable land was in state farms.

The disturbed state of the country after the revolt saw a sharp decline in the proportion of land held by collectives, as many peasants sought to return to a system of private holdings. On December 1, 1956 only 7 per cent of land remained in the collectives, and the total "socialist" sector of agriculture, including state farms, amounted to 18.4 per cent. Promises were made by the regime that forced collectivization would not be undertaken again, but within a year the policy had changed. By the beginning of 1958 collective farms held 9.7 per cent of the land, and the total socialized sector, 21.3 per cent. By February 1, 1960 about 66.2 per cent of the tilled land was under "socialist production" including 51.9 per cent in "cooperatives," and the policy of the regime seemed to envisage a further and fairly rapid extension of this proportion.

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The "collective farms" are nominally cooperatives, owned and managed by their members. In actual practice, the cooperative features are purely external ones, and all major decisions are predetermined by Party and governmental officials. Each collective is controlled by higher authorities through the agencies of local government, the financial system, the supply and procurement system, and the Party. Members of the collectives are paid from the "profits" of the enterprise--the sums remaining after all taxes and obligations to the state had been met and after reserves for investment had been set aside. In an attempt to ease the transition from private landholding, members receive a certain sum in recompense for the land they had contributed, but the bulk of the payment is conditioned upon performance of set norms of work.

The state farms are controlled by a large and complex bureaucracy. Most are directed by the Ministry of State Farms, but others are supervised by the Ministry of Food Industry, or by the Ministry of Agriculture. Workers on all such farms are paid a wage, usually based upon amount of work performed rather than upon hours expended.

Both collective and private farms are serviced with major agricultural machinery by the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS). These institutions, subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture, work under contract with rates being so graduated as to favor the collectives over private farms. Their efficiency is not considered to be high and there is undoubtedly a great deal of loss occasioned by their bad management. Charges for their services provide a means of bringing under state control a larger portion of agricultural production than might otherwise be the case, so their continued existence is viewed as advantageous to the state. No transfer of MTS functions to collective farms, on the model of the USSR, has been undertaken.

Agricultural policy of the Hungarian regime has shown a number of fluctuations of attitude toward private ownership of farms. It is

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currently in the midst of a period in which efforts are being made to extend collectivization, thus reaching its avowed goal of complete socialization of the economy. Although the future may see some relaxation in the pressure put upon the remaining free peasants, it is not expected that any other goal than eventual socialization will be undertaken.

E. Control Force

Hungary is controlled by the present regime through the agency of the roughly 487,000 persons who constitute the control force of the country. Among them are all those who through their administrative or military ranks, or because of their professional or technical training, direct, control or coordinate vital governmental, military, social, or economic functions. This is equivalent to 4.8 per cent of the total population, or 7 per cent of those 18 years and older, and to 16.1 per cent of the labor force.

This group may be divided into 3 major components upon the basis of the extent of the power each wields. The most powerful, numbering less than 2,000, is the primary control force, made up of the most important leaders of Party and government and of the general officers of the armed forces. Each person at this level of authority is responsible for control of nationally significant activities and, although there are marked differences in power among its members, the primary control force is the chief locus of decision-making in the country. Typical positions held by the members of the primary control force include those of first secretary of the Party, Prime Minister, or Chief of Staff of the Army. Next in power are the approximately 110,000 members of the intermediate control force who have responsibility for control of only one branch of activity or of a limited geographic area. Among this group are such persons as the heads of local Party and Civil administrative bodies, national managers of the transport system, directors of regional public service agencies

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or field grade officers of the armed forces. The least powerful of all are the more than 375,000 persons who make up the lower control force. These provide professional and technical services, supervise the direct performance of work, or hold non-commissioned posts in the armed forces. The typical member of this segment of the control force would be an engineer in an industrial enterprise, a supervisory teacher in the public schools, a clerk in a government office, the head of a collective farm, or a corporal in the armed forces.

The control force is predominantly an urban group. The primary control force is concentrated in Budapest, with a few representatives in the county seats. The intermediate group is to be found in Budapest and in the county seats, and a few in the district seats. The lower control force has some of its members in rural areas, but most are city dwellers. Little is known of the age and sex composition of the control force but it is probable that only a small proportion, less than 25 per cent are women, and it seems likely that the largest age group are those over 40 years. The proportion of men and of those over 40 may be higher in the primary control force. Party membership of those in the control force probably follows a similar pattern.

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Table V. 4

Hungarian Control Force: 1960

Category	Number		Per Cent of Total	
Party Administration	21,000		4.3	
State Administration	20,000		4.1	
Economic Administration	232,000		47.6	
Industry		(137,000)		(28.1)
Construction		(17,000)		(3.5)
Agriculture		(28,000)		(5.8)
Transportation and Communications		(26,000)		(5.3)
Trade, Supply, Procurement		(.24,000)		(4.9)
Military Command	63,000		13.0	
Services	151,000		31.0	
Education		(103,000)		(21.2)
Health		(20,000)		(4.1)
Other (Public Utilities, Housing, Police and Fire Services)		(28,000)		(5.7)
Total	487,000		100.0	

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Volume Two, Part II

VI. Poland

A. Introduction

Poland is in a state of transition, the outcome of which is uncertain at the present time. Its geographic location between its two historic enemies, Germany and Russia, continues to strongly influence its political, economic and social development--with the ideological ties with both countries serving at times to heighten its dilemma? While its foreign policy is generally in accord with that of the USSR and, therefore, with the other East European Satellites, its domestic policies are no longer based primarily on Soviet as opposed to Polish interests. The Gomulka regime is striving to find a "Polish Road to Socialism" which is at once both acceptable to the Polish people and tolerable to the Soviets. The year 1959 witnessed a continuation of the struggle of the regime to placate both interests, but by the year's end, the Soviet interests appeared to be gaining the upper hand.

As in all Communist countries, the conflict was expressed largely in economic terms. Ever since October 1956, the Gomulka regime has been pulled in two directions. On the right were the economists and officials who favored strict control, and orthodox Marxism. On the left were the so-called liberals who felt that the answer for Poland's troubles was to increase initiative on the county and factory level. Initially, Gomulka's answer was somewhere in the middle and "workers' councils" with a considerable degree of managerial authority were formed. Emphasis was placed on economic incentives, consumer goods production was increased substantially and investment policies were changed in favor of light industrial projects.

Coupled with the ideological ferment and sense of freedom from Soviet domination, these moves relaxed central control only to the degree sufficient to create confusion, but not sufficient to create

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local initiative or incentive. The errors in agricultural planning, 1959's meat shortage, for example, were symptomatic of fumbling in other parts of the economy. Industrial production was increasing, but Communist officials admitted that the rising curves covered up maladministration and rampant corruption. The standard of living was rising but at a cost the regime considered excessive.

Unwilling to go all the way and replace central control with the open market mechanism, the regime began to retrench. Even before 1959 workers' councils were transformed into facades of Party control. The ministerial apparatus was extensively reorganized and strengthened its control over local affairs.

A crisis appears to have been reached early in 1959. In February the regime spoke proudly of increased production for 1958 and of increased target plans for 1959 and the years ahead. But by late fall, Gomulka was appearing before his lieutenants to speak in shrill tones of the troubles the country faced. The propaganda apparatus was turned on full blast calling for a thoroughgoing administrative housecleaning. Before the country really knew what was happening, tough-line economists and heavy-handed former Stalinist administrative bosses had been brought back to high places.

To what extent these moves presage a return to the policies and practices of earlier years remains unclear at the present time. The pendulum has swung in opposite directions before. The Gomulka regime may best be pictured, perhaps, as attempting to maintain a precarious balance on a see-saw with a restless Polish population on one end and the ubiquitous Khrushchev on the other, with the queasy Polish economy as the fulcrum.

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B. The Polish United Workers' Party

Poland is politically in a state of transition, the outcome of which is uncertain at the present time. The almost daily fluctuations in policy veer from stern admonitions reminiscent of the former Stalinist regime to appeals for popular support characteristic of pre-war Poland. It is clear, however, that the Polish state can no longer be considered a wholly reliable Soviet satellite. While its foreign policy is generally in accord with that of the USSR, its domestic policies are no longer primarily based on Soviet as opposed to Polish national interests. Its Communist Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, is no longer relatively immune to popular opinion and simply an obedient servant of the Soviet Party. The Polish Party is striving to find a "Polish road to Socialism" which is at once both tolerable to the Soviets and acceptable to the Polish people. The question whether these two power constellations can be appeased remains moot.

1. Growth

A Communist Party has existed in Poland since 1918 under a variety of names. Originally it was called the Communist Workers' Party of Poland, but in 1925 it was renamed the Communist Party of Poland under the Comintern. Sometime in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern and almost all of its leaders, most of whom were then residing in the Soviet Union, were executed. It was reestablished in 1942 as the Polish Workers' Party and, after a forced merger with the Polish Socialist Party, it was given the title of the Polish United Workers' Party.

On 1 January 1960 the Polish United Workers' Party was reported to have a total membership of 1,018,409 comprising 3.5 per cent of the Polish total population or 5.6 per cent of the adult population. Membership in the Polish Party has varied considerably since the end of World War II (see Table VI. 1). In 1944, according to official

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sources, there were only 20,000 members of the Party, including 12,000 for the "native" element and 8,000 for the "Soviet" element. In the subsequent period, both elements were virtually submerged in the influx of new members. In 1945 the Party's doors were opened to all who wished to join and the membership increased 11 times by the end of the year. In the following 2 years the Party began an intensive recruiting drive of persons considered essential to its aims, particularly persons in positions of influence and prestige. After the virtual dismemberment of the only major opposition group, Polish Peasant Party headed by Mikolajczyk, the Communists forced the Polish Socialist Party to join its ranks which then numbered over one million. Following the merger, Gomulka was charged with indiscriminate recruitment and building up a personal following in the Party and was expelled from the Party. By 1950 the purge had been extended to the Party as a whole and more than 200,000 had been dropped from its ranks. Between 1949 and 1954 the Party based the recruitment of new members on quality rather than quantity and the size of the Party remained relatively constant.

Following the death of Stalin, the "thaw" witnessed a new upsurge in membership, reaching a high point of 1,440,134 in January 1956. The turmoil in the Soviet Union which followed Krushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February of that year quickly reached Poland. The Polish Stalinists appeared to have the situation well in hand until the workers' uprising in Poznan in June. The schisms revealed by the uprising and the isolation of the leadership from the realities of life permitted Gomulka to move from non-membership in August to the post of First Secretary at the October Plenum of the Central Committee.

Since 1956 Party membership has declined drastically as both Stalinists and revisionists were purged and thousands left the Party

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Table VI. 1

Growth of the Polish United Workers' Party: 1946-1960

Date	Total Membership	Number per 1000 Total Population	Number per 1000 Adult Population
1946 Jan.	555,888	23	36
1948 Dec.	1,442,000	60	91
1950 Jan.	1,240,965	50	77
1956 Jan.	1,440,134	52	81
1957 Jan.	1,376,651	49	77
1958 Jan.	1,261,151	44	70
1958 Sept.	1,023,577	35	57
1959 Jan.	1,023,425	35	57
1960 Jan.	1,018,409	35	56

on their own volition. Gomulka, speaking shortly after his return to power, welcomed this trend. "If we had half as large a Party but one composed of conscious, militant Party members, completely devoted to the cause of socialism, the Party would have great power in the country. Perhaps the greatest difficulties would not reach higher than our knees. Now, despite our large membership, the difficulties sometimes reach our shoulders." By 1959, Party officials were proudly reporting that they had purged more than 100,000 and admitting that almost 400,000 had left the Party voluntarily. At the same time, a low keyed recruitment program was initiated and more than 120,000 new members were admitted. Nevertheless, by 1960, the Party experienced a net decline of 424,000 or almost one-third of its 1956 membership. As Table 1 indicates, however, since September 1958, total membership has remained almost constant. Unless unforeseen events occur, it is expected that the Polish United Workers' Party will remain slightly more than one million strong throughout 1960.

2. Organization

In its basic organizational pattern, the Polish Party follows the structure of the Soviet Party and is consequently quite similar to all other Communist Parties. The guiding organizational principle is

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"democratic centralism": nominal horizontal subordination, real vertical control. At each level there are elected delegates to meetings (on all except the lowest level, indirectly elected) at which committees are selected and which, in turn, select an inner core of officials who comprise the Party apparatus who really operate the system. The major difference between the Polish and other national Parties is the fact that the Polish committees exercise more of their extensive statutory powers and, as a result, occupy a more important position in the Party power structure.

a. Basic Party Organization

The lowest organizational unit of the Party is the Basic Party Organization (POP). Every Party member must belong to a POP. Since 1954, the POP has been set up fairly consistently on the basis of places of work as opposed to the previous mixture of residence and place of work. POPs are established in all industrial enterprises, state farms, offices and institutions, military units, etc., where there are at least 3 Party members. POPs in productive institutions and establishments are responsible for the proper functioning of the place of work in which they are formed. They are required to exercise political control over and influence the work of management, particularly in matters relating to key production problems, supply and distribution and personnel policies. POPs in ministries, bureaus and state institutions do not, however, have this right of control. They are expected to bring to the attention of management all shortcomings they uncover and, at the same time, to report the same information to superior Party bodies. Officials of these POPs are appointed by the Party Central Committee apparatus (see below).

The structure of POPs varies with their size. In an organization with more than 100 members, Party branches may be formed.

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Party branches with less than 15 members elect a first and second secretary at a general meeting of members: a larger unit with between 15 and 100 members elects an executive of 3 to 7 members which, in turn elects a first and second secretary from among its members. A POP with 100 to 400 members elects at a general meeting a committee consisting of from 7 to 11 members; and one with more than 400 members, a committee of from 15 to 23 at a meeting of delegates from Party branches. These committees elect an executive of 7 to 9 people and a first and second secretary. All such elections are supposed to take place annually, except for the largest POPs which elect every 2 years. The Party apparatus at the POP level consists of the secretaries, particularly the full-time officials of large POPs, and their staff assistants.

b. Intermediate Party Organizations

The intermediate organizations in the Party hierarchy above the POP and below the national level are the county (powiat) and province (voivodship) organs, each with their own committees and executives. On the county level there are Party organizations in towns with county status, in wards in large cities, or in the county proper; the latter are responsible for the activity of all the widely scattered POPs in rural areas and urban settlements. Province Party organizations exist in all provinces and in the cities of Warszawa and Lodz.

The general meeting is theoretically the highest authority in the POP. Similarly, in the county and province Party organizations a biennial conference of delegates from their subordinate units has the highest legal status. The county conference, consisting of delegates elected at POP meetings, elects a committee of 21-33 members and 7-11 alternates, which, in turn, elect an executive of 7-11 members and secretaries. Here the power of the conference has ended for the

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committee it has elected "acts in accordance with resolutions of higher Party authorities under the direction of the province committee." This is the essence of "democratic centralism," which, although it theoretically makes the committee responsible to its electorate (the conference), in fact prescribes the control of higher bodies over lower ones.

The same structure is found on the province level where a biennial conference of delegates from county conferences elects a committee of 29-51 members and 11-15 alternates. The executive chosen by the committee has, in the past, consisted of 11-15 members and 3-5 secretaries, one of whom is designated first secretary. The province committee and its executive operate under the direction of the national Party apparatus. Control is so complete that the national authorities determine the composition of the province committees and must confirm the election of all secretaries before they take office. Meetings of the committees are supposed to be held at least once every two months. The executive of the committees meet more frequently.

The Party apparatus at the county and provincial levels consists of the executives and the executive secretariats (departments and commissions of the committees).

c. National Party Organization

The Party organization on the national level is similar to that on the local. It consists, in inverse order of importance, of the Party Congress, Central Auditing Commission, Central Committee, Central Control Commission, and the Politburo and Secretariat (see Figure VI. 1).

(1) Party Congress

A Party congress is the equivalent of the general meeting or conference at lower levels and is, therefore, theoretically the highest Party authority in the country. In practice, the authority

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FIGURE VI.1

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL APPARATUS OF POLISH UNITED WORKER'S PARTY



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of the congress is severely limited and it serves mainly as a sounding board for the Politburo and Secretariat.

A Party congress, composed of delegates chosen at Party conferences at the provincial level and at major economic enterprises in accordance with rules established by the Central Committee, is held every 4 years. It receives and approves reports from the Central Committee, adopts a program and Party statute, and elects a Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission. According to the statute it also establishes the Party line and tactics and may make decisions on all other matters; these decisions in fact, however, are made by the Politburo and Secretariat.

(2) Central Auditing Commission

The Central Auditing Commission, elected at the Party congress, is the Party's efficiency expert. It examines the financial and managerial activities of the Party apparatus and is legally responsible for the proper functioning of the apparatus. It submits proposals on these matters to the Central Committee (actually to the Secretariat upon which it is supposed to check). The functions of similar commissions at the provincial and county level are analogous.

(3) Central Committee

According to the Party statute, the Central Committee is the highest Party authority in the intervals between Party congresses. In fact, however, the Central Committee delegates its duties and authority to its own executive organs: the Politburo, Secretariat and Control Commission. The Central Committee is not, however, the supine organ which is found in other satellite parties.

The Central Committee consists of approximately 75 members and 50 alternates who are required to meet at least once every 4 months. In the past, such meetings were called primarily to

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rubber-stamp major policy decisions of the Politburo. Since 1954, meetings have been more frequent and have lost much of their rubber-stamp character. At the March 1956 meeting, for example, at least two alternate members disagreed so violently with the Soviet representative, N. S. Khrushchev, that they were expelled, only to be readmitted shortly thereafter because of serious Party opposition to their expulsion. At the July 1956 session voting was no longer pro forma but a real contest in which leading Politburo members sought the support of Central Committee members much as the Soviet leaders vied for the support of members of the USSR Central Committee in June 1957 (which resulted in the ouster of Molotov, Malenkov et. al.). While it is an open question whether the Central Committee will ever again have the power of decision it enjoyed in 1956, available evidence indicates that it has not returned to its former mute state.

The Central Committee elects a Politburo, Secretariat and Central Control Commission.

(4) Central Control Commission

Although elected by the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission operates under the aegis of the Politburo and Secretariat. Its primary function, and one much exercised since October, is guarding the "purity of the Party ranks. . . ." In other words, the Control Commission is the disciplinary arm of the apparatus. It checks on the observance of Party discipline and serves as both prosecutor and judge in cases involving infringements of the Party's ideological and programatic principles, subversion of the Party's unity, etc. The Central Control Commission is the Party agency which conducts the "verification" or purges of membership. At less than the national level it works primarily through provincial control commissions attached to the province Party committees.

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(5) The Politburo and Secretariat

According to the Party statutes: The Central Committee creates a Political Bureau to direct the work of the Central Committee in the intervals between plenary sessions and a Secretariat to direct current work, particularly in the areas of organization of control over execution of Party decisions and selection of cadres.

The Politburo and Secretariat are in fact the highest Party authorities.

The Politburo is primarily a policy-making body under the leadership of the First Secretary, Gomulka. Each of its members usually has one area of responsibility which includes both Party and governmental affairs on a nationwide basis. The majority of its members usually hold down full-time jobs in the top echelon of the government apparatus, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers; the remainder are usually members of the central Party Secretariat. As such, the Politburo is the pinnacle of both the Party and government power structures.

The Secretariat, also under the leadership of Gomulka, is basically the administrative arm of the Politburo. It consists of the secretaries "elected" by the Central Committee, their assistants and the departments and commissions of the Central Committee. Each of the secretaries has his own small staff of officials consisting of highly qualified political workers. Each of these staffs (also known as secretariats) oversees the execution of policy within the general area of the particular secretary's responsibility. Under these staffs function the 5 departments and 12 commissions of the Central Committee.

Each of the departments is headed by a director who is usually a candidate member of the Central Committee. Department directors often are in a position to control government ministries, particularly when the ministry is headed by a person of lower rank in the Party hierarchy. In addition, the possibility of the department director conducting independent field checks through subordinate

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departments in the provinces strengthens his hand in dealing with government agencies. Each department is subdivided into sections, each headed by a chief. The sections have a senior instructor and one or more instructors who act as field trouble shooters. The power of these section instructors in the field coming from the central Party apparatus is usually far greater than the head of the institution or enterprise under scrutiny. The General Affairs Department performs housekeeping functions for the national apparatus. The Agriculture Department exercises general supervision over the planning and operations of government and non-government agricultural agencies. The Propaganda Department is in charge of ideological guidance for the entire Party and state apparatus. The Organization Department supervises Party personnel and Party organizational activity, including all Party elections and meetings. The Economics Department exercises general supervision over all non-agricultural economic activity in Poland, mainly through the numerous Party Commissions (see below). Another department (not shown in Figure VI. 1), only nominally under the Secretariat, is the Chief Political Directorate in the Armed Forces. Although the payroll is believed to have come from Central Committee funds, the directorate has been more under the control of the Minister of Defense than of the Secretariat.

Gomulka's major innovation in Party organization following his return to power has been to reduce drastically the number of full-time employees in the Party apparatus, some reports indicate the cut may have been as high as 70 per cent, and to work through Party Commissions instead of regular departments. The Party Commissions, 12 of which are known to exist on the national level and similar numbers on the local scene, are his organizational devices to provide the Party leadership with direct contact with the so-called "social active." Headed by an official in the Party apparatus, their

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membership is made up almost exclusively of Party members in key public positions, specialists and government administrators in their respective fields. This innovation while reducing the number of direct orders issued by the Party apparatus and, at the same time, providing for an exchange of views between the Party official and workers in the field, has not been as successful as the regime would wish. In fact, a number of the commissions, such as the one for Cultural Affairs, have been completely ineffective.

The commission approach to problem-solving in the Party apparatus is an outgrowth of the aktiv. The staff officials working in the Central Committee apparatus form the bulk of the Central Party Active, a body not mentioned in the Party statute. Together with ranking members of the Party intelligentsia, they normally meet at the instigation of the Politburo to be sounded out on important matters being considered by the regime. It provides a forum for the regime of the ranking Party professionals and, as such, may at times play a more important role than the Central Committee itself.

3. Distribution and Composition

The geographic distribution of the Polish Party among the various administrative-territorial divisions is extremely uneven. Katowice and Poznan Voivodship Party Organizations have the largest memberships, and Bialystok, the smallest (see Table VI. 2). Of more significance, however, are the variations in the incidence of Party membership per 1,000 population for they reflect directly the regime's own estimate of the importance of the given area. Within this context, Warszawa City is pre-eminent with an incidence of 61. Among the voivodships, Bydgoszcy ranks the highest and Bialystok, the lowest.

Territorial variations in the incidence of Party membership

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reflect variations in the occupational composition of the area labor force. Areas with high incidences have relatively large numbers of persons in occupations the regime considers sensitive; conversely, those with low incidences, a labor force engaged in less sensitive occupations. The extent to which the incidence of Party membership varies by occupations can be seen from the fact that in 1956 (the last date for which relatively accurate information is available), Party members comprised more than one-third of all administrative personnel in the country, but less than 5 per cent of the peasantry were Party members. In that year some 70 per cent of the Party membership worked in the socialized sector of the economy where they totalled 16 per cent of the workers and employees. Almost 30 per cent of metallurgical workers belonged to the Party and more than 20 per cent of the railroad transport and metal processing labor force were Communists, while only 10 per cent of construction workers were members of the Party. Party professionals totalled approximately 5 per cent of total membership.

Between 1948 and 1956 the total membership of the Party remained constant. Considerable turnover in membership took place, however, and the social composition of its membership was drastically altered. In 1948, for example, bench-workers comprised 60.5 per cent of total membership, but by 1956 they accounted for only 45 per cent (see Table VI. 3). While the number of bench-workers and peasants were declining by approximately 25 per cent, the number of white-collar workers was almost doubling. The bureaucratization of the Party continued after Gomulka's return to power and the intelligentsia now constitute the largest single social group in the Party. While white-collar workers declined by more than 26 per cent between 1956 and 1959, the number of professionals, as opposed to clericals,

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Table VI. 2

Distribution of the Polish United Workers' Party
Administrative Division: 1960

Administrative Division	Membership	Number per 1,000 Total Population
Bialystok V.	21,500	19
Bydgoszcy V.	85,000	50
Gdansk V.	42,900	36
Katowice V.	130,700	40
Kielce V.	51,700	28
Koszalin V.	22,300	33
Krakow V.	66,000	26
Lodz City	39,300	56
Lodz V.	52,100	32
Lublin V.	33,500	18
Olsztyn V.	28,700	32
Opole V.	32,900	36
Poznan V.	101,700	42
Rzeszow V.	39,400	24
Szczecin V.	26,900	36
Warszawa City	67,500	61
Warszawa V.	60,300	34
Wroclaw V.	91,900	42
Zielona Gora V.	24,100	31
Total	1,018,400	35

Table VI. 3

Social Composition of the Polish-
United Workers' Party: 1948-1959

Social Group	December 1948 Number (in thous.)	December 1948 Per Cent	January 1956 Number (in thous.)	January 1956 Per Cent	January 1959 Number (in thous.)	January 1959 Per Cent
Workers	873,000	60.5	648,000	45.0	428,000	41.8
Peasants	243,000	16.9	175,000	12.2	125,000	12.2
Intelligentsia	292,000	20.3	582,000	40.4	430,000	42.0
Inc. Officials	na	na	(225,000)	(15.6)	(242,000)	(23.7)
Others	34,000	2.3	35,000	2.4	40,000	4.0
Total	1,442,000	100.0	1,440,000	100.0	1,023,000	100.0

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actually increased by 7.6 per cent. Despite serious attempts by the regime to recruit more persons from the production lines and fewer from the front offices, the long-term trend toward a Party of essentially managerial personnel with token representation among "workers" is self evident.

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C. Government

The government of the Polish People's Republic is closely patterned after that of the Soviet Union, although points of divergence resulting from particularly Polish solutions to specific Polish problems, especially after Gomulka's return to power in 1956, still exist. Variations from the Soviet norm in Poland follow the French governmental system. The process of transforming the Polish Government into a typical "People's Democracy" proceeded more slowly than in other East European Satellites. But since 1947, the essential feature in the structure and functioning of government has been the same; the staffing of all key positions by trusted members of the ruling Party. As a result, government is largely limited to the status of an administrative mechanism for the implementation of Party policy.

1. The National Government

The national government of Poland consists essentially of 4 agencies. In inverse order of importance, they are the Sejm, Council of State, Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

a. The Sejm

The historic name of the Polish national legislative assembly is its only remaining distinctive feature; in virtually all of its activities it is almost indistinguishable from the legislatures of the other East European Satellites. Essentially a powerless body, meeting usually twice a year for sessions lasting a few days, the Sejm formally designates the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and, when required, approves the appointment of ministers. It also simply passes with little or no alteration a number of legislative bills presented by the Council of Ministers and approves decrees promulgated in the interval between its sessions by the Council of State.

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What substantive work is accomplished in the Sejm is performed by commissions of its members, both permanent and temporary. Of the seven-odd standing commissions only two (legislative and budgetary) have any real importance. The Legislative Commission must clear all drafts of laws before they can reach the Sejm floor, while the Budgetary Commission must examine the entire state budget before it can be approved by the Sejm. The other commissions principal function appears to be limited to keeping informed on needs and accomplishments in their respective fields.

In spite of its ostensible functions as a legislative body, and in spite of the constitution which claims that it is "the highest organ of state power," which "exercises control over the activities of other organs of state power and administration," the only vital function of the Sejm is that of a forum through which the regime can explain the meaning and purpose of important measures to the population. Most of its formal legislative powers are usually exercised by the Council of State; and the Council of Ministers, whose orders and decisions, though nominally administrative acts issued to implement existing legislation, are often of such scope as to constitute new legislation, thereby even further encroaching on the formal powers of the Sejm. The Sejm is simply a device whereby the regime maintains the fiction of indirect popular support for its policies and acts. Expressions of disagreement with government policies by members of the Sejm have occurred since 1956, particularly in regard to Church-State relations, but the Sejm has always hewed to the Party line and it remains a creature of the regime.

b. The Council of State

The Council of State of the Polish People's Republic equates in organization and function with the Presidium of the USSR

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Supreme Soviet. Composed of a chairman, 4 deputy chairmen, a secretary and 9 members, it is elected at the first session of a new Sejm and is theoretically accountable to that body. The statutory powers of the Council of State are extensive. Its chairman and secretary must sign all acts of the Sejm before they are promulgated, and the Council can issue decrees which have the force of law when the Sejm is not in session. It can declare martial law, order mobilization and even declare war. In actual practice, most of these functions are exercised by the Council of Ministers or its presidia which act on the initiative of the central Party apparatus, but the end products (decrees, instructions, decisions, etc.) are issued in the name of the Council of State.

The most important responsibility of the Council of State is supervision of the network of the People's Councils which are elected at the provincial, county, city, and village levels.

c. The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic is constitutionally the leading executive and administrative organ of state power. Legally it is responsible to and reports on its activities to the Sejm and, when the Sejm is not in session, to the Council of State. In practice, the Council of Ministers is subordinate only to its Presidium which is the chief executive agency of the state.

The Council of Ministers constitutes the central core of the state apparatus. It consists of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, deputy chairmen, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and Economic Council and 22 ministers (see Figure VI. 2). One of the major functions of the Council of Ministers is to coordinate the activities of the individual ministries and to give direction to the state apparatus on all levels. It is responsible for the execution of all legislation, prepares the national budget and economic plan.

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FIGURE VI.2

COMPOSITION OF POLISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: JANUARY 1960



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It initiates legislation, conducts foreign relations and oversees the Polish military establishment. It also directs the work of the presidia of the local People's Councils (see below). In all its activities, the Council of Ministers is closely supervised by the central Party apparatus which is required to "give direction to and check on the activities of Party members occupying leading positions of national importance."

Each of the ministers is in charge of a specific branch of the state administration. In their work they are assisted by one or more deputy ministers who are known as under secretaries of state. In the majority of cases, an under secretary is responsible for a well-defined part of the ministry or particular function within it. Together with other key officials of a ministry, the under secretaries form a ministerial collegium. These bodies are only advisory in nature, but all major problems of internal policy, operation, and control must be submitted to them for consideration. The collegium's decisions are not binding upon a minister, but he must report his disagreement with it to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

All ministries have some features of internal organization in common, but only those dealing with economic affairs have a uniform pattern of organization. The economic ministries are subdivided into central boards (equating with Soviet chief directorates), functional departments and service organizations. Central boards control, coordinate and direct all operations of a particularly closely related economic enterprises or, less frequently, a group of similar enterprises located within the same geographic region or, occasionally, a group of dissimilar enterprises grouped together for administrative reasons. Central boards are in turn subdivided into branches and sections. Functional departments, such as planning, investment and personnel, have no operational responsibilities. They are required

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to inform themselves on the state of affairs within their respective fields of competence and serve as staff adjuncts to the minister. Service organizations support both the central boards and functional departments in such fields as budgetary accounting. Both the functional departments and service organizations are made up of divisions, and these, in turn, are subdivided into offices.

The non-economic ministries are organized in a somewhat similar fashion, but no overall pattern exists and their organization varies. In general, they do not possess central boards, although some have operational departments which have directing, controlling and adjudicating functions with respect to provincial and local administration, the school system, etc. They also have a prevalence of bureaus rather than departments and occasionally bureaus and departments which are not subdivided.

Vertically, the ministries present a highly centralized structure, particularly in economic affairs. Possible conflicts with agencies of provincial and local administration are largely resolved by the fact that the presidia of people's councils, which concentrate under them most administrative functions of local and regional government, are organs of both the central and local administrations and their offices are in practice regarded as field units of particular ministries. Local branches of certain ministries, such as Communications, National Defense and Transportation, operate entirely independent of provincial and local governments.

d. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers

The true chief executive agency of the Polish Government is the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. This Presidium is composed of the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, the majority of whom are also members of the Party's Politburo. Each

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member of the Presidium is apparently responsible for the functioning of one branch of state administration, consisting of a number of ministries or other central agencies. As such, he maintains continuous control over ministries or agencies in his sector, explains and brings up at Presidium meetings all matters pertaining to them, and supervises the execution of Presidium decisions within his sector.

According to available information, the Presidium as a whole considers and decides all political, economic, and social questions of importance which lie within the sphere of responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Its functions include: policy decisions and directives for the guidance of ministers in all matters of importance; preliminary approval of all projected laws, decrees, orders, and decisions; review of drafts of the more important orders and ordinances of individual ministries; power of decision in all matters involving two or more sectors; direction of the activities of the presidia of people's councils; establishment of the composition of governmental delegations; approval of operational plans of ministries; etc.

2. Provincial and Local Government

There are 3 groups of agencies which comprise the provincial and local governmental apparatus. In inverse order of importance, they are the People's Councils, Presidiums of People's Councils, and Departments of People's Councils. Each of these agencies works on the principle of dual subordination: People's Council to the electorate and to the next higher People's Council; Presidium to the People's Council and to the next higher presidium; and Department to the Presidium and to the corresponding department at the next higher level. At the apex of the People's Council pyramid stands the Council of State, of the Presidiums, the Council of Ministers,

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and of the Departments, the Ministries and central boards. In the highly centralized Polish structure, the vertical subordination always takes precedence over the horizontal.

a. People's Councils

Polish People's Councils equate in organization and function with Soviets of Working People's Deputies (Soviets, for short) found in the USSR. People's Councils are established on all levels below the national, from villages to voivodships (provinces). Membership in the 9,000-odd People's Councils is chosen by direct, universal, equal and secret elections in which some freedom of choice is permitted. The number of People's Council members on each level is fixed by law within a minimum and maximum for each body by the Council of State in the case of provincial and county councils, and by the next higher council for all other councils.

The role of People's Councils is twofold. With more than 200,000 members and possibly twice as many "activitists" (persons who participate in one or more of their activities), they involve a large segment of the population in their work, including that part which is least exposed to other government agencies, the peasantry. As such, they serve as transmission belts through which the regime's plans and programs reach the population. In addition, they serve as instruments of "social control" over administrative organs of the local government, the presidiums and departments. Social control includes not only investigation and reporting of any form of mismanagement, but also the formulation of positive solutions to problems in community life, plan fulfillment, etc. In practice, however, criticism is largely destructive and what positive approaches are proposed often run counter to the policies of the regime and are quashed.

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Legally, People's Councils have the right to issue legal enactments within the competence granted to them by specific laws, elect and even to recall their own presidiums, form their own commissions, direct the activities of their own agencies, pass upon local economic plans and budget and oversee the execution of both. In actual practice, however, they function much as the national Sejm. The Presidiums and Departments have the same relationship to the People's Council as do the Council of Ministers and Council of State to the Sejm.

b. Presidium of People's Councils

Presidiums of People's Councils are the local counterparts to the Council of State and equate with the Presidiums of higher level Soviets in the USSR. Elected by the People's Councils on the initiative of the appropriate Party Committee, Presidiums are composed of 3 to 9 members, headed by a chairman. Although they are officially the executive and administrative organs of the People's Councils, analysis of their enabling acts implies that decisions of the presidiums may neither be changed nor cancelled by the councils.

Theoretically, presidiums are responsible for the direction of all agencies subordinate to the People's Councils and for supervision and coordination of agencies of the central government located within their territories. Their powers with regard to the latter, however, are limited to requests for specific information, invitations to attend meetings, and to establish coordination commissions. Officials of these agencies, on the other hand, are required to make available to presidiums only such of their plans and decisions as are "of basic importance to the local population or to economic development of the aarea." Disagreements between these bodies are to be resolved by the Presidiums of the People's Council at the next higher level in cooperation

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with the officials which exercise control over the agencies in disagreement.

A similar situation exists in what is usually regarded as the apparatus of the presidium, the Departments of the People's Council. Changes introduced following Gomulka's return to power indicate that these agencies have become more working branches of the central government administration, ministries and central boards, and are, in practice, operationally independent of both People's Councils and their Presidiums (see below).

In effect, the Presidiums of People's Councils, while possessing significant statutory power, are basically coordinating agencies for the broad range of activities the central government considers important and direct only those activities of a housekeeping nature in their respective territories.

c. Departments of People's Councils

As indicated above, these agencies are legally subordinate to the People's Councils via the Presidiums of the Councils, but by and large operationally independent of them and subordinate only to the corresponding departments at the next higher level. Each department is administered by a director appointed by the corresponding department at the next higher level with the concurrence of the chairman of the presidia. The number of departments or other agencies nominally under the respective presidia, their internal organization and every detail of their activity, including hiring of employees, is under the ultimate or direct control of ministries and central boards in Warszawa. A typical provincial departmental structure consists of 20-odd departments and specialized offices (see Figure VI. 3) while a typical county apparatus has about 15 (see Figure VI. 4). Generally speaking, the internal organization of these departments parallels that

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FIGURE VI.3

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL VOIVODSHIP GOVERNMENT: 1960



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FIGURE VI.4

COMPOSITION OF TYPICAL COUNTY GOVERNMENT: 1960



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of their parent agency at the national level, but with decreasing complexity as one moves from the provincial to local levels. At each level, the largest and most important enterprises and institutions are administered by superior agencies, the less important from the given level, and the least important through subordinate departments at lower levels.

3. Administrative-Territorial Divisions

Poland is divided into 17 voivodships (provinces) and two cities (Warszawa and Lodz) of national subordination which are also voivodship capitals (see Table VI. 4 for an alphabetical list of these areas). Voivodships are subdivided into approximately 75 cities of voivodship subordination and almost 400 powiats (counties). The powiats govern towns, settlements and villages. The larger cities are broken down into wards and some exercise direct control over adjacent towns, settlements and villages bypassing the powiat level.

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Table VI. 4

Alphabetical List of Administrative Divisions of the Polish People's Republic and their Control Centers: 1960

Administrative Division	Control Center	Coordinates	
		Latitude	Longitude
Bialystok V.[1/]	Bialystok	57 - 08	23 - 10
Bydgoszcz V.	Bydgoszcz	53 - 09	18 - 00
Gdansk V.	Gdansk	54 - 21	18 - 40
Katowice V..	Katowice	50 - 16	19 - 01
Kielce V.	Kielce	50 - 53	20 - 38
Koszalin V.	Koszalin	54 - 12	16 - 11
Krakow V.	Krakow	50 - 03	19 - 58
Lodz City	Lodz	51 - 45	19 - 29
Lodz V.	Lodz	51 - 45	19 - 29
Lublin V.	Lublin	51 - 15	22 - 34
Olsztyn V.	Olsztyn	53 - 47	20 - 29
Opole V.	Opole	50 - 40	17 - 57
Poznan V.	Poznan	52 - 25	16 - 58
Rzeszow V.	Rzeszow	50 - 02	22 - 01
Szczecin V.	Szczecin	53 - 25	14 - 35
Warszawa City	Warszawa	52 - 15	21 - 00
Warszawa V.	Warszawa	52 - 15	21 - 00
Wroclaw V.	Wroclaw	51 - 06	17 - 02
Zielona Gora V.	Zielona Gora	51 - 56	15 - 30

1/ V. is an abbreviation for Voivodship (province).

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D. Economic Administration

Poland is the largest of the East European Satellites in area, population, and total output of goods and services. The westward shift in Poland's boundaries and the postwar economic development program have transformed the predominantly agricultural economy of prewar Poland into a semi-industrialized one. Over half of the Polish labor force, however, is still employed in agriculture, and the industrial technology of Poland remains far inferior to that of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. With the exception of agriculture, which has remained largely in private hands, the Polish economy has been forced into institutions of the Soviet type and subjected to economic policies and methods of management similar to those of the USSR. Looser methods of state control and more independent policies, however, have been introduced since Gomulka's return to power in October 1956.

There are 3 sectors in the Polish economic structure: socialized, cooperative, and private. With the exception of small private shops with a total employment of less than 250,000, all units engaged in industry, trade, transport, and financial activities are owned and operated by the state. The cooperative sector, although legally owned by cooperative members, is subject to operative control of state agencies. In agriculture the private sector is dominant. State farms include only about 13 per cent of agricultural land and collective farms, about 1 per cent.

Poland has a planned economy modeled in most respects after that of the USSR. Production goals of the major goods and services outside agriculture are established in the State Plan on the basis of information on the past performance of production units, the economic goals of the government, and the requirements of these goals in terms of

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available or prospective resources. Parallel to the production plan is the financial plan which traces the flow of money and credit, current costs, and the means of financing various other expenditures. Control over the formulation and supervision of the execution of these plans rests with the central Party apparatus, the State Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Finance. Direction of production units is entrusted to the economic ministries, central boards and combines.

Within the state-owned and operated sector, the basic producing unit is the enterprise, the direction of which is entrusted to a manager appointed by the state. Enterprises buy and sell goods and services on their own account, subject to the financial supervision of the state bank, and are generally expected to cover operating costs from their sales. Investments, however, are mostly paid from the state budget, and most of enterprise profits are channeled into the budget. As distinct from enterprises which have a degree of administrative and financial autonomy, institutions connected with government operations or with cultural services are controlled directly through the state budget.

Although private producers, workers, and consumers are not subject to direct state orders, their operations are limited by a number of restrictions. In agriculture, the principal restrictions are state contracts and delivery quotas for a number of products. In other areas, licensing requirements and allocations of state-produced materials greatly restrict the scope and nature of production. Workers are usually free to change their work, and consumers may choose among goods available in stores, but wages, prices and the quantity and assortment of the consumer goods are determined by the state. A free market exists only for certain farm products and imported consumer manufactures.

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1. State Planning Commission

The basic principles of the state plan are established at the highest government level (the Presidium of the Council of Ministers) and, in fact, represent the goals of the Party as formulated by the central Party apparatus. The details of the plan are then worked out by a reconciliation of the policies and goals of the top planners with the specific proposals of the production units. The work of coordinating and formulating an internally consistent plan which takes into account both the government's desires and production possibilities of enterprises is done largely by the State Planning Commission.

The State Planning Commission exercises control over the entire administrative and economic apparatus of the state. In the preliminary planning stage it must oversee the planning of all the component parts of the government from local people's councils to the ministerial level, and make the overall plan conform to the general directives of the highest Party and government authorities. After a plan has been approved by these authorities and ratified by the annual Sejm session, the State Planning Commission must make certain that all economic agencies operate in conformity with the general lines of the plan and comply with its detailed specifications.

Since Gomulka's return to power the all encompassing activities of the State Planning Commission have been somewhat curtailed as detailed planning for activities of purely local significance have been transferred to local agencies. The production plan for major commodities and materials and the distribution plan for these items are still planned by this agency. It also coordinates the detailed plans of all major undertakings in the country, as well as the overall plan for provincial administrations.

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Thus, the State Planning Commission is the key agency involved in planning, coordination, allocation of supplies, and control over the entire economy. For its manifold purposes, it not only controls a number of independent agencies at the national level, but also operates a territorial apparatus attached to both the provincial and county presidiums.

2. Ministry of Finance and State Bank

The Ministry of Finance and the State Bank are the other 2 major agencies which exercise control over all aspects of the economy.

The Ministry of Finance is almost the equal of the State Planning Commission in its influence on the economy. It is the agency which prepares and supervises the execution of the state budget, the monetary counterpart of the national economic plan. The state budget has 2 principal functions: to finance all activities of government institutions, such as administration, national defense, education, and health and social insurance, and to provide to enterprises the financial means for economic development. The state budget provides enterprises with investment funds via the investment bank, working capital for new or expanding enterprises and even covers planned losses on current account. In its preparation of the national budget, the Ministry of Finance must work closely with all ministries and other agencies of the government down to the local level, particularly with the State Planning Commission. It has field offices attached to the provincial and county presidiums.

The State Bank and its subordinate branches, which are entirely independent of local governmental agencies, handle all financial transactions between state enterprises. They also periodically examine the accounts of enterprises, approve or reject proposed expenditures, control the size of enterprise cash balances and

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inventories, and extend short-term credits. They are also the mechanism through which payments in the form of cash are made to workers, farmers, and other persons outside the state-controlled sector. Their functions are so all-pervasive that they control the amount of cash in circulation and, thereby, the consumer goods market.

3. Industrial Administration

There are 2 types of industrial administration in Poland: centralized for all important commodities; and decentralized for commodities of purely local significance. The administration of enterprises producing important commodities runs from the economic ministry, central board or combine, to the plant. Plants producing less significant goods and service are administered by the appropriate sections of the presidiums of provincial and county people's councils (see Figure VI. 5).

The highest level of state economic administration, as opposed to planning and control, consists of the 10 economic ministries and other organizations of the same rank with some production responsibilities. Each of these agencies is responsible for economic planning and investment policy in their respective fields; direction of subordinate state, state-cooperative and state-administered enterprises; direction and supervision of the central offices of cooperatives, as applicable; arbitration of disputes among subordinate enterprises; manpower; and research. Particularly important enterprises are subordinated directly to the ministry.

Ministries fulfill these responsibilities mainly through central boards and combines. Central boards are responsible for translating the principles of the national economic plan into goals and basic indices for their subordinate units; for reviewing the drafts of plans of lower units and combining them for integration into higher

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FIGURE VI.5

INDUSTRIAL SUBORDINATION IN POLAND: 1960



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departmental plans; and for organizing and supervising the accounting and operational reporting of their subordinate enterprises. Where the number of enterprises on the lowest level is small, the central boards administers them directly. If the number is large, intermediate administrative entities are formed, such as associations and trusts. In such cases, however, the largest and most important enterprises are subordinated directly to the central board.

As in other Soviet-type economies, the basic industrial unit is the enterprise, an entity comprising one or several plants and generally, but not always, producing technologically related products. Under the direction of state-appointed managers, enterprises are responsible for the implementation of the various aspects of the economic and financial plan and also engage in some marginal activities not specified in these plans. They are held responsible for the results of current operations (production, purchases, sales, etc.) and are usually expected to cover operating costs from their receipts from sales. In October 1956, workers' councils and other workers' organizations gained limited prerogatives in the determination of intra-enterprise operations. Since then, most of these prerogatives have been abolished or so emasculated as to make this form of control nonexistent.

Some moves toward a decentralization of this type of administration have been made in the last 2 years. Some central boards, which functioned as ministerial offices, have been replaced by combines and boards which function as economically independent agencies. Paralleling this administrative reorganization, large numbers of officials have been downgraded or transferred to production activities. Given the modicum of success achieved to date, it is inlikely that this trend will be intensified in the immediate future.

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4. Agricultural Administration

There are 3 sectors in the Polish agricultural economy: state, cooperative, and private. In contradistinction to industry, however, the private sector is the largest and most important sector; with about 85 per cent of the arable land, private holdings outproduce the cooperative sector by about 20 per cent and the state sector by almost 60 per cent per hectare. The extent and form of control exercised by the regime over agricultural production units varies from direct operation of the state sector to indirect control of the private sector through manipulation of the price system and taxation policy.

The paramount agricultural control agency is the Ministry of Agriculture. It is responsible for the overall direction of agriculture in Poland. The scope of the activities of the ministry include planning agricultural production to meet the requirements of the state, cost-price and incentive analysis, development and implementation of investment policies and programs, operation of the state farm sector and of agricultural machinery production enterprises, and the usual manpower and research functions.

The Ministry of Agriculture controls the operations of the Polish state farm system, which emulates the Soviet sovkhoz system, through a number of regional offices attached to local presidiums of people's councils. Although ideologically the most acceptable to the regime, Polish state farms are far from being model agricultural enterprises. Despite the advantages of higher input levels of fertilizers and machinery, and relatively more fertile soil than the private sector, crop yields and overall productivity on state farms are lower.

Control over collective farms, while less direct, is nevertheless pervasive. Nominally owned and operated by their members,

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collective farms are controlled through county sections of agriculture and forestry which oversee their day-to-day activities. While ideologically less desirable than state farms, collective farms are more preferable than individual farms to the regime. As such, they, too, have received favored treatment from the regime in the form of lower delivery quotas, more fertilizers and lower tax rates. Collective farms have not been popular with the traditionally independent minded Polish peasantry. Initially established in 1948, collective farms were to have by 1955 a membership totalling 60 per cent of all private farmers and 15 per cent of arable land. By the end of 1955, however, only 6 per cent of the farm holdings and 10.1 per cent of agricultural land were in collectives. Then came October. Within 2 months, approximately 75 per cent of the collective farms had been dissolved. Their influence on the Polish agricultural scene decreased proportionally and has remained at a low level.

As regards the future of collectives, official directives reaffirm the intention of maintaining state support. While the goal of socializing agriculture is maintained, the realization appears to be relegated to the distant future. Part of the necessary preparation for ultimate realization lies in the lessening of the individualistic tendencies of the peasantry. According to Gomulka, "while we are eliminating administrative pressure in the formation of cooperative farms, the state should not renounce the use of various organizational and economic measures which would promote the development of agricultural circles, turn them into mass organizations and guide their activities in the desired direction."

Agricultural "circles" existed in prewar Poland as voluntary groups formed by the peasantry for the joint purchase of machinery and tools and mutual help and were similar to the Western "cooperative"

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approach at the time. Under the present regime, "circles," although voluntary, cannot dispose of their property (machinery, fees, and land) once formed. They are required to carry out public and some legal functions assigned to them by the government and are encouraged to engage in collective farming on land leased from the state. The appeal of the traditional cooperative approach and the preferential treatment received from the state has brought tens of thousands of members into the "circles." It is estimated that "circles" exist in more than 40 per cent of Polish villages and include at least 15 per cent of the farms.

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E. Control Force

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Polish Control Force totalled approximately 1,170,000 persons or almost 16 per cent of those employed in the socialized sector of the Polish labor force (see Table VI. 5). By definition, the Polish Control Force equates with the Soviet in that it is composed almost exclusively of persons with command responsibilities or in staff positions requiring specialized knowledge which would enable them to effectively exercise supervisory responsibilities in a post-attack situation.

The degree of responsibility exercised by the various components of the control force varies considerably. The most powerful segment consists of the 30,000 full-time Party professionals. Within this group, the members of the central Party apparatus exercise nationwide control over all political, economic, social, and military activities. On the local level, members of the Party apparatus are equally important within the geographic confines of their areas.

The 110,000 members of the state administration, comprise the second most significant segment of the Polish Control Force. Composed of employees of the national, provincial, city, county, and village governments, this component is primary executor of the Party's will in relation to the population. Members of the highest echelons of the state administration rank just below the central Party apparatus in power and prestige; at the lower echelons the differential is greater.

The estimated 160,000 members of the armed forces control force consists of the Polish officer corps and NCOs. They command the major instruments of repression at the disposal of the regime and, as such, would play a major role in a crisis situation.

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Table VI. 5

Composition of the Polish Control Force: 1960

Category	Number	Per Cent of total
Communist Party	30,000	2.6
State Administration	110,000	9.4
Armed Forces	160,000	13.7
Economic Administration	560,000	47.9
Industry	(340,000)	(29.0)
Trade, Supply, etc.	(70,000)	(6.1)
Transport and Communications	(60,000)	(5.1)
Construction	(60,000)	(5.1)
Agriculture	(30,000)	(2.6)
Services	310,000	26.4
Education	(160,000)	(13.7)
Health	(50,000)	(4.2)
Housing and Public Utilities	(20,000)	(1.7)
Finance and Credit	(20,000)	(1.7)
Others	(60,000)	(5.1)
Total	1,170,000	100.0

The largest single segment of the Polish Control Force is employed in economic administration. They range in importance from the head of a regional heavy industry trust (persons with nationwide responsibility in the economic sphere are included in the state administration category) to a shift-foreman in a shoe factory. Given the economic dilemma the Gomulka regime faces, it is upon the shoulders of this group, perhaps more than on any other, that the ultimate viability of the "Polish Road to Socialism" rests.

More than 25 per cent of the Polish Control Force are employed in service occupations, such as education and public health. While possessing relatively little significant command responsibility in peacetime, their role is considerably augmented in wartime. Moreover, in periods of internal turmoil, persons from this group are usually found in the vanguard of dissident groups.

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Almost all of the Polish Control Force live and work in urban areas. Warszawa probably contains the majority of persons with nationwide responsibilities; lesser concentrations are probably found in the provincial capitals.

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Volume Two, Part II

VII. Rumania

A. Introduction

Rumania--called the Rumanian People's Republic by its Communist masters--is ruled by a totalitarian regime imposed and maintained by the USSR. The nucleus of this regime is the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party which controls all aspects of the political, sociological and economic life of the country. The Party is the creation of the Kremlin and the chief instrumentality through which the USSR has introduced a political and economic system modeled on its own. In leading Rumania down the road to socialism, which is now scheduled to be reached by 1965, the regime has met with considerable success when imposing structural changes that do not require mass support for their execution, although it has encountered difficulties in carrying out policies in those fields which require popular support.

Nevertheless, the regime has consistently shown itself to be one of the strongest and most stable of the East European Satellites. The underlying source of this strength has been the presence of the Soviet Union on the scene. The main factors virtually precluding overt opposition to the present rulers are the cowing and isolation of a traditionally apathetic people, the elimination of organized resistance, and rigid Party unity.

The Communist regime in Rumania maintains its supremacy over a basically hostile but passive population primarily through the action of strong and efficient security forces, which in the last 2 years have been strengthened through a drastic revision of the penal code which now provides the death penalty for some 60-70 separate crimes. It has also initiated a drive for more intellectual conformity and is tightening controls over the various church and ethnic groups. In order to gain more control over the traditionally recalcitrant peasantry,

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it has added impetus to the collectivization drive. Since 1958, the socialized sector of the rural economy has been increased 29 per cent and now includes 70 per cent of the agricultural lands.

The Party leadership has avoided taking extremist positions on any issues. It has, for example, evaded taking definitive stands on such issues as the changing status of Tito and the downgrading of Stalin. In addition, no nationalist faction has been permitted to arise. The absence of serious factionalism at the top levels has inhibited the formulation of any opposition in the lower echelons. The process of purging is continuous, however, and considerable acrimony exists among the plant managers and other economic chiefs who are the regime's scapegoats for its many and varied failures. Apathy on the part of the lower Party echelons and the population as a whole is the greatest deterrent to success.

In an effort to overcome the passive resistance of the population to its programs and policies, the regime has recently undertaken a number of steps to improve the living standards of the urban labor force, the success of which are problematical. The regime remains Stalinist in organization and outlook--but dull. Rumania appears to have bypassed Djilas' "heroic era of Communism" and entered directly into its "epoch of practical men."

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B. Rumanian Workers' Party

In Rumania a Communist regime installed by Moskva in 1945 exercises all effective power. Its main instrument is the Rumanian Workers' Party which is ruled by a small clique of individuals in its Politburo and Central Committee. Despite 2 major intervening purges, these are the same individuals who led the Communist movement in the 1930's. Their continued presence in the leadership symbolizes the stability and continuity which distinguish the Rumainian Communist regime as one of the most faithful to the Kremlin and most trouble-free in the East European Satellites.

The Rumanian Workers' Party, as presently constituted, is a lineal descendant of the Communist Party of Rumania which was founded in 1921. In 1924 it was outlawed and operated clandestinely for more than 20 years. In June 1944 the again legal Communist Party joined the Peasant, Liberal, and Socialist Parties to form the National Democratic Bloc under the monarchy. Four months later, charging the others with collaboration with the Germans, the Communist broke with the bloc and formed a purely left-wing organization called the National Democratic Front (later called the People's Democratic Front). In December 1947, through extensive use of the instruments of terror and repression and with the support of the Soviets, the monarchy was overthrown and the Rumanian People's Republic was established. Early in 1948, the Communists forced a merger with the left-wing Social Democrats under the name of the Rumainian Workers' Party and the country became in effect a one-Party state.

The Rumanian Workers' Party and its leadership are marked by a carefully colorless, deliberately spiceless conservatism of action. The ability of the leaders to survive all the twists and turns of the Kremlin line which have spelled oblivion for many satellite chiefs appears due, on the one hand, to the eradication of factionalism at the top and

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prompt reaction to active signs of discontent from below, and on the other hand, to the ability to remain apart from the mainstream of bloc ideological controversies. By and large, they have taken enough action to avoid the Kremlin's displeasure, yet not enough to cause internal repercussions.. As one Communist official expressed it to an American newspaperman in 1958, "for us there has been no revisionism, no Titoism, no relaxation, no tightening." Stalin's death produced few changes in Rumania, and the regime remains essentially Stalinist in its policies.

1. Growth in Membership

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Rumanian Workers' Party totaled approximately 750,000 or 4.1 per cent of the total population and 5.9 per cent of the adult population of the country (See Table VII. 1). Under the stress of opposing needs, the size of the Party has fluctuated constantly since its inception. On the one hand there has been the desire to increase numerical strength of the Party in order to give it a semblance of popular support; on the other, there has been the necessity to insure the political reliability and ideological purity of its membership which has necessitated eliminating unreliable elements.

Table VII. 1

Growth Of The Rumanian Workers' Party: 1944-1960

Year	Number	Per Cent of Total Population	Per Cent of Adult Population
1944 Apr.	1,000	neg.	0.1
1947 Dec.	750,000	4.7	7.1
1948 Feb.	920,000	5.9	8.8
1951 Jan.	720,000	4.4	6.5
1955 Dec.	595,398	3.4	4.9
1958 June	720,000	4.1	5.9
1960 Jan.	750,000	4.1	5.9

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The rise from 1,000 members following its re-establishment in 1944 to 750,000 in December 1947 was achieved through wholesale enrollment, often without scrutiny of the political and social background of new members, in order to create the impression of mass support. (Indiscriminate re-enlistment of hostile elements was one of the charges levelled at Anna Pauker when she was purged in 1952.) The merger of the Communists with the dissident wing of the Social Democratic Party in 1948 to form the Rumanian Workers' Party brought the membership to a peak of about 920,000.

Only 6 months after unification, the now self-confident regime ordered a halt in recruitment and instigated a thorough examination of its membership. The elimination of opportunists and hostile elements reduced its membership by almost 23 per cent or 200,000 in the next 2 years. In May 1952 the Party leadership opened the membership rolls again but on an individual basis and after careful screening of applicants. The purge continued, however, for by the end of 1955 total membership had declined by an additional 125,000.

Following the Second Party Congress in December 1955, admissions exceeded expulsions and by June 1958 total membership reached the 1951 level of 720,000. No official membership figures have been published since that date. Available evidence indicates that in the months immediately following the Second Congress membership decreased somewhat, only to increase again as the time for the Third Party Congress (Summer of 1960) approaches. Recruitment and purification continue to exist side by side, with the former gaining ascendancy in periods of relaxation, and the latter during periods of tension.

2. Distribution of the Party

While the Rumanians have never published information concerning the geographic distribution of Party membership, analysis of delegate listings to the Second Party Congress indicate that it is distributed

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similarly to that of the Soviet Union. The highest concentrations are found in urban areas containing major control agencies, such as Bucuresti where it is estimated that almost 8 per cent of the total population belong to the Party, and in major industrial centers, such as Ploesti (see Table VII. 2). Lesser concentrations are found in predominantly agricultural areas like Craiova where only 2.7 per cent of the population are believed to be Party members.

Table VII. 2

Distribution of Rumanian Workers' Party
By Selected Administrative Divisions:
1960

Administrative Division	Number	Number Per 1,000 Total Population
Bucuresti City	105,000	78
Cluj R.	58,000	44
Craiova R.	42,000	27
Ploesti R.	68,000	47
Ploesti City	14,000	113
Stalin R.	47,000	50
Others	430,000	37
Total	750,000	41

3. Organization of the Party

Although officially it is the government and not the Party which makes the laws, runs the state, administers the economy, and controls the armed forces, meaningful charges are announced by the Party, invariably adopted by the government, enforced through both the governmental and Party organizations, and explained to the people through Party and Party-controlled channels. Party organizations exist within every governmental body, supervising and guiding its activities and assuring fulfillment of Party policy, and governmental officials are removed when they lose Party standing.

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Nominally, on both national and local levels, the Party and government have separate though parallel apparatuses (see Figure VII. 1); actually they are linked by an identity of membership, especially at the higher levels. Virtually all the higher officials and many of the lower officials in the government are leading members of the Party. The existence of a parallel Party apparatus, however, is of major significance for it provides the top leadership with separate control, communication and reporting channels over the government and population. It is this apparatus upon which the regime relies in crisis situations. Next to the Soviet Army perched on its borders, the Party apparatus is the major bulwark of the dictatorship.

The Rumanian Workers' Party is organized on the pattern of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and operates by the same rules. Under the principles of "internal Party democracy" and "democratic centralism," leading organs are "elected" by a secret vote, and the minority always submits (in theory) to the majority. Decisions of the higher organs are always obligatory on the lower. In theory, the membership has the power to select the leadership through a series of indirect elections and the leadership, in turn, is supposed to observe the wishes of the electorate. In practice, the Party membership has little to say regarding the leadership and its policies and operations. They are expected merely to confirm Moskva's choice of hierarchy, obey their leaders, and enlist the support of the population for the decreed policies of the regime.

The basic unit of the complex Party structure is the individual cell or basic Party organization in factories, farms, and government agencies. On the foundation of the primary organizations is built a pyramid of higher Party organs with a steadily expanding territorial jurisdiction: raions and towns, regiunes, and the national Party offices.

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FIGURE VII. 1

ORGANIZATION OF RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY AND GOVERNMENT: 1960



KEY

- Control or Supervision
- Formal Election
- Direct Election
- Indirect Election or Appointment

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a. National Party Agencies

At the national level, there are 6 major Party agencies: in decreasing order of importance, they are the Politburo, Secretariat, Party Control Commission, Central Committee, Central Auditing Commission, and Congress.

(1) The Politburo

The Political Bureau or Politburo is the paramount Rumainian control agency. Nominally elected by the Central Committee of the Party and empowered only to direct the Party between the quarterly meetings of the Central Committee, the Politburo actually runs the country. Responsible to the Central Committee in theory, the Politburo is really only answerable to Moskva. It is composed of 10-15 members and candidates who are mostly old-line leaders of the 1930's, who have been coopted and hold their positions with Soviet approval. Each member is responsible for a broad sector of the country's activity, such as economy, defense, or internal security, even though he may have no formal government assignment. In addition, each Politburo member holds one or more key positions in the government, mass organizations, or Party. Since the real locus of power is in the Politburo, some Rumanian officials refer to it in private as "the government."

(2) Secretariat

Ranking next in importance to the Politburo, and exercising a strong influence upon it, is the National Party Secretariat. It is the agency in charge of the Party apparatus, supervising personnel matters (including assignments), conducting current work and organizing the fulfillment of Party directives.

Headed by the First Secretary of the Party and the other 2 secretaries, it consists of their personal staffs and the professional Party workers in the 14-odd Directorates of the Central Committee (see Figure VII. 2). As in the Soviet Union, the most important section

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FIGURE VII. 2

ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL APPARATUS OF RUMANIAN WORKERS' PARTY: JANUARY 1960



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of the central secretariat is the Directorate for Party Affairs which controls appointments in all national Party agencies and has a veto over appointments at lower levels. The Military Directorate of the Secretariat is, at the same time, the Higher Political Directorate of the Armed Forces which is responsible for the political orientation of the troops. The Party hierarchy in the Armed Forces, which operates on the basis of unpublished regulations, functions independently of the regular territorial Party organizations but is expected to maintain close contact with them. The reliability of Party officials in the Armed Forces is subjected to more stringent political scrutiny than is the case for officials in the civilian sphere. The other directorates control appointments in broad sectors of the economic and social complex and are expected to ensure both the reliability of supervisory personnel and their fulfillment of Party directives in their respective areas of interest.

The national secretariat is believed to employ approximately 5 per cent of the total number of Party professionals in the country.

(3) Party Control Commission

Elected by the Central Committee upon the recommendation of the Politburo/Secretariat, the Party Control Commission is the disciplinary arm of the national Party organs. It is responsible for ensuring Party "purity and unity," punishment of infractions against both Party and state regulations, and acts as a court of second instance for members appealing sanctions or expulsions imposed by regional Party Control Commissions. The task of this 7-man body is difficult because of the pandemic corruption in Rumania, opportunism in the Party, and a general tendency to disregard Party directives by its members.

(4) Central Committee

The Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party is "elected" at each national Party Congress. The statutory powers of this

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100-man body are great. It is supposed to "lead all Party activities between congresses; represent the Party in its relations with other Parties, organizations and institutions; organize and lead various Party institutions and socially important enterprises; appoint the editors of central newspapers . . . and appoint and allot the forces and means of the Party and administer its funds." It also is required "to direct the activities of the central agencies of state power and of public organizations through the Party groups at these agencies." In actuality these functions are exercised by the 2 supreme Party agencies which are only nominally subordinate to it: the Politburo and Secretariat.

(5) The Central Auditing Commission

The Central Auditing Commission is a little publicized body "elected" by the national Party Congress to watch the top Party agencies. Members of the Central Committee may not, at the same time, belong to the Central Auditing Commission. Its main function is to check on the efficiency of the central Party apparatus and to watch Party finances. Together with its counterparts at lower levels it receives complaints and acts as a countrywide barometer to detect areas of popular discontent.

(6) Party Congress

According to the Party statute, the Congress is the supreme Party organ; it is composed of an indirectly elected body of regiune delegates (who are, in turn, representative of an indirectly elected body of raion and town delegates) which supposedly represent the general membership. It is required by the statute to meet every 4 years in order to elect a Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission, modify the Party program and statute, establish the current line on fundamental problems of policy, and hear reports on (and approve) the activities of the central organs between congresses. In practice, the

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Congress has fulfilled only the latter function, rubber-stamping the activities of the Politburo/Secretariat and Central Committee.

b. Intermediate Party Agencies

The organization of the Party at the regiune, raion and town levels is patterned after that at the national level. At each level there is a conference which equates with the national Party congress, a committee paralleling the Central Committee, and an executive consisting of a bureau and secretariat at the regiune level and bureau and secretaries at lower (the raion and town) level which are comparable to the Politburo and national Secretariat.

The 17 regiune (including Bucuresti City), 200 raion and 386 town Party conferences correspond to the national Party congress. The regiune level conference is composed of delegates elected at raion and town Party conferences and is normally required to meet biennially. The raion and town Party conferences are composed of delegates elected at basic Party general meetings and is supposed to meet at least annually. The main function of conferences is to confirm the activities of their executive arms during the intervals between their meetings and elect new committees and delegates to the next higher conference (or congress).

Regiune committees are elected at regiune conferences and are supposed to meet once every 3 months. As is the case with the Central Committee, their statutory responsibilities are significant, including fulfillment of higher Party directives and supervision of the implementation of Party policy concerning education, expenditures of funds, personnel assignments, economic production, etc., within their respective territories. The committees, however, exercise only a fraction of their statutory responsibilities.

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The Bureau and Secretariat of Regiune Party Committees, corresponding to the Politburo and national Secretariat, are the primary control agencies at their level. The executive organ is the bureau which is composed of approximately 10 persons, including the secretaries of the regiune organization--all of whom must be confirmed by the national Secretariat. The regiune First Secretary heads the secretariat which is organized like and has responsibilities similar to the national Secretariat. Also, at the regiune level there are formed Party collegiums which are the equivalent of the national Party Control Commission.

Raion and town conferences, composed of delegates elected at basic Party organization general meetings, elect committees which, in turn elect bureaus and secretaries who perform functions similar to those at the regiune level. The first secretary of a raion or town committee must be confirmed by the national Secretariat. Other members of the bureau, including the lesser secretaries, must be confirmed by the regiune secretariat. These organs are primarily responsible for the activities of the basic Party organizations within their areas. Lacking a formal secretariat, they work primarily through instructors attached to the bureau who have face-to-face contact with lower Party organ officials.

The committees at the regiune and raion levels have a total membership of approximately 11,000. The bureaus, like the committes, are composed of the leading Party government, economic and social officials in the area, most of whom have full-time positions outside the Party apparatus. Therefore, the secretaries, and particularly the First Secretary, constitute the most powerful segment of the Party control force at this level.

c. Local Party Agencies

The basic Party organization is the cell which is formed in schools, units of the armed forces, industrial enterprises, collective farms, government institutions, etc., wherever there are at least 3

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Party members. The general assembly of members at this level corresponds to the conference at the intermediate level, but, because of its more or less intimate contact with its officials and work situation, exercises somewhat more of its extensive statutory powers. Heading a basic organization is a bureau "elected" at the general assembly of members on the recommendation of the raion or town bureau secretaries. Where a basic organization consists of less than 10 members, a secretary and deputy serve in lieu of the bureau. At basic organizations with less than 100 members, Party work is usually performed by members on a released time basis. At enterprises or institutions with more than 100 members, full-time Party officials usually hold secretarial posts. At enterprises and institutions with more than 300 members, committees are formed and shop or office basic organizations are established. There are approximately 75,000 members of the basic Party organization bureaus.

The 30,000 basic Party organizations serve as the rallying point for the mobilization of the labor force for plan fulfillment and as the Party's check on management. In government offices, their checking functions are limited to reportage to higher Party agencies; in non-government activities, they often usurp managerial functions for they, too, are held responsible for the activities of the enterprise or institution in which they are formed.

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C. Government

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rumanian Government is its similarity to that of the Soviet Union. In addition to espousing the official ideology of the USSR, as interpreted by the Kremlin, the Rumanian Government follows Soviet governmental patterns in internal organization, operational procedures, domestic and foreign policies, and judicial and penal practices. Applicable Soviet administrative reorganizations are promptly enacted by the Rumanians.

According to the Rumanian Constitution, the Rumanian People's Republic is a workers' state in which the basis of power resides in the alliance between the working class and the working peasantry, with the leading role belonging to the working class. The Rumanian Workers' Party is, of course, the "vanguard of the workers." Therefore, the Constitution states that "the Rumanian Workers' Party is the leading force of all workers' organizations, as well as of state organizations and institutions." As the Government of the USSR is dominated by the CPSU, so the Rumanian Government is dominated on all levels by the Rumanian Workers' Party. The Party, through its Politburo, reserves all policy-making matters for itself, appoints all key personnel to government posts, and maintains organizations of its members in all governmental bodies to supervise implementation of its policies. The Government is an instrument of the Party.

The fundamentally totalitarian nature of the regime, which is characterized by rigid centralization and hierarchical subordination of lower government echelons to higher ones, is obscured by the democratic facade which envelops it. Despite assertions to the contrary, there is no popular participation in policy formulation--only in implementation. The "democratically" elected governmental bodies are essentially rubber-stamp organs for their nominally subordinate executives which, in turn, play a similar role in relation to the appropriate Party agencies.

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1. Central Government

The central government is patterned closely after that of the Soviet Union. It consists of the Grand National Assembly and its Presidium, which equate with the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and the Council of Ministers which is organized and operates like its superior counterpart in the USSR. Despite a certain overlapping of functions, the Grand National Assembly and its Presidium constitute the weak legislative branch of government and the Council of Ministers, the executive branch. Theoretically, the locus of power lies in the Grand National Assembly, to which all branches of government are directly or indirectly subordinated. In reality, however, the most powerful branch is the executive, as embodied in the Council of Ministers, which is the principal administrator of Party policies. All branches of government act on the initiative of the Party, and all key positions are staffed by Party personnel.

a. The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is described in the Constitution as the "supreme administrative and executive organ of the Rumanian People's Republic." In practice, it is the heart of the governmental system. The Council's power stems from the concentration within it of the leading figures of the Party and its jurisdiction over most phases of political, economic, social, and cultural life in the country. Although the Constitution subordinates the Council to the Grand National Assembly, its members need not be members of that body and are really only responsible to the Party Politburo/Secretariat.

The Council of Ministers is a corporate body with collective responsibility for implementing the directives of the Party. It is empowered to issue binding resolutions, decisions, and orders affecting every aspect of the country's life, to direct and coordinate the work of ministries and other government agencies, to prepare and execute

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the economic plans and state budget, organize and maintain the armed forces, protect public order, exercise foreign relations, and to suspend and cancel decisions and orders of subordinated ministries and local governmental agencies.

The Council of Ministers consists of a President, 7 vice-presidents, the chairmen of the State Planning Committee and State Control Commission, and the heads of 15 ministries (see Figure VII. 3). Whereas basic policy is made by the Party Politburo, policy implementation is concentrated in the hands of the president and vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers (the president and 3 of the 7 vice-presidents are also Politburo members). The president's duties include convening and presiding over the sessions of the council, supervising the work of ministries and other central agencies, and signing and checking on the implementation of the council's acts. He conducts his work through an administrative staff, the General Secretariat. In his absence, the president appoints one of the vice-presidents to fulfill his functions. The vice-presidents, in addition to coordinating the activities of the central administration, have broad responsibility for some individual sector, such as planning, agriculture, or heavy industry. Individual ministers may also exercise considerable power, depending on their positions in the Party hierarchy.

The Council of Ministers convenes ordinary sessions twice monthly and in extraordinary session as needed. Problems which do not come before it as a body are resolved by the president himself. The latter practice, coupled with the infrequency of meetings, would suggest that the bulk of the council's business is transacted between the president and the head of the ministry or agency concerned, while full meetings are reserved for resolving interagency problems and for discussion of general policy directives.

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FIGURE VII 3

COMPOSITION OF RUMANIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: JANUARY 1960



* Comprised of heads of all agencies marked "a" and of State Bank, Price Committee, State Committee for Labor and Wages, Statistical Office and Central Council of Trade Unions.

** Believed inoperative

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b. Ministries and Ministerial Agencies

Rumanian practice divides central government organs into 2 types: ministries and agencies with ministerial rank; and non-ministerial agencies under the Council of Ministers. As shown in Figure VII. 3, there are currently 15 ministries and 2 agencies of ministerial rank. Seven ministries deal with primarily economic matters: 5 respectively with education and culture, finance, foreign affairs, health and social welfare, and local organs of state administration (the latter is believed to be inoperative); 2 with public order and safety, and one with defense. The State Planning Committee and State Control Commission have ministerial rank for they are the only 2 agencies whose jurisdiction and duties cut across all economic sectors. The Economic Council is chaired by a vice-president and includes in its membership the chairmen of the State Planning Commission, State Bank, State Committees for Prices and for Labor and Wages, Statistical Office, and the Ministers of Commerce, Finance, and Local Organs of State Administration. Available evidence suggests that it functions as a broad economic advisory or coordinating agency for the president of the council. Non-ministerial central agencies are divided into 2 categories: economic, such as the State Bank, and cultural, such as the Academy of Sciences. There are at least 8 economic and 5 cultural non-ministerial agencies subordinated to the Council of Ministers.

The structure of ministries and non-ministerial agencies is rigidly departmentalized and hierarchically organized. A collegium is the principal policy body of a ministry or agency. It is usually composed of the minister or agency head, his deputies, heads of the general directorates, and of the more important directorates. Collegiums meet regularly twice monthly in their advisory capacity. The minister or agency head is president of the collegium and directly responsible for the formulation of policy details and supervision of their execution

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within the establishment. The specific implementation of policy decisions within ministries or agencies is entrusted to the general directorates, which are actual operational branches, each in charge of a specialized, technical field. The principal structural unit is the general directorate which is subdivided into directorates, sections, offices, and service branches. The number of general directorates varies according to the scope of the establishment's activities. Directorates, on the other hand, usually handle administrative affairs, although some are of a functional nature. Sections and offices deal with special problems more circumscribed in scope.

c. The Grand National Assembly

Under the Constitution, the Grand National Assembly is the highest organ of state power and simultaneously the sole national legislative body. In reality neither this body nor its Presidium exercises the considerable statutory powers at their disposal, but only mechanically follow the dictates of the Party. Since the Hungarian Revolution, the Communist regime has attempted to make the legislative branch appear to be more than the rubber-stamp appendage of the executive; the changes are only on the surface, however, and the executive continues to dominate the legislative.

The Grand National Assembly is a unicameral organ elected for a period of 4 years by all enfranchized citizens over 18 years of age on the basis of one member of every 40,000 inhabitants. The Assembly meets twice a year for a few days each time. The duties of the Assembly according to the constitution include amending the constitution, ratifying decrees, establishing national economic plans, approving the state budget, etc. Most sessions are concerned with ratifying Presidium decrees, the budget, electoral laws, and constitutional amendments, already previously formulated as policies by the Party.

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The assembly is headed by a president elected by the deputies. Two vice-presidents and 4 secretaries together with the president form the Bureau of the Assembly. The deputies themselves are organized into 8 permanent committees: foreign affairs, defense, education and culture, agriculture and forestry, finance, administration and judicial affairs. These committees functions are strictly procedural: to clarify the working of legislation at hand and to sponsor it before the full assembly for approval.

d. Presidium of the Grand National Assembly

The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly functions as a standing committee of that body. Consisting of one chairman, 3 vice-chairmen, one secretary and 14 members, the Presidium possesses the statutory powers of the assembly when it is not in session. Legally, it is viewed as "the collective president of the Rumanian People's Republic." Since its statutory powers are actually exercised by the Party Politburo/Secretariat and the government Council of Ministers, the role of the Presidium is largely ceremonial. Most of its activities are of the nature of conferring decorations, approving appointments, and rubber-stamping legislation prepared by the Party apparatus and Council of Ministers.

2. Regiune and Local Government

Regiune and local government is entrusted to essentially similar agencies operating in 4 principal types of governmental units: regiune (province), raion (county), town, and comuna (township). The highest territorial unit is the regiune which is defined as a strong territorial subdivision upon which the central government organs rely in the realization of Party and state policy (see Table VII. 3 and Map). The regiune government is subordinate to the national government; Bucuresti is a city of national subordination which makes it equal to a regiune.

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Table VII. 3

Alphabetical List of Administrative Divisions of the Rumanian People's Republic and their Control Centers: 1960

Administrative Division	Control Center	Coordinates Latitude	Coordinates Longitude
Bacau R.1/	Bacau	46 - 34	26 - 54
Baia Mare R.	Baia Mare	47 - 40	23 - 35
Bucuresti City	Bucuresti	44 - 25	26 - 06
Bucuresti R.	Bucuresti	44 - 25	26 - 06
Cluj R.	Cluj	46 - 47	23 - 36
Constanta R.	Constanta	44 - 10	28 - 40
Craiova R.	Craiova	44 - 18	23 - 48
Galati R.	Galati	45 - 27	28 - 03
Hunedoare R.	Deva	45 - 53	22 - 55
Iasi R.	Iasi	47 - 10	27 - 37
Oradea R.	Oradea	47 - 05	21 - 55
Pitesti R.	Pitesti	44 - 51	24 - 51
Ploesti R.	Ploesti	44 - 57	26 - 02
Stalin R.	Orasul Stalin	45 - 38	25 - 34
Suceava R.	Suceava	47 - 38	26 - 15
Timisoara R.	Timisoara	45 - 47	21 - 13
Regiunea Autonoma Maghiora	Targul Mures	46 - 33	24 - 33

1/ R. is an abreviation for Regiune (region).

Regiunes are subdivided into raions and cities of regiune subordination: Bucuresti is subdivided into urban raions or wards. Raions are, in turn, subdivided into towns of raional subordination and comuna, which comprise one or more villages. As of the summer of 1959, there were 16 regiunes plus the city of Bucuresti, 199 raions (including 8 in the city of Bucuresti), 171 cities and towns of regiune and raional subordination, and 4,314 townships.

The machinery of regiune and local government consists of 3 series of hierarchically ranked agencies: People's Council, Executive Committee of People's Council, and Sections of Executive Committee of People's Councils (for the organization of a typical regiune government, see Figure VII. 4). Each series is found at each administrative level:

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FIGURE VII. 4

ORGANIZATION OF TYPICAL REGIUNE GOVERNMENT: JANUARY 1960



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regiune, city, raion, town and township. Patterned closely after the system found in the USSR, each People's Council consists of members nominally elected by the people and equates in importance with the Soviet or Council of Workers' Deputies in the USSR. Each council elects an administrative body (executive committee) from among its members which plays a role similar to that of the Soviet ispolkom or Soviet Executive Committee. Finally, the executive committees form special and functional sections to administer activities subordinated to it.

The councils, which are nominally subordinated to the Grand National Assembly through the next higher council, are theoretically the principal structural links between the central government and the intermediate and local administrative subdivisions. In actuality, the executive committee of any particular council, rather than the latter as a whole, forms the link because of its subordination to the next higher executive committee up to the Council of Ministers. A third chain of command runs from the central government ministries to the special and functional sections of each executive committee. Each agency, therefore, is dually subordinate: vertically to its counterpart at the next higher level, and horizontally to the organ which formed it. In case of conflict, the vertical subordination takes precedence.

a. People's Councils

The nominally supreme organs of state power below the national level are the People's Councils composed of deputies elected every 2 years on the basis of "universal, direct, and secret ballot." The current number of deputies in a people's council ranges from a maximum of 100 at the regiune level to 65 and 45, respectively, on the raion and township levels. For cities and towns, membership ranges from 250 to 35 members.

Organizationally, people's councils are made up of several permanent committees whose members are elected from among the deputies.

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They are set up on a functional basis, each having specific responsibilities such as commerce, planning, and education and culture. Permanent committees are authorized to supervise and exercise surveillance over the functional sections subordinate to executive committees. Actually, they perform similarly to the standing committees of the Grand National Assembly; that is, they are weak tools of the executive. People's Councils meet at varying intervals, more frequently at the lower than higher levels: semi-annually for regiune and raions, every 2 months for cities and towns, and monthly in townships.

People's councils are devoid of all real power, which is concentrated in their executive committees. Acting on the initiative of the Party, the body politic elects the deputies, the deputies elect and recall members of the executive committee, set up permanent committees, and approve budgets and plans prepared by the executive committee for enterprises and institutions under their jurisdiction.

b. Executive Committees of People's Councils

The most important body of a people's council is its executive committee. Executive committees are the administrative bodies of people's councils performing at the regiune and local levels functions corresponding to those of the Council of Ministers at the national level. They exercise virtual control over the regiune and local administrative apparatuses.

In theory subordinate to the people's council, the executive committee is actually subordinate only to the next higher executive committee and ultimately to the Council of Ministers. Its members, elected from among the deputies of the people's council, remain in office for 2 years unless the Party determines to recall them. The Council of Ministers determines the size of executive committees at each level: currently, each has a president, a number of vice-presidents, members, and a secretary.

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Although the president and vice-presidents exert considerable influence, the secretary is by stature the most powerful official associated with an executive committee for he is the channel through which the Party exercises direct control. Formerly elected by the people's council from among its members, he is now appointed by the executive committee itself on the basis of the Party's recommendation and no longer need be a deputy to the people's council. Not all the power in executive committees is concentrated in the secretaryship, however. Whereas the secretary supervises the implementation of directives from higher authorities, their actual implementation devolves on the president and vice-presidents. The president coordinates the activities of the executive committee, convenes and presides over its meetings, signs its decisions and administers its funds. The vice-presidents wield considerable operational authority and work in direct liason with the heads of the special and functional sections attached to the executive committee. Available evidence indicates that executive committees are convened about once every 10 days.

c. Special and Functional Sections of Executive Committees

In implementing the measures and ordinances relating to the conduct of regiune, city, raion, town and township affairs, the appropriate executive committee forms functional and special sections to assist it. The executive committee appoints, transfers, and releases the heads or chairmen of these agencies with the approval of the next higher executive committee and in certain cases, the Council of Ministers.

Functional sections are in effect equivalent on a small scale to ministries of the central government. Each is responsible to its respective executive committee for policy implementation in its field more or less in the same manner in which each central ministry is responsible to the Council of Ministers. Within the framework of executive committees decisions, the section chairmen participate in

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discussions of annual plans for their territories, investments, availability of materials, production, labor, finance, and related matters. In conjunction with the Party apparatus and the intermediate or local office of the pertinent central ministry, the head of a particular functional section suggests instructions to be issued by the executive committee and also supervises enforcement of these instructions. Since major industrial enterprises or construction projects are subordinated to central ministries, section responsibilities are limited to supporting the activities of local offices of central ministries in regard to those enterprises or sites. They direct locally subordinated activities and supervise, through sections formed at lower levels, plants and projects subordinate to executive committees formed at those levels.

In addition to the functional sections, executive committees have 5 special administrative sections. A "cadres" section recruits, screens and hires personnel for the functional sections and controls their activities; a section of instructors conducts the political and ideological indoctrination of the people's council staff. A legal section serves 2 functions: it apprises the executive committee of the legality of its measures and interprets the decisions and instructions issued by central government agencies. An administrative section concerns itself with such matters as efficiency reports, promotions and disciplinary problems. A "technical secretariat" functions as the executive committee's housekeeper.

The exact relationship between the executive committees and the regional and local police headquarters is unknown. The regular police are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and have no organizational relationship with less than central government agencies. It is believed, however, that they work closely with local governments on an informal basis. The security police, also subordinate to the MInistry of Internal Affairs, are believed to operate entirely independent of local governments.

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D. Economic Administration

Rumania is the second largest of the Soviet East European Satellites and is exceeded only by Poland in population. In its petroleum resources Rumania possesses what is, perhaps, the most valuable single industrial asset of the entire Balkans. The country is largely self-sufficient in fuel and has a better balance of natural resources, both mineral and agricultural, than have several other satellites. Despite these advantages the Rumanian economy has developed slowly and unevenly. The population remains predominantly agrarian; the standard of living continues to be one of the lowest in Eastern Europe; and the economy, which depends heavily on imports for industrial equipment and products, is plagued by a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. Rumania is short of trained manpower, especially technical and managerial personnel. As a result, her industries are badly managed and productivity remains low.

The administrative structure of the Rumanian economy is similar to that of the USSR. The Politburo and Council of Ministers determine policy and exercise broad planning functions; the actual plans are drafted by the State Planning Commission. When finally approved, the State Plan carries all the force of national legislation and controls all economic activity by establishing production goals for every branch of the economy, allocates materials, controls product distribution and utilization, and determines the amount and distribution of investments. Since the economy is mixed, the extent of control exercised by the state varies from branch to branch. In industry, where the so-called socialized sector (state and cooperative ownership) accounts for 99 per cent of the product, state controls are direct and all-encompassing. In agriculture, on the other hand, where the socialized sector accounts for only slightly more than 70 per cent of the product, controls exercised by the state are more indirect. In all spheres, however, the interests of the state

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receive the highest priority and are more likely to be met than are those of the private individual.

1. Central Economic Agencies

The State Planning Commission is the highest planning body in the government. As a preparatory organ engaged in continuous study of the conditions and prospects of the national economy, it coordinates plans submitted by ministries and agencies, works out the annual and long-range economic goals, and indicates to the Council of Ministers discrepancies in the production, distribution and consumption of goods by state enterprises. Within the framework of the Soviet-bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) the State Planning Commission maintains contact with Soviet and satellite planning agencies. Its internal structure includes directorates for light and heavy industry, natural resources, construction materials, agriculture, investments, transportation, and foreign trade. Its officials include a chairman, 2 vice-chairmen, several deputy chairmen, and ministerial counselors. In addition to its staff function at the national level, the State Planning Commission exercises command responsibilities over planning agencies attached to regiune and local organs of government.

The State Control Commission is the highest agency of fiscal and audit control and, as such, has broad responsibilities in both economic and non-economic fields. Its primary function is to oversee financial transactions and the utilization of state funds. It also works closely with the various components of the judicial system in detecting violations of state regulations and in prosecuting the guilty. Information on its internal structure is unavailable, but it probably parallels that of the Council of Ministers with functional departments for each ministry or branch of the economy.

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The only other agency which exercises overall control over the Rumanian economy is the Ministry of Finance. This agency is responsible for preparation of the fiscal equivalent of the state plan, the national budget. The budget provides funds to state enterprises, for capital investments and increases in working capital in accordance with the planned increases in the volume of production. Seasonal needs for additional working capital are satisfied by planned extensions of short-term credit. Long-term capital investments are financed not only from grants of funds through the state budget but also from the planned retained earnings of the operating enterprises. Together with its subordinate banks, and particularly the Rumanian State Bank, the Ministry of Finance also maintains control over the day-to-day utilization of allocated funds.

In March 1957 the Council of Ministers created an auxilliary body, the Economic Council, presumably to provide an overview of the economy as a whole. Existing information suggests that this agency is directly responsible to the chairman of the council and is charged with the supervision of adherence to the state budget and of submitting periodic reports on the national economy. Membership in the Economic Council consists of its chairman, a vice-president of the Council of Ministers, the chairmen of the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, State Committees for Prices and for Labor and Wages, the Central Statistical Directorate, and the Ministers of Finance, Commerce and Affairs of Local Organs of State Administration. The present status of the latter agency and the Economic Council itself is unknown.

2. Industrial Administration

Four ministries direct the operations of the Rumanian industrial establishment which accounts for slightly over 50 per cent of the republic's gross national product (excluding services). They are the Ministries of Construction and Building Materials, Consumer Goods Industry (light and

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R004600090003-5

food industries), Heavy Industry (metallurgical, machine building, and electro-technical industries and electric power), and Petroleum and Chemical Industry. Within the limits of the economic plans established by the agencies described above, the ministries plan production and verify fulfillment by branches, and manage in general lines all activities of subordinate enterprises and institutions.

A minister is in charge of each industrial ministry: he gives orders and instructions according to existing legislation and the decisions of the Council of Ministers, and also controls their execution. In his work, the minister is assisted by a number of deputy ministers, heads of general industrial directorates and functional directorates and members of the Technical Council. The minister, deputy ministers and heads of the chief directorates form the ministerial collegium, an advisory organ, which hears reports by officials of the ministry and subordinate enterprises and institutions and recommends to the minister specific remedial actions. The Technical Council is also an advisory organ responsible to the minister for scientific and technical developments in the branches of the economy assigned to the ministry. Functional directorates are staff organs in charge of planning, investments, supplies and personnel of subordinated enterprises and institutions. Their responsibilities are limited and they are not empowered to give orders to field agencies of the ministry except through the intermediary of the general industrial directorates.

The general industrial directorates are the basic organs of the ministry in charge of groups of subordinated enterprises and institutions. They are operational organs involved in direct management functions, including organization of production, plan fulfillment, investment, finance, technology, and supply and distribution. Directives from the minister are given to enterprises and institutions only through the general industrial directorates. The structure of industrial directorates

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varies according to the branch of the economy they direct. In general, they directly control the operations of the most important plants in their respective fields, and control the operations of less significant plants through field trusts and associations or comparable sections of regiune executive committees. (For a schematic diagram of industrial subordination, see Figure VII. 5.) Enterprises of purely regiune significance are controlled by the appropriate section of the regiune executive committee; a similar situation exists for raion or city industries. Where horizontal relationships exist, such as those between ministerial trusts and sections of regiune executive committees, the former has operational control and the latter, service functions.

Since 1953 the number of industrial ministries has been reduced from 10 to 4 paralleling the merger of ministries in the Soviet Union. Also paralleling developments in the Soviet Union, since 1957 there has been some deconcentration of industrial management as regiunes have gained operational control over more of the enterprises located within their territories. This trend may be expected to continue, perhaps through the transfer of ministerial trusts to sections of the regiune executive committees.

3. Agricultural Administration

Before World War II, Rumania was one of the principal granaries of Europe. After the War Rumania lost substantial agricultural lands to the Soviet Union (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina) and to Bulgaria (southern Dobruja). Other agricultural troubles have included droughts, the continuation of most of the traditionally backward farming practices, and poor management. The latter element is, perhaps, the most important for it includes inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate mechanization, and insufficient investment, and collectivization--all imposed on the rural economy by the Communist regime. As a result, agricultural production is estimated to amount to only 75 per cent of the pre-war level.

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FIGURE VII. 5

ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION IN RUMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: 1960



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The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the approximately 30 per cent of the Rumanian gross national produce (excluding services) which the rural economy produces. In the rural economy the socialized sector (state and cooperative ownership) is reported to encompass 70 per cent of rural families and agricultural land. State holdings are divided among state farms, machine tractor stations, subsidiary farms of large industrial establishments, and other state organizations. Cooperative holdings include collective farms and agricultural cooperatives and associations. The type and extent of control exercised by the Ministry or Agriculture differs according to the type of ownership. In the state sphere, it is direct; in the 30 per cent of the rural economy still in private hands, it is more indirect.

State farms, the epitome of socialized agriculture, and machine tractor stations are copies of the Soviet models. They are controlled by the Ministry by means of the regiune and local executive committee sections for agriculture. The subsidiary farms of industrial enterprises are operated by the ministry which exercises jurisdiction over the industrial enterprises according to regulations issued by the Ministry of Agriculture. The collective farms resemble the Soviet kolkhozy in that land and certain types of equipment are owned in common, and payment is made according to work performed. They, together with the agricultural cooperatives (where a peasant receives rent on his contribution to the joint land fund as well as for his work) and agricultural associations, the "lowest" but most numerous form of cooperative ownership (where payments are based on agreements among members), are under the indirect control of the raion sections for agriculture. This control takes the form of differantial purchases prices and taxation policies. The Party takes a very active role in the management of the rural economy and often usurps strictly government functions.

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E. Control Force

On 1 January 1960 it is estimated that the Rumanian control force numbered approximately 875,000 persons or about 8 per cent of the total labor force (see Table VII. 4). Persons engaged in economic administration comprise the largest single group of which industrial administrators are the most numerous. The full-time employees of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party constitute the smallest major group, but the most important in terms of power and responsibility.

Members of the Rumanian control force are persons with administrative responsibilities or specialists in staff positions without command responsibilities who could, because of their specialized knowledge, assume such functions in crisis situations. As indicated above, they exercise varying degrees of command responsibilities. Probably not more than 5,000 in their number, all of whom are in the central apparatus of the Party or state administration or hold general or flag rank, are in the primary segment of the control force; that is, have nationwide responsibilities and may be expected to be familiar with significant portions of the Rumanian war plan. The majority of the primary control force live or work in Bucuresti; smaller concentrations are probably located at the regiune capitals and at headquarters of major military commands. Members of the intermediate control force have either geographic or functional limitations to their command responsibilities. Major concentrations of this level may be found at the regiune capitals, Bucuresti and field commands of the armed forces and security troops. The lower control force, which numbers approximately 650,000 or about 75 per cent of the total control force, exercise direct, face-to-face control over the activities of small groups of the population, such as bench workers, privates, and collective farmers.

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Table VII. 4

Rumanian Control Force

Category	Number	Per Cent of Total
Workers' Party	40,000	4.6
State Administration	100,000	11.4
Armed Forces and Security Troops	135,000	15.4
Economic Administration	325,000	37.1
Industry	(165,000)	(18.9)
Construction	(20,000)	(2.3)
Transport and Communications	(30,000)	(3.4)
Trade, Supply, Procurement, etc.	(30,000)	(3.4)
Agriculture	(80,000)	(9.1)
Services Administration	275,000	31.5
Education	(100,000)	(11.4)
Health	(60,000)	(6.9)
Housing and Public Utilities	(10,000)	(1.2)
Credit and Insurance	(10,000)	(1.2)
Others	(95,000)	(10.8)
Total	875,000	100.0

In any given situation members of the Party component of the control force may be expected to exercise command. Following in importance are the members of the state administration, armed forces, economic and services administrations. The overwhelming majority of control force personnel live or work in urban areas.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES



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